BACKGROUND PAPER

Drafted as Preparation for the ECHA DDR Working Group Paper:
"Harnessing Institutional Capacities in Support of DDR of Former Combatants"

This Background Paper served as a basis for the ECHA DDR Working Group's development and refinement of its findings, conclusions, and recommendations to ECHA as presented in its report "Harnessing Institutional Capacities in Support of the Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration of Former Combatants", submitted to ECHA on 6 June 2000. The Background Paper was drafted by the ECHA Working Group's consultant, the Praxis Group Ltd., based on information acquired through a series of consultations with UN staff, donors, foreign ministries, NGOs, and academics; through information provided by Country Offices; and an extensive literature review on the subject of DDR. The Annexes attached to this paper reflect the methodology and substance of this process.

It should be noted that the ECHA Working Group's final findings, recommendations, and conclusions are those submitted to ECHA on 6 June 2000 in its report "Harnessing Institutional Capacities in Support of the Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration of Former Combatants".

INTRODUCTION

The successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants after violent conflict represent the touchstone, the moment of truth, for any peace-building process. When combatants are asked to give up their arms, they face a "point of no return": they, and their leaders, must have faith in a future where the advantages of peace outweigh those of war. Without a vision of that future, they will not make the choice for peace--and if they remain a threat, no one will be able to make that choice. A country or a region without peace and security is doomed to a marginal existence. Neither its inhabitants nor its neighbours will risk an investment in its development, and thus the vicious circle of instability and poverty will tighten its grip. Moreover, DDR is no substitute for a comprehensive peace process: in no case has DDR succeeded when the peace process was flawed.

If the international community wants to "restore hope" in a country or region emerging from violent conflict by supporting and nurturing a peaceful resolution, it will have to pay special attention to the long term prospects of the military and the warlords who are about to lose their livelihoods. Supporting a demobilization process is not a just technical military issue: it is a complex operation that has political, security, humanitarian and development dimensions as well. If one aspect of this pentagram is neglected, the entire fragile peace process may unravel. While the violence may have been abated, the underlying sources of conflict may take years, if not generations, to overcome. If support to the demobilization process is not matched, moreover, by the efforts required to facilitate

the entire peace process, failure is again likely. Thus, the response of the international community can not be half-hearted or piece-meal.

Typically, cease-fire and DD&R will take place when a country's crisis has reached such magnitude that even war has become unsustainable. At this stage of the emergency, humanitarian needs and assistance programs are at their utmost scale, reach and complexity. Combatants, ex-combatants and dependants, child soldiers, etc. are key actors in the peace process. Nonetheless, for humanitarian agencies and national/local authorities their needs represent only a minor share in the context of global needs. For example, in Mozambique there were approximately 150,000 demobilised soldiers and dependants, compared to 3 million members of the general population who were affected (IDPs, returnees, etc.)

An objective difficulty exists when attempting to plan and establish priorities with government authorities, including the Ministry of Health, donors, NGOs. There can be a perceived sense that there is an excessive focus on the needs of a few, while daunting global needs for relief and reconstruction loom on a national scale. Civilian population is likely to have suffered more during the conflict and former soldiers are easily perceived as those responsible of violence. Structures and systems which produce the impression of privilege must be avoided.

The group therefore considered that the question raised by ECHA as to the division of labour in the DDR process in fact encompassed a range of questions. What "labour" is involved? Who are the actors? Do they divide the tasks at hand, as if on an assembly line, or do they integrate their respective capacities towards a joint purpose? If the latter, who leads and who follows? What principles should guide this process? Do the external actors share resources? What role should their mandates and competencies play? How does their work fit into the broader framework of relief and development assistance provided by the international community? What is the role of the United Nations system, and where do other international and regional organisations, bilateral donors, non-governmental organisations and civil society come in? How, above all, can we ensure that "ownership" of the process is not taken away from the parties to the conflict?

I.   THE TASKS AT HAND: THE HOLISTIC NATURE OF THE DDR PROCESS

When it comes to supporting countries in their efforts to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate former combatants, particularly after violent conflict, the international community has been on a steep learning curve. Numerous reports and studies have analysed every DDR effort from the early days in Zimbabwe and Namibia to recent events in Liberia and Sierra Leone.[1] By now there is an impressive body of policy recommendations and lessons learned (see, *inter alia*, annex II), and many of the people interviewed expressed their concern that these cumulative insights had not led to a more informed and harmonised international response capacity.

---

[1] Of particular interest are: Mats Berdal, Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper 303, Oxford University Press, New York, 1966; Nat J. Colletta, Markus Kostner and Ingo Wiederhofer, The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa, The World Bank, Washington D.C, 1996; Bernd Hoffmann and Colin Gleichmann, Programmes for the Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Changing Perspectives in Development and Security, Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Eschborn, 2000

From the literature, from the interviews and from the respondents to the questionnaires one message came through very strongly: the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants constitute a holistic process, and every element needs to be integrated closely into the whole. In fact, there are at least five interconnected processes:

- political, consisting of ongoing negotiations and power shifts, well beyond the conclusion of a peace accord, leading to the integration of the former combatants into a new power structure (and possibly into a new military framework, such as a consolidated army);

- military/technical, leading from cease-fire and cantonment to disarmament and discharge, while peacekeeping mechanisms are employed to prevent conflicts from recurring;

- security, linking reductions in the threat posed by combatants with guns to broader disarmament and weapons collection efforts intended to create a climate less prone to violence, as well as to general conflict prevention and reductions in the arms trade;

- humanitarian, linking the well-being of the former combatants to that of vulnerable groups within and on the fringe of their ranks (e.g., child soldiers, female combatants, disabled soldiers and chronically ill soldiers), as well as to the well-being of other vulnerable groups in the population at large (while maintaining a balance among the various interests), and leading to their (re)insertion into society as healthy and stable citizens;

- socio-economic, linking the prospects of the various skill-based subgroups within the demobilising population to the potential opportunity structure (employment, land, credit, training), and leading to their (re)integration into the economic activities of their communities.

As a matter of principle, the main responsibility for the planning and execution of a DDR process should rest with the parties, and should involve the communities, not only official institutions. In some instances, such as the peace process in northern Somalia, large groups of soldiers have been demobilised with little or no support from the international community; more often than not, however, international support is sought. At that stage, it is essential that the planning and preparations for each of these five processes begin simultaneously and in a concerted fashion; if one strain is neglected, the others will by necessity suffer.

It should also be born in mind that DDR can be a sterile exercise if the overall needs of the country are not addressed. DDR is only a part of the overall peace-building process, and it needs to be planned in strict coordination with other activities (institutional reinforcement, administrative reorganisation, rehabilitation of social services such as health and education). It therefor makes sense to establish strong linkages from the very onset of the DDR process with other ongoing or planned initiatives by various actors, with the aim of identifying and bridging gaps.

The Secretary-General has outlined the role of United Nations peacekeeping in the DDR in his recent report to the Security Council on this topic (S/2000/101), and has made a number of recommendations on how this might be strengthened. The Task Force has agreed on a broad outline

of the tasks at hand which is shown in the fact finding matrix at Annex IV[2]. These tasks can be grouped in seven major areas:

- Building political and popular support for peace and reconciliation
- Disarmament
- Negotiating the DDR aspects of conflict settlement
- Military oversight of demobilization process
- Civilian support to demobilization process
- Reinsertion, into new consolidated army
- Reinsertion: short term, into civilian life
- Reintegration: long-term

Each of these sets of tasks has to be developed with an eye to their impact in the five key areas described earlier; each of these activities has potential implications for the others on the list. Military oversight, for example, has political ramifications; it needs to have humanitarian dimensions, connections to broader security concerns, and so on.

Many of the respondents also stressed that this checklist, while possibly sequential in its execution, should not be sequential for planning purposes. Some activities have a long lead time: procurement, for example, to establish cantonment areas may take months, and often it can not start until budgets have been approved and funds have been obligated. Other activities, such as food aid, may play a vital role during the entire process, beginning with the cantonment of troops, and ending only with the successful reinsertion and reintegration of demobilised militaries and their dependants. Ensuring that each of the "tasks sets" described above is carefully managed - taking into account the five-fold range of potential implications - may be the most daunting challenge to the international community. The planning, for example, for long-term reintegration is crucial at the early stages of the peace process in order to build confidence among the combatants that there are concrete opportunities beyond the confines of their barracks; the political, humanitarian, security-related and socio-economic implications are self-evident.

From the nature and the complexity of the work to be done, then, certain specifications emerge for the competencies required from the actors who contribute to this process. These competencies should match the challenges posed by the key areas of possible intervention: political, military/technical, security, humanitarian and socio-economic expertise are all called for in equal measure in order to provide meaningful support. Above all, there is a clear need for the capacity to provide guidance and leadership to the entire international DDR support process, so that the individual capacities and competencies of the participating actors are best integrated into a concerted effort where the whole becomes more that the sum of its parts.

---

[2] By far the best overview of the specific activities that ought to be included in a comprehensive DDR process (in a peacekeeping context) can be found in the study that Ambassador Peggy Mason and General Emmanuel Erskine have just prepared in collaboration with DPKO's Lessons Learned Unit (to be published shortly),

II. THE CONUMDRUM OF DDR COORDINATION AND SUPPORT: THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM THROUGH THE EYES OF ITS PARTNERS

The consultants conducted numerous interviews with actors and observers outside of the United Nations system, in order to obtain a better and more diverse perspective on the system's strengths and weaknesses in de area of DDR. The Task Force, in reviewing the often quite outspoken comments made by its global partners, realised that some of the criticism might be unnecessarily harsh, and that some of the praise might be undeserved. Yet, it believes that these observations deserve a hearing; the issue of coordination and collaboration can not be properly addressed unless some of the concerns expressed are taken into account. A summary of these interviews can be found at annex VIII. Some of the key observations made have a direct bearing on questions of actor competencies and the integration of institutional capacities:

Donor country representatives

- Not all UN organisations and agencies have the capacity to live up to their mandates.
- Clear benchmarks should be set in DDR to avoid spillage of resources and to ensure compliance with goals established.
- UN system organisations and agencies have a continuing and necessary role, given their neutrality and impartiality.
- There is need for a flexible approach to the coordination and division of labour in DDR, and this issue should be resolved based on the respective comparative advantage of each agency.
- Recipient countries should be full partners in the design, planning and execution of DDR programmes - capacity building should be part of the DDR mandate.
- The "calibre" of the UN system staff, including SRSGs, is crucial to the success of their operations.
- Obstacles to co-financing between UN system entities and other major players (such as ECHO) need to be examined and removed.
- UN system organisations need to integrate or harmonise their agendas, time frames, and procedures.
- The Resident Co-ordinator system has yet to gain recognition and appreciation among some donors.
- Once a SRSG has been appointed, he or she should take charge of the entire DDR process.
- Intergovernmental organisations such as the IOM and the ICRC should be directly involved in the UN system's preparations for DDR support activities.

Regional Organizations, NGOs and Academics

In the coordination of DDR support programs, both the developmental and humanitarian concerns should have a voice.

- The NGO community is under-utilised as partners to the UN system in the design and delivery of DDR support.

- The operational relationships between regional/sub-regional organisations and UN system need to be clarified if cooperation on DDR support is to function effectively.
- While NGOs should be involved, the UN system has to choose partners who are truly independent and impartial.
- Similarly, the impartiality of regional partners is not always a given.

III. UNITY IN DIVERSITY: VIEWS FROM WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

In discussions with members of the Working Level Group, the Task Force, representatives of the United Nations Secretariat, its funds and programmes, and with staff of the specialised agencies and the World Bank, certain themes figured prominently:

- the need to ensure that certain values and concerns - including the rights of children - are fully integrated into the design and execution of DDR activities;
- the need to take a holistic approach to DDR support, linking it closely to other elements of the peace process;
- the need, in this respect, to approach the DDR process as an opportunity to build national capacity;
- the need to simplify and clarify the complex funding mechanisms affecting the DDR process;
- the need to build on the specific competencies and capacities of the common system partners;
- the need to draw on the expertise and knowledge of a broad range of partners outside the UN system, including regional and sub-regional organisations, other intergovernmental bodies, non-governmental organisations, civil society institutions, academics, and the private sector;
- the need to ensure that the experience gained is transformed into lessons learned, through effective contemporary documentation, analysis, and above all, cross-organisational learning.

Values and concerns

Some organisations, which are not at the operational forefront of the DDR process nevertheless, have strong values and concerns that should be reflected in DDR planning and design. First of all, there are principles enshrined in international humanitarian law, such as neutrality, impartiality, and the right of non-combatants to protection. Human rights and the concept of "dignity" are also of great importance to all organisations; in this respect, UNHCR emphasised that ex-combatants should be able to return to their communities without being subjected to discrimination – the "sustainability of return" is not just an issue for refugees and IDPs.

The plight of children in armed conflict is an issue of particular concern to both the Office of the Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict and to UNICEF. In some conflicts, child soldiers constitute up to one third of the combatants. They both make the point that the demobilization and reintegration of children need not wait until a formal DDR process is in place – for children, it is always the right moment to demobilise. Moreover, the demobilization of children should be separated from that of adults. At the time a peace accord is being considered, specific provisions should be made for child soldiers; agency field reports should refer to their status; planning for reintegration should clarify what options are available for children. The inclusion of a Child Protection Officer in the Sierra Leone Peacekeeping operation is an important precedent.

DDA attached special importance to planning well in advance the disarmament of both ex-combatants and the civilian population who may be in possession of weapons in a post-conflict situation. In order to be successful, weapons recovery programs as well as programs to develop civilian support for disarmament should involve local and national authorities, civil society and the international community. These plans should include specific guidelines for safeguarding and disposal of weapons, including their destruction. UN experience has proven that civil society can play an integral role in the development of a culture of peace, thereby reducing the likelihood of large amounts of weapons circulating within society.

Holistic Approach

Bringing all the potential actors together at the earliest possible stage, to ensure that all aspects of the multi-sectoral DDR process are duly considered, was essential in the eyes of those interviewed. DPA, for example, has no explicit mandate for DDR, but it is implicit, as it chairs the ECPS and together with DPKO where a peacekeeping operation is envisaged, normally advises the parties during the peace negotiations. In Sierra Leone, the SRSG, supported by DPA, had a range of experts with him at the negotiations to explain the DDR process, so that the parties could make an informed commitment. Additionally, the SRSG invited the Bank to Lome to present to both delegations (i) lessons learned from demobilization and reintegration programs elsewhere and (ii) the DDR Programme in Sierra Leone. This could be a model.

The holistic approach preferred by the Task Force's interlocutors places special demands on the start-up phase of a DDR support operation, as the establishment of a multi-sectoral task force of the Country Team, the identification of implementation partners and the mobilisation of resources would all have to be undertaken simultaneously in very a very short timeframe.

Similarly, more thought might have to be given to the early response capacity in support of DDR, and of peace initiatives in general, within the United Nations Secretariat. The General Assembly's recent decision to allocate a separate fund to DPA for political field missions should have a positive impact; at the same time, it is important that peace initiatives with ramifications for peace and security as well as for humanitarian assistance and development should not fall between the mandate gaps separating the distinct executive committees (ECHA and ECPS) in the Secretariat. The establishment of the Coordinating Action on small Arms (CASA) adds another valuable coordination tool. Yet, gaps remain. The composition of the IASC is very much oriented towards humanitarian concerns, and does not by itself provide a forum where some of the key political and development actors who are crucial to successful DDR can participate.

Capacity building

Several of the United Nations system staff who were interviewed focused on the temptation to plan DDR operations as external interventions, rather than programs in support of national institutions. This made it even more important to quickly develop a robust analytical and planning capacity at the country level. Only by working closely with the factions and institutions on the ground – not just

during formal negotiations, but before, after and instead – can support be structured and tailored to meet the real needs and match the real capacities of the main protagonists of the peace process.[3]

Civil society institutions, such a religious organisations, should not be neglected in this process, and often the NGOs and the diplomatic community working in a country have better contacts and insights in this respect than the United Nations system organisations represented there. Establishing effective partnerships beyond the United Nations circle is therefore best done very early on as a peace initiative takes hold.

Funding mechanisms

Financial support for DDR activities comes from a wide range of sources. In a peacekeeping environment with a mandate from the Security Council, there will normally be funds from assessed contributions under the Peacekeeping Account. Humanitarian activities carried out by members and standing invitees of the IASC will partly covered by funds raised in special appeals (but some IASC invitees, such as the ICRC and some NGOs stay away from the CAP process). There may be trust funds for specific aspects of the DDR process. There may be parallel funding by bilateral donors, who will take some components of the DDR process under their wings. There may be bilateral funds disbursed through sub-contracting NGOs, which may have a large impact in areas such as reintegration. There may be national or regional resources, often in kind, that are essential to the overall operation.[4]

According to the representatives of the organisations interviewed, it is well beyond the current capacity of the international community to program all these different inputs in a coherent manner. Even to keep track of them is a major task. The gaps between pledges and disbursements, the inefficiencies of bureaucratic procedures, the lack of transparency, and the long lead time of some budgetary processes are infuriating for the practitioners at the country level, and make effective integration of the actors' respective strengths even more of a challenge. Any discussion about an effective distribution of labour, according to the practitioners consulted for this study, needs also to focus on an effective and timely distribution of resources.

Concerns were expressed about the lack of readily available start-up funds to initiate activities in support of DDR; while DPA and DPKO now each had a reserve from which early allotments could be drawn, these could not be used for economic and social activities, and the CAP process for humanitarian as well as transition funding had its own timeline with concomitant delays.

Some respondents also commented that some crises were more popular than others, and that especially the DDR process was difficult to "sell", given the sometimes unsavoury image of its primary beneficiaries. This made resource mobilisation more difficult.

Support for the DDR process has to be patched together from a plethora of separate funding sources, and this makes coordination, let alone collaboration, particularly complex. Different donors have different procurement and reporting standards, and most agencies have to maintain their separate

---

[3] See also Mary Anderson, *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – Or War,* Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1999

[4] See also: Shepard Forman, Stewart Patrick and Dirk Salomons, *Recovering From Conflict: Strategy For An International Response,* Center on International Cooperation, New York University, New York, 2000

identity, making the pooling of resources nearly impossible. Many of the operational staff interviewed felt that these operational problems need to be addressed on a system-wide basis.

United Nations system competencies

The mandates with regard to DDR of the organisations participating in the United Nations system are, on the whole, reasonably clear (see, *inter alia*, annex I). Less is known about their actual competencies and experience in this area. Some organisations without a specific DDR mandate, such as UNHCR, still are very much involved and have much to contribute; others, such as UNDP and OCHA, have a mandate that is still fluid and either open to interpretation (OCHA's "coordinating" role after shedding its "operational" responsibilities), or subject to an overall change in direction (UNDP's role in post-conflict recovery, now under discussion in its Executive Board).

In the interviews conducted by our consultants, therefore, much emphasis was placed on identifying the organisations' actual strengths and experience in supporting the DDR process in countries emerging from conflict. A number of organisations have established units with specific responsibility for post-conflict recovery issues, others have "mainstreamed" these topics into their regular programs. Some have extensive in-country experience, others are just beginning to explore their capacities. The material provided to our consultants has been deposited with the UNDP DDR Resource Centre, but for the purpose of this paper, a brief overview has been tabulated to reflect some key features of the main actors (see Table I). Obviously, being a first attempt in this direction, further revisions and modifications will be necessary.

Partner capacities

While the organisations of the United Nations system, including the World Bank, have much to contribute to countries emerging from conflict and seeking support in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, they do not by themselves have a sufficient capacity or resources. In all of the DDR operations that were successful thus far, other intergovernmental, regional and non-governmental actors have played a major role, and occasionally even taken the lead.

Particularly the IOM and the German GTZ have considerable experience in the actual demobilization phase of the DDR process. The ICRC and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies can provide effective links between DDR programmes and broader measures to alleviate the suffering of vulnerable groups. The effective reintegration of ex-combatants can be best supported in close collaboration with major NGOs such as Save the Children or Oxfam. CARE can support the food supply to both ex-combatants and their families. Such options need to be examined further, and an overview should be at the disposal of the RC/HC network (possibly a task for the UNDP Resource Centre). The participation in the IASC of Interaction and the International Council on Voluntary Agencies should provide an opportunity for more systematic "standby" arrangements whereby the capacities of their various members are mapped out and "pre-packaged" as potential components of a DDR programme. The profiles of the ICRC, IOM and the GTZ have been added to the UN system profiles at Table I.

Another aspect of potential partnerships is the role of the private sector. Reintegration and private sector development are closely linked, and the experience gained in Mozambique for example shows how private investors are very agile when they sense that incipient peace can be transformed into

economic activity. Unfortunately, countries emerging from conflict often do not meet the conditions that will enable the World Bank and the IMF to provide assistance, and to pave the way for investors. However, the Bank uses other tools at its disposal (technical assistance, post-conflict fund, etc) that allows it to be active even immediately after war ends, avoiding thus a gap in Bank's involvement (e.g. Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, etc). UNDP has also focused on the immediate post-conflict reconstruction phase, which may last some two to three years, and which requires special support from the donor community. As the question of incentives and disincentives normally is high up on the agenda of any peace process, and often is at the heart of DDR negotiations, early consultations on private sector involvement (often through the diplomatic community in-country) may well be profitable.

Learning and Training

Given the fact that so much in the area of DDR is relatively new, that there have been so many different approaches, so many successes and so many failures, it is regrettable that so little effort has been made so far to learn from the experiences gained. The academic literature on the DDR issue is mainly read by academics; agency evaluations, if they do exist, remain within the agency; returning staff are rarely debriefed and no systematic oral history is being recorded; lessons observed are not necessarily disseminated, and rarely learned.

Yet, some recent improvements in the evaluation and learning process must be noted. The World Bank has been a remarkable exception to the rule: its case studies on demobilization and reintegration in Africa go back to the late 1980s, and its Post-Conflict Unit has consistently published assessments of its DDR activities, culminating in a succinct summary of lessons learned contained in its study of the "Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa" (see bibliography at annex II). Reference should be made to the findings set out in the Secretary General's recent report to the Security Council on "The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration" (S/2000/101, 11 February 2000).

The Lessons Learned Unit in DPKO also deserves a special mention, as it has recently developed and delivered a series of training courses on DDR for delivery, and as it is about to publish a comprehensive study (earlier mentioned in this report, and circulated among the UN system partners in draft) on "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment".

The time has now come, in the eyes from many respondents, to begin an intensive learning and exchange programme, involving actors from inside and outside the United Nations system, to ensure the development of a common DR culture across organisational and occupational divides. Once a critical mass of practitioners from various organisations has participated in such a programme, it will be much easier to overcome the inherent institutional barriers that so often block effective collaboration. The experience gained with the UN Staff College program for field coordination could serve as an example, and in fact, the Staff College and DPKO already intend to present a pilot course in the Fall of 2000. Events of this type should be planned for frequent and wide-spread delivery. Support for such an initiative might have to be sought from the donor community or the private sector.

IV. COORDINATION AND LEADERSHIP

Form follows function

Several interlocutors stressed that there should be very few hard and fast rules in this area, given the large variety in circumstances under which a DDR process might be conducted. In some situations, there was a clear victor and a clear loser - in others, a stalemate; here, there were two factions, there six or more; one conflict was contained within state borders, another could cross several international borders simultaneously; in one conflict, donor interest was vivid and generous - another was mostly neglected by the donor community; in one situation, there would be a functioning government, able to call for World Bank support - in another, there would be a failed state, unable to function even at the most basic level. It was not always certain that there would be a robust peacekeeping operation, authorised by the Security Council – possibly there would just be a few military observers on the ground.

Sometimes, individual donor countries or even NGOs would have taken on a major role in the peace-building process well before the United Nations or the international community as a whole became involved (as was the case with Italy and the Community of San Egidio in Mozambique); in other situations, the international community would just stay away, as was the case in northern Somalia. Therefore, there should be considerable flexibility in the UN system's approach to DDR support, depending on the context, the level of international commitment, and the capacities of the players already on the ground.

Core principles

Two basic principles, however, have broad validity:

1. In situations where the peace process is governed by a Security Council mandate, and where a Special Representative of the Secretary-General heads the United Nations' mission, the SRSG's leading role in the oversight and coordination of the UN system's support to the national DDR process is paramount.

2. Where there is no SRSG (or no SRSG yet, or no longer a SRSG), the Resident Co-ordinator, usually also serving as Humanitarian Co-ordinator (RC/HC), should act as the focal point for the overall coordination responsibility within UN system for DDR, including children and vulnerable groups.

The RC/HC, in this construct, would then be responsible for establishing a DDR task force of the Country Team, consisting of representatives of common system organisations already in country, as required, but reinforced with dedicated staff, full time or part time, possibly on a secondment basis from essential partners. Other non-operational actors like OSRSG/CAC or Human Rights Office should be involved in an advisory capacity in the Task Force's work from the HQs. This adjustment must go beyond the traditional mechanism and should seek to include a variety of non-UN actors such as NGOs, donors, national authorities, international organisations, civil society and other stakeholders. This would respond to one complaint often heard about the RC/CH mechanism: "a

head without a body", "good people already overburdened by day-to-day responsibilities". It would also follow the guidelines discussed in ECHA at its March 1998 meeting.[5]

An overview of the potential partners for such a consultative process under SRSG/RC/HC or any other lead agency is given in Table II [of the "Harnessing Institutional Capacities in the DDR of Former Combatants" paper submitted to ECHA on 6 June 2000] which maps out the key tasks in support of DDR as well as the areas where key players can make a contribution. It is clear from this table that for many tasks there are several potential "providers", so that it is up to the SRSG/RC/HC to choose partners in the context of the situation on the ground (political interest, funding, presence on the ground, and similar considerations). In case there is another lead agency instead of SRSG/RC/HC, the lead agency will be responsible for the choice of partners, after due consultation with the SRSG/RC/HC, the national authorities and the country team. It would be important that all such activities be part of a comprehensive programme .

As the Resident Co-ordinator system is gradually being strengthened[6], this reliance on the RC/RH mechanism will become more realistic. The approach also mirrors the coordination mechanism already adopted for another constituency of cross-cutting concern, i.e., internally displaced people[7]. Some concerns were expressed about the concept of a lead agency, given the multi-sectoral nature of the DDR issue. If a lead agency is to be appointed[8], it should not replace the RC/HC's overall guiding role, but rather act as *primus inter pares* among the actors on the DDR Country Team reporting to the RC/HC, and through the RC/HC, either to the Department(s) in charge of the operation at UN/HQ, or to the SRSG in country.

In addition to the scenarios described above, a totally different model may emerge, whereby the national authorities, with due consideration for the views of the bilateral donors and the United Nations system, approach the World Bank to lead international cooperation efforts. This was the case in countries such as Uganda, Cambodia, Djibouti, Chad, Guinea Bissau, and most recently Sierra Leone. In the latter, the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (a multi-stakeholder body representing all sides of the struggle) is in charge. Where the World Bank is lead agency, it reports to senior Bank management and its Board of Directors.

This does not exclude close cooperation with the SRSG and the RC/HC, but there is no formal reporting line. It is quite possible that the United Nations will have its own programmes in place, funded from its own resources, and possibly of a humanitarian or development nature. In this case, close consultations will be required, both at the level of the Country Team's DDR Task Force (of which the World Bank would be a member), and through the IASC. In addition, the other organisations of the United Nations system could be a source of expertise for the Bank, and possibly serve as delivery partner for programmes funded from Lead Agency resources.

---

[5] ECHA minutes, 4 March 1998

[6] *Strengthening the Work of the Resident Coordinator*, Office of Evaluation and Strategic Planning, UNDP, New York, 1999

[7] *Protection of Internally Displaced Persons*, IASC Policy Paper, New York, December 199

[8] See "factors influencing the designation of a lead agency", chapter I, paragraph 5, in Proposed IASC Recommendations Related to the Review of the Capacity of the United Nations System for Humanitarian Assistance (draft), New York, 1999

Demobilization

As to the question raised by ECHA[9] who should be in charge of the actual demobilization component of the DDR process, respondents observed that this would normally best be determined in the context of the overall planning process conducted by the Country Team's DDR Task Force. One mechanism used successfully (in Mozambique) was a small Technical Unit, sponsored by the Swiss Development Cooperation, working under the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination office of ONUMOZ. OCHA, then DHA, in the past has provided oversight to a number of technical demobilization and reintegration units, notably in Liberia and Angola. Both the IOM and the German GTZ have a proven track record in this area, and the World Bank also has a demonstrated ability to oversee the demobilization component of the DDR process.

It would therefore, from the perspective of most officials interviewed, be most effective for the Country Team's DDR Task Force, with HQ backstopping, to identify suitable partners in the light of the country context, taking also into account which potential partners have expressed an interest (the World Bank's cooperation with the UK's DFID in Sierra Leone, for example, illustrates this type of flexible arrangement).

In the view of several interlocutors, including the CAC, the personalities of the agency representatives on the ground are an important factor. The exemplary collaboration, for example, of the EU, the UN and UNDP in Guatemala demonstrates how much personal commitment can achieve. This reinforces the argument made by some observers among the NGO's and in the diplomatic community, that coordination mechanisms can only do so much: if the calibre and competence of the people on the ground is inadequate, no mechanism will save the day – but good people can make even inadequate systems work. Issues of recruitment and assignment therefor also have a direct bearing on the success of DDR activities.

An important element of leadership is speed. UNHCR, for example, stressed that rapid action to create a secure environment is essential for its work. Effective mechanisms, from this perspective, must not only be inclusive, they must also have the necessary resources and authority. The United Nation system, with its emphasis on "command and control" structures and extensive checks and balances, as well as its diffused funding tools, can often be counterproductive in this respect.

V.   CONCLUSION

In pursuing its inquiry as to the optimal distribution of labour in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, the members of the Working Level group soon discovered that this question, in turn, raised broader questions of a strategic nature. Defining the "labour" led to a thorough examination of the many elements that need to come together in order to support DDR effectively. Discussing the "distribution" required first of all the identification of key actors, within and outside of the United Nations system, as well as an assessment of their mandates, comparative advantages and competencies.

Questions of competencies and effectiveness necessarily lead the Working Level group to explore what conditions had to be met, and what environment had to be created, in order to allow for

---

[9] Discussion Paper, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, ECHA Meeting, 14 September 1999

effective DDR support, and thus the paper presents quite a number of preliminary conclusions and considerations that all have an impact on the core issue: how do we work together most effectively?

Sound leadership lies at the heart of the matter. It goes beyond coordination, and it integrates the best qualities and competencies of each partner into a cohesive whole, exceeding the sum of its parts. This paper addresses some mechanisms that can support leadership and coordination, by clarifying procedures and alternative scenarios. It identifies who can do what, how competent players can be brought together, and how the obstacles in their path can be removed. That may mark a new beginning. The members of the Working Level group hope that its paper will make tangible contribution to United Nations system reform, and that its recommendations will smooth the road to effective leadership in support of peace and reconciliation.

ANNEX I.
COMPENDIUM OF MANDATES AND ACTIVITIES RELATED TO THE DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION OF FORMER COMBATANTS IN COUNTRIES EMERGING FROM CONFLICT

DDA
DPA
DPKO
FAO
ICRC
IOM
OCHA
OSRSG/CAC
UNDP
UNHCR
UNICEF
WFP
WHO
WORLD BANK

Available at the DDR Resource Centre (UNDP)

http://www.undp.org/erd/ddr

ANNEX II
TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR
ECHA DDR WORKING GROUP CONSULTANT

1. Background:

As agreed in the 14 September meeting of the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs, a Task Force on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) was established "in order to develop guidelines on the institutional division of labour of DDR as well as a broad strategy for DDR". The first meeting of the Task Force was held on 1 October 1999 with the first order of business being the designation of UNDP as the Chair. Based on the Task Force's discussions and the need to concretely address and resolve this issue, the Task Force agreed to convene a working level group, comprised of experts in DDR from each relevant agency who would draft a paper with particular focus on the assignment of responsibilities in DDR efforts and to clarify "the process by which agreement will be reached on the assignment of tasks in specific situations". The Task Force mandated the Working Level group to draft a paper on the issue of assigning institutional responsibilities in DDR, which would then be finalised in consultation with the Task Force for presentation to ECHA.

Participants at the first Working Level group meeting held on 26 October 1999 agreed that, based on the timeframe outlined by the ECHA Task Force meeting on 1 October, the most realistic approach to fulfilling the group's obligation and mandate is for UNDP to request the services of consultants with expertise in inter-agency processes[10]. The consultants would undergo the process of drafting the paper outlining agency responsibilities and the process of delineating and coordinating these responsibilities in close consultation with the Working Level group.

2. Activities:

The consultants will:

➢ 2.a. Participate in all Working Level meetings/discussions to be held approximately once a month or on an "as needed basis" between January until a finalised paper is presented to the DDR Task Force on / around 31 March 2000. During these meetings the consultants will brief the Working Level group on the status of the consultation process and the paper.

➢ 2.b. Meet individually with the designated agency experts/representatives for necessary information on the agencies' activities, roles, and responsibilities in the DDR process at the field and HQ levels. This will require travel to agency HQ to meet with the relevant experts and/or units. Agency meetings should include the following programme that may be subject to changes,

---

[10] UNDP subsequently identified and funded the services of the consultant, Praxis Group Ltd., to undertake the research and initial drafting required for the Working Group's preparation of its final report to ECHA.

as per the suggestions of the WG, but without involving additional costs (for example, Save the Children-USA or UK, Care, WVI and LWF):

    <u>New York:</u>   DPKO, UNICEF, DDA, DPA, SRSG/CAC, OCHA, UNDP
                                 Number of working days: *3 1/2*

    <u>Washington:</u>   World Bank, IOM
                                   Number of working days: *1*

    <u>Geneva:</u>   UNHCR, WHO, ILO,
                                   Number of working days: *1 1/2*

    <u>Rome:</u>   FAO, WFP
                                   Number of working days: *1*

➢ 2.c. Confer with donors and other agencies/organisations with experience in DDR to acquire information on donor planning*,* strategies and funding in terms of specific agencies in post-conflict situations as relevant to the DDR process, and the impact donor policies/funding levels/and funding strategies *have* on the process of delineating and coordinating responsibilities.

    <u>New York:</u>   OAU, Organisation of the Islamic Conference, International Peace Academy
                                   Number of working days: *1*

    <u>Washington:</u>   USAID, Department of State (PRM)
                                   Number of working days: *1*

    <u>London:</u>   DFID, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
                                   Number of working days: *1*

    <u>Brussels:</u>   ECHO/EU, DG-8 or DG-1A
                                   Number of working days: *1/2*

    <u>The Hague:</u>   Ministry of Foreign Affairs
                                   Number of working days: *1/2*

    <u>Ottawa:</u>   CIDA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
                                   Number of working days: *1*

➢ 2.d Meet with NGO umbrella organisations and major NGOs that have worked with UN system agencies or on activities funded from bilateral sources to implement programs related to the DDR process to gain an outside perspective on UN agency activities, coordination, and responsibilities within DDR.

    <u>Geneva:</u>   World Council of Churches, ICRC
                                   Number of working days: *1*

| Lausanne: | Terre des Hommes |
| | *Number of working days:* | *1/2* |

Washington: InterAction
                Number of working days: *1/2*

Boston: Oxfam USA
                Number of working days: *1*

London: Oxfam, ODI, Int. Institute for Strategic Studies, IANSA, Christian Aid
                Number of working days: *2 1/2*

Brussels: MSF Belgium
                Number of working days: *1/2*

The Hague: Novib
                Number of working days: *1/2*

Cornwallis Park: Lester Pearson Can. Int. Peacekeeping Centre
                Number of working days: *1*

➢ 2.e. Formulate a questionnaire to be sent *(through the respective Members of the Task Force or Working Group)* to relevant agency field offices or individuals that have been involved in DDR operations to obtain input from the field relevant to determining the best process through which responsibilities can be delineated and assigned. In coordination with the Working Level Group, determine the list of field offices/individuals to receive this questionnaire. Include relevant information obtained from the field into the final report (see 2.f.).

➢ 2.f Draft a comprehensive paper and guidelines that addresses the objectives of the Working Level Group, i.e. the process by which responsibilities will be delineated, assigned, and coordinated in the context of a DDR operation (see 3.a. "Expected Output").

➢ 2.g. Based on the discussions and information acquired during the drafting process, the consultants will provide relevant data, case studies, and documents to UNDP to be included in the DDR Resource Centre to be housed within UNDP (see "Expected Output 3.c.).

3. Expected Output:

➢ 3.a. As mandated by the DDR Task Force, the consultants' final product will be in the form of a paper that describes the range of functions involved in the DDR process, and focuses on the process of assigning such responsibilities in DDR efforts with particular regard to the demobilization aspect, with issues relevant to disarmament and reintegration also considered as part of the DDR spectrum. The paper will also clarify the process by which agreement will be reached on the assignment of tasks in specific situations.

➢ 3.b Provide a draft version of the paper to the Working Level group at least two weeks prior to its submission to the DDR Task Force, *i.e.,* in early/mid March, for review, discussion, and

possible revision. The final paper will be provided in the timeframe established by the DDR Task Force (see "Activity Duration").

➢ 3.c. Additionally, the consultants will contribute all materials and information gathered for the establishment and expansion of the DDR Resource Centre.

4. UNDP's support

UNDP will provide access to office space and a computer as needed for the consultants' use in New York. In addition, it will provide support in the scheduling of appointments and the despatch of documentation.

5. Activity Duration:
➢ 5.a   The consultants will begin employment on 1 January 2000. The consultants would subsequently start consulting with the relevant agencies, conduct necessary background research, engage in consultations with field offices, meet with donors and organisations external to the ECHA process as required, and to present a finalised draft that has been cleared by the Working Level group to the DDR Task Force by 31 March 2000.

➢ 5.b Pending submission of the finalised draft to the Task Force in March, the consultants would render their services on an as-needed basis in the case that there are requests from the DDR Task Force for further revisions to the paper before it is presented to ECHA after 31 March 2000.

6. Qualifications:
➢ 6.a. Demonstrated experience in working with UN agencies and in-depth experience with and expertise in inter-agency processes, including coordination mechanisms and functions.

➢ 6.b. Knowledge of UN interagency processes in post-conflict situations with particular regard to DDR activities.

➢ 6.c. Previous field or HQ experience in working on issues relevant to DDR.

➢ 6.d. Ability to work in a consultative manner within the context of representatives of agencies with diverse mandates.

➢ 6.e. Strong writing skills and ability to produce expected outputs within the established timeframe.

Methodology

The Working Level group met several times in the fall of 1999, and agreed to request the services of consultants with experience in inter-agency processes. Three of the consultants selected had worked on DDR issues at the country level; the fourth was well versed in matters of coordination and management. The Working Level group prepared succinct statements reflecting the DDR mandates and responsibilities of the various organisations and programs represented on it (annex I). It further developed detailed terms of reference (annex II) that were to guide the consultants in their work.

In line with their terms of reference, the consultants collected many studies and reports in the course of their interviews, and conducted a review of existing key internal documents as well as academic and organisational publications (annex III). The consultants further met with most members of the Working Level group individually, and interviewed designated representatives of a broad range of UN common system organizations, both within and outside of the ECHA. For this purpose, the Working Level Group and the consultants agreed on a matrix (annex IV) to structure the fact finding process.

To complement this common system perspective, the consultants scheduled meetings in North America and Europe with representatives of various donor governments, regional organisations, independent research institutions, bilateral aid agencies, and non-governmental humanitarian as well as development organisations. In addition, interviews were conducted with participants in the DDR process in northern Somalia and Djibouti. A list of the people interviewed can be found at annex V.

On the basis of the fact finding matrix, the organisations and programs participating in the Working Level group sent out questionnaires to their staff in program countries who had first hand experience in the design and delivery of DDR programs; annex VI contains the questionnaire, and a list of respondents can be found at annex VII.

During the month of March 2000, the consultants analysed the outcome of their literature review, the interviews, and the questionnaires. The documents collected, as well as summaries of the interviews (see annex VIII), were made available to the Chair of the Task Force and were subsequently added to the documentation available at the Task Force's Resource Centre, housed within UNDP.

ANNEX III
LITERATURE REVIEWED FOR THIS REPORT

Africa Region Working Group on Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel, World Bank. *Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel: the evidence from seven country case studies*. Volume I, Synthesis Report (draft). Washington, D.C., February 1993

AWEPAA Conference on "Repatriation, Demobilization and Reintegration", Maputo, April 1993, Report prepared by African European Institute and Norwegian Refugee Council

Barnes, Sam. *Reintegration Programmes for Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique*. Report prepared for UNDP, Maputo, March 1997

Ball, Nicole. "Demobilising and Reintegrating Soldiers: Lessons from Africa." In: Krishna Kumar (ed.), *Rebuilding Societies after Civil War; critical roles for international assistance.* Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1997.

Ball, Nicole and Campbell, Kathleen F. *Complex Crisis and Complex Peace: Humanitarian Coordination in Angola.* Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations, New York, 1998

Berdal, Mats R. *Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars.* Oxford University Press, New York, 1999

Challenges of Demobilization and Reintegration. A Discussion Paper, Refugee Policy Group, Washington D.C., 1995 (?). Report prepared for UN/DHA and the IASC.

Clark, Kimberly Mahling. "Fostering a Farewell to Arms: Preliminary Lessons Learned in the Demobilization and Reintegration of Combatants". Research and Reference Service, USAID Centre for Development Information and Evaluation. Washington, D.C., 1996

Colletta, Nat J., Kostner, Marcus and Wiederhofer, Ingo *The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa*, The World Bank, Washington D.C, 1996

Colletta, Nat J., Kostner, Markus and Wiederhofer, Ingo. *"Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transition: The Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia and Uganda."* World Bank Discussion Paper no. 331. Africa Technical Department Series. Washington D.C., 1996.

Compendium of Operational Frameworks for Peacebuilding & Donor Coordination. Peacebuilding Unit, Multilateral Programs Branch, CIDA, Ottawa, 1999

Concepts and Experiences of Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-combatants: Guidelines and Instruments for future Programmes. GTZ, Eschborn, 1997.

Creative Associates International. "Assessment of the Demobilization and Disarmament Process in Liberia." Final report to USAID, Washington D.C., 1997.

Creative Associates. *Program Options for Reintegrating Ex-Combatants into Civilian Life.* Report prepared for USAID El Salvador (covers Nicaragua, Zimbabwe, Panama, Colombia, United States for purpose of comparison). San Salvador, 1991

Dworken, Jonathan; Moore, Jonathan; Siegel, Adam. *Haiti Demobilization and Reintegration Program, an Evaluation Prepared for USAID.* Institute for Public Research, the CAN Corporation, Alexandria, 1997

Gabinete Nacional dos Antigos Combatentes e Vitimas de Guerra. *O Programa de Promocao dos Veteranos de Mocambique*. Sumario, Maputo, January 1993

Hoffmann, Bernd and Gleichmann, Colin. *Programmes for the Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Changing Perspectives in development and Security.* GTZ, Eschborn, 2000

International Resource Group on Disarmament and Security in the Horn of Africa; Bonn International Centre for Conversion. *Report of the Seminar on Donor Response to Demobilization and Reintegration in the Horn of Africa*. Copenhagen, September 1995

Javan, Jafar and Smith, Frank J. *Demobilization and Reintegration of Combatants into Post-Conflict Civil Societies: A Preliminary Collection of Policies and Programs*. North Carolina State University, December 1993 (draft report).

Kingma, Kees. "The Role of Demobilization in the Peace and Development Process in Sub-saharan Africa: Conditions for Success." *African Security Review*, Vol. 5, No. 6.

Lockett, Danuta. *After the War: Reintegration of Ex-combatants within the context of National Reconstruction*. Creative Associates Int., Washington, D.C., August 1993 (draft)

Mason, Peggy; Douglas, Ian C.; and Fraser, Douglas. *Practical Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Measures for Peacebuilding.* Dept. of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, 1997

Mason, Peggy and Erskine, Emmanuel. *Disarmament, Demobilization and reintegration of Ex-combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment (draft, publication forthcoming).* Dept. of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, New York

Operational Guidelines for WFP Assistance to DRPs in Countries Emerging from Conflict Situations. Technical Support Service, World Food Programme, Rome, 1999

Pike, Claire. *Facing the Challenges of Microdisarmament: a Case Study Review of Practices in Post Conflict Countries.* Peacebuilding and Human Security Division, Dept. of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, 1999

Preston, Rosemary. "Demobilising and Reintegrating Fighters after War: the Namibian Experience." Warwick International Centre of Education in development, University of Warwick, 1994

Report on the Third Wolfsberg Humanitarian Forum: Protection in Armed conflict. ICRC, Geneva, 1999

Sharing New Ground in Post-Conflict Situations. Evaluation Office, UNDP, New York, 2000

Strengthening the Work of the Resident Co-ordinators. Office of Evaluation and Planning, UNDP, New York, 1996

UNIDIR Case Studies under its Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project: Somalia, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Haiti, Cambodia, Mozambique, Liberia. Issues papers: *Managing Arms in Peace Processes*. Internet at www.unog.ch/UNIDIR.

United Nations Blue Books Series on Mozambique, El Salvador and Cambodia. UN Department of Information, 1995.

When Combatants Become Civilians. GTZ , Eschborn, 1997

World Bank. *Aide Memoire on Uganda Veterans Assistance Program (Demobilization of the National Resistance Army)*, September, 1992, with comments and findings of Netherlands Govt. delegation to mission.

World Bank. Summary of Seminar on Demobilization and Reintegration Programs for Military Personnel. Washington, D.C., June 1994

ANNEX IV
MATRIX FOR FACT-FINDING

This framework was used to organise the information on operational activities collected in interviews and through questionnaires

Dimension I: Activities

A. Building political and popular support
  Advocacy of peace and reconciliation, disarmament
  Mobilisation of resources for specific aspects of DDR
  Advice and guidance to parties in conflict

B. Negotiating DDR aspects of conflict settlement
  Establishing management and coordination structure
  Establishment of Cease fire
  Definition and identification of combatants
  Definition and identification of combatants' arms
  Disarmament provisions
  Design programme of assistance in cantonment areas
  Identification of cantonment areas; design specifications
  Consider the needs of surrounding population when planning for cantonment areas
  Cantonment
  Special measures for vulnerable groups, incl. Female, child combatants, disabled soldiers and chronically ill soldiers
  Start public health education and information among combatants and dependants
  Demobilization incentives
  Reintegration options
  Veterans' benefits

C. Military oversight of demobilization process
  Collection and destruction/disposal of arms
  Establishing secure armoires
  Ensure security of access, demining, etc
  Supporting broad-based disarmament programs, including those held by para-militaries or civilians
  Supporting internal security, incl. handover to police forces

D. Civilian support to demobilization process
  Preparation and construction of cantonment sites
  Registration and issue of identification documents
  Provision of food, water, sanitation
  Support to families
  Support and psycho-social care for child soldiers and female combatants
  Support and psycho-social care for combatants with stress disorders
  Medical and nutritional screening on registration

Socio-economic surveys and skills inventories of ex-combatants
Documenting and monitoring case histories of combatants in vulnerable groups
Immunisation
Health care and epidemiological surveillance in cantonment area
Provision of HIV/AIDS control and reproductive health services
Recreational activities
Weapons collection programme
Mine clearing in areas of cantonment and areas of return

E. Reintegration: short-term, into new consolidated army

F. Reintegration: short term, into civilian life
Job counselling and referral
Health counselling
Medical and dental care
Family reunion and/or services
Specific measures for vulnerable groups
Transportation
Departure packages, e.g., tools
Cash
Clothing
Food and food coupons
Housing, and housing materials

G. Reintegration: long-term
Programs to integrate and balance programs for demobilised soldiers, returning refugees and internally displaced
Public Health education
Credit
Land (and land reform)
Professional and vocational training
Public works job creation
Income generation programs; micro-enterprise
Participation of private sector, incl. hiring incentives
Business and legal advice
Veterans programs and outreach

Dimension II: Countries

1) Angola
2) Central African Republic
3) Chad
4) Eritrea
5) Ethiopia
6) Liberia
7) Mozambique

8) Namibia
9) Rwanda
10) Sierra Leone
11) Somalia
12) Uganda
13) Zimbabwe
14) El Salvador
15) Guatemala
16) Haiti
17) Nicaragua
18) Cambodia
19) East Timor
20) Philippines
21) Bosnia & Herzegovina
22) Eastern Slavonia
23) Kosovo
24) Tajikistan

ANNEX V
PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

➢ *The Netherlands*

Caroline Poldermans, Deputy Head Peacebuilding, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Caroline Weijers, Senior Policy Adviser, Directorate for Africa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dominique Bakker, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague
Hans Smarling, Deputy Head of West Africa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Jan Ruyssenaars, Senior Policy Advisor, NOVIB
Jose Antonio Bastos, Director of Operations, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) Holland
Jurjen van der Tas, Programme Officer, NOVIB
Klaas van Walraven, Political Scientist, Africa Studies Centre, University of Leiden
Mario Weima, Policy Adviser, NOVIB
Stephen Ellis, Director, Africa Studies Centre, University of Leiden
Sue Prosser, Field Adviser Mental Health, MSF Holland, Amsterdam
Tilleke Kiewied, Co-ordinator Emergencies, NOVIB (Netherlands Organisation for International Development Cooperation), The Hague
Wicher Slagter, Humanitarian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

➢ *European Commission Brussels / European Union*

Caroline Weijers, Co-ordinator/Representative to European Union's Africa Working Group, Brussels
Francesca Mosca, Head of East Africa and Great Lakes, Directorate for Development
Mikael Barfod, Head of Strategy, ECHO

➢ *United Kingdom*

Ed Cairns, Senior Policy Advisor, OXFAM, Oxford
Graham Styles, Africa Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London
Malcolm Rodgers, Senior Policy Officer, Christian Aid
Nicola Reindorp, Policy Advisor, OXFAM
Peter Raven, Programme Manager, Christian Aid, London
Phillipe Le Billon, Researcher, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London
Sally Joss, Co-ordinator, IANSA, London
Sarah Dunn, West Africa Department, Department for International Development (DFID)
Simon Mansfield, Emergency/Rehabilitation, DFID, London

➢ *Canada*

Alex Morrison, President, the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Otawa
Amb. Peggy Mason, Director of Development, Canadian Council for International Peace and Security, Ottawa
Col. (Ret'd) Douglas A. Fraser, Executive Director, Canadian Council for International Peace and Security, Ottawa
Diane Harper, Regional Security and Peacekeeping Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa
Jennifer Loten, Policy Advisor, Peacebuilding and Human Security Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa
Susan Brown, Chief, Peacebuilding Unit, International Humanitarian Assistance, CIDA, Ottawa

➢ *Djibouti*

Abdi Elmi Achkir, Project Director, IDA, Programme de Reinsertion des Anciens Combattants (PRAC), Ministere de L' Emploi et de la Solidarite Nationale

➢ *United Nations – New York*

Agnes Asekenye-Oonyu, Chief, Africa Section, Emergency Liaison Branch, OCHA, United Nations
Amjad Abbashar, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, Policy, Advocacy and Information Division, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations
Anthony Craig, Special Assistant to the Military Adviser, DPKO, United Nations
Ed Tsui, Director, Policy, Advocacy and Information Division, OCHA, United Nations
Evgeniy Gorkovskiy, Director and Deputy to the Under-Secretary-General, Department for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations
Ilene Cohn, Programme Officer, Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, United Nations
Jean-Claude Legrand, Senior Adviser, Child Protection, Programme Division, UNICEF
Jennifer Klot, Programme Officer, Division of Evaluation, Policy and Planning, UNICEF
Johanna Brismar-Skoog, Programme Officer, Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, United Nations
Margaret T. Carey, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), United Nations
Marta Santos-Pais, Director, Division of Evaluation, Policy and Planning, UNICEF
Mary Symmonds, Special Initiatives Co-ordinator, Special Team on Africa Recovery, UNDP
Omar Bakhet, Director, Emergency Response Division, UNDP
Youssef Mahmoud, Director, Africa II Division, Department of Political Affairs, United Nations

➢ *New York – Other*

Ahmad Haji Hosseini, Deputy Permanent Observer to the United Nations, Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)
H.E. Mokhtar Lamani, Permanent Observer, OIC
Keflemariam Sebhatu, Chief of Humanitarian Affairs, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
Shahid Husain, Special Adviser, OIC

➢ *Washington, DC*

Chris O'Donnell, Program Support Officer, OTI, USAID
James Bishop, Director, Humanitarian Response, InterAction
Johanna Mendelson Forman, Senior Adviser on Democracy and Governance, USAID
Luca Dall'Oglio, Representative, International Organization for Migration (IOM), Washington Office
Markus Kostner, Economist, Post-Conflict Unit, the World Bank
Nat J. Colletta, Manager, Post-Conflict Unit, the World Bank
Sylvia A. Fletcher, Senior Adviser, Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), USAID

➢ *Switzerland*

Alessandro Loretti, Medical Officer, Division of Emergency and Humanitarian Action, WHO, Geneva
Eugenia Date-Bah, Chief, Focus Programme on Crisis and Reconstruction, ILO, Geneva
Larbi Mebtouche, Senior Economist, Reintegration and Local Settlements, UNHCR, Geneva
Meinrad Studer, Head of Sector, International Organizations Division, ICRC, Geneva

➢ *Italy*

Agnes Dhur, Consultant, Special Relief Operations Service (TCOR), Field Operations Division, FAO, Rome
Carlo Scaramella, Senior Programme Adviser, Office of the Humanitarian Adviser, Operations Department, World Food Programme, Rome
Dr. Ranieri Guerra, Director, Secretariat for Cultural Affairs, Instituto Superiore di Sanita, Rome
Laurent Thomas, Senior Operations Officer, TCOR, Field Operations Division, FAO, Rome

➢ *Other*

Bernd Hoffmann, Head of Division for Emergency and Refugee Aid, Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Eschborn, Germany (interviewed in Westpoint)
Mike Delaney, Director of Humanitarian Assistance and Special Projects, Oxfam America, Boston

ANNEX VI
QUESTIONNAIRE USED FOR INTERVIEWS
AND FIELD INPUT

I. Mandate

a) What is your organisation's overall mandate? Which aspects of that mandate are directly related to DDR?
b) If your organisation has already provided a written statement about its mandate to the Task Force, do you have any comments?
c) Has your governing body or board issued specific guidelines for your DDR-related work?
d) Have your constituents expressed specific expectations with regard to your work in DDR?
e) Do you expect your mandate (or your interpretation of it) to evolve? How will this affect your DDR activities?

II. Experience

a) How has your organisation translated its mandate in respect of DDR into action?
b) In which activities set out in the survey matrix has your organisation been involved? Any activities not listed?
c) In which countries listed in the survey matrix has your organisation carried out DDR-related work! Any countries not listed?
d) What are, in your opinion, the particular operational strengths of your organisation? Examples?
e) What documents or reports reflect or describe your organisation's activities?

III. Coordination and Leadership

a) In carrying out its DDR activities, how well has your organisation been able to work together with other institutional actors? Choose one or two "critical" examples - if more than one, possibly related to different time periods, countries and/or activities.
b) How were working relationships developed? Networking? Planned structure?
c) To what extent did you perceive your work as part of an overall strategy?
d) If there was one, where did that strategy come from? Within UN system? External?
e) Was it supported by operational guidance and coordination?
f) Was there a support structure, e.g., a special coordinating unit?
g) Was the leadership formal and structured, or ad-hoc and informal?
h) What was the basis for its authority?
i) Did the leadership shift as the DDR process evolved?
j) If so, how, and why?
k) Have you seen changes over time in the manner responsibilities are divided and coordinated?
l) How would you like to see the process evolve?
m) What would be the ideal process for the division of labour within the UN system?

n) What would be the ideal process for the division of labour among the UN system actors and their partners: government, warring factions, military observers and peacekeeping troops, local and international NGOs, regional organisations, donors, etc.?
o) What criteria should govern this ideal process?

IV. Funding

a) Where do you find the money for your DDR activities? Assessed contributions? Voluntary? Trust funds? Cost sharing?
b) How do you go about resource mobilisation? Do you share in joint appeals?
c) To what extent has the level of funding supported or hampered you in specific operations? Examples?
d) Is there a need for the integration or pooling of resources in support of DDR at the operational level in country?
e) If you are a donor, what criteria do you apply to decide whether you will support specific DDR activities? Thematic preferences? Regional? Political considerations?

V. Competencies

a) Which institutional actors, not counting your own organisation, have particularly impressed you as they went about their DDR-related business?
b) What was their expertise?
c) Whom could you link, in terms of competencies, to the various activities set out in the matrix?
d) Which institutional actors have specific links to, or expertise about, countries currently emerging from conflict (see also matrix list)?

VI. Evaluations and lessons learned

a) Has your organisation evaluated any aspects of its DDR-related work?
b) Are these evaluations in the public domain?
c) Does your organisation learn from experience? How?
d) Have there been any recent external evaluations of your work? Auditors? JIU? Donor governments? Recipient governments? Academic institutions or researchers?
e) Have you seen any interesting evaluations of other organisations' work?
f) Have you seen any interesting evaluations of the coordination process in specific DDR operations?
g) Which studies or reports about DDR would you recommend?

ANNEX VII
COUNTRY OFFICES RESPONDING TO QUESTIONNAIRE

Angola: WHO (with case studies)

Burundi: FAO

Bosnia and Herzegovina: WHO/DFID case study

Eritrea: WHO case study

Guatemala: UNDP, WHO

Guinea Bissau: FAO

Haiti: PAHO/WHO (with case study)

Liberia: DHA/HACO mission report

Mozambique: WHO, case studies

Nicaragua: UNDP

Philippines: FAO (with case studies), UNDP

Sierra Leone: WHO, FAO, Interaction case study

ANNEX VIII
OVERVIEW OF PRAXIS GROUP, Ltd. NOTES
COMPILED FROM INTERVIEWS

The following Annex represents an overview of the informal notes taken by the Praxis Group Ltd. during their interviews with the representatives of various organisations (see Annex 5) and are provided as an annex for background information only. While some of these views may or may not be reflected in the background document, the ECHA Working Group's final conclusions and recommendations remain those that are contained within "Harnessing Institutional Capacities in Support of the DDR of Former Combatants" submitted to ECHA 6 June 2000.

Meetings with foreign ministry representatives

Given the close working relations between the UN system and Foreign Ministries coupled with the institutional culture shared by both, it was hardly surprising some interviewed within this community were the least critical of UN agencies in their involvement in DDR. Nevertheless, some of those interviewed indicated that there were concerns that needed to be addressed by certain UN agencies - specific mention was made by at least one representative of WHO being an agency that had not yet reached its potential in contributing to the provision of health care to ex-combatants in assembly areas either directly or indirectly via national Ministries of Health.

There were concerns voiced about the lack of success of the DDR process in Angola despite a large amount of funds being made available by the international community to handle this issue. However, while it was recognised that this was a problem not entirely of the UN's making, it was felt by some that the UN peacekeeping operation should have set very "clear benchmarks" to be met, and these should have been consistently monitored to ensure compliance (here DPKO and DPA were mildly criticised by some for not drawing up better "blueprints" but at no time was there any suggestions to keep them out of the process - on the contrary).

In the main, however, some interviewed saw a continuing and necessary role for UN system organizations and agencies in DDR. These were perceived as being "neutral" and they posed "less of a problem" in working with national governments. NGOs, on the other hand were considered as being a problem when working directly with national governments and in some cases were also considered as being "politically biased" due to link-ups with national partners, some of whom carried strong political agendas. Having said that, there was recognition by some that NGOs may be able to play a role in "monitoring the commitment of the parties involved" in DDR and in some cases, in an implementation role too.

Two organizations were identified overall by those interviewed as being the best in taking the lead-role in DDR – the World Bank and UNDP (contrary to the views of others - see below). In Cambodia, UNDP was identified as playing a positive part in overseeing the demobilization efforts, but more so in the reintegration segment - where the agency was able to leap-frog on the back of it's very successful "CARERE project" (rural reintegration of marginalised populations) to ease ex-combatants into civilian life. It was felt that UNDP could play a similar role in other countries too. OCHA was not left out in the cold - its importance was recognised by some, although others raised questions. Concern was also voiced about the political infighting at the Secretariat about OCHA and its coordinating or operational role.

In general, many interviewed stressed the need for a flexible approach to the coordination and division of labour, and suggested that this issue be resolved based on the respective comparative advantage of each UN system agency. Agencies with a strong local presence should be given a major role. Some officials interviewed expressed concern that in most cases the recipient countries were not sufficiently included in the design, planning and execution of DDR programmes. While some governments might be weak, their capacity should be strengthened, even if this required extra efforts. Lack of a concerted and joint action plan had further diminished the impact of the assistance provided. Donor competition exacerbated the problem.

When it came to other UN agencies positive comments were made about WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF and also about two non-UN agencies, i.e., IOM and ICRC - all of whom, it was felt, had played, and could continue to play, a niche role in their specific specialization.

On the disarmament (plus demobilization) segment it was felt by some that the continuing participation of military observers from donor countries, coordinated via DPKO, was essential - if only because their presence provided a sense of security in the assembly areas and because civilians do not appropriately handle weapons disarmament. Given a future scenario where military observers may not be made available by donor countries (and here we talking mainly about OECD countries) they did not rule out the involvement of private military resources to handle this segment - although the point was made that this was still a contentious issue.

Meetings with bilateral donor agencies

Some of the bilaterals interviewed conveyed a view of UN agencies similar to that given by those interviewed from the foreign ministries. However, given their funding mechanisms and greater involvement with international NGOs, they saw a more prominent role for NGOs than the officials in the foreign ministries did. ECHO, which channels a major component of its funds via NGOs, indicated that it might take on a more prominent role in DDR. In addition some expressed concerns about the implementation capacity of most UN specialised agencies - remarking specially about the uneven "caliber" of staff placed in the field. Both ECHO and the Directorate for Development (former DG-8) had some reservations about link-ups with UN agencies on DDR. In addition ECHO rules create barriers to co-financing with the UN. However, there was a trend to find ways of developing closer working links with UN agencies.

Concerns were also expressed about the fact that each UN system organization has its own agenda, time frame and procedures, some of which may overlap or clash. Officials in CIDA stressed the importance of the study being prepared by Ambassador Mason and General Erskine in collaboration with DPKO, as it addressed these problems in great detail, and offered pragmatic solutions.

It did not seem that the new coordination mechanisms structured around the concept of a Resident Co-ordinator, also normally serving as Humanitarian Co-ordinator, had left much of an impression with most of those interviewed in the bilateral agencies. Most supported the idea of a lead agency when it came to coordination, and UNDP's dual role was not always quite clear. There was general agreement though that, once a SRSG had been appointed, he or she should take charge of the entire DDR process, leading the UN community.

At the same time, some respondents complained that the selection of SRSGs sometimes seemed to be based on political considerations rather than on merit and managerial skills. In general, the necessary competencies for SRSGs and RCs were described as: political maturity, excellent negotiating skills, strong analytical ability, good judgement, flexibility, creativity, an aura of neutrality, commitment, tact, diplomacy, and a sense of team work.

Some interviewed identified UNDP as one of two effective coordinating agencies on DDR - the other being OCHA. The World Bank too was mentioned, but the preference was towards UNDP, the argument being that UNDP has a strong institutional memory, has been in the field on a longer-term basis and therefore understands the socio-economic and political trends on the ground and as such can make a viable contribution in coordinating DDR. However, here again, the quality of UN staff was brought up, and the need was emphasised to field carefully screened staff who meet the new standards established for RCs. One bilateral also raised the question whether UNDP was always perceived as neutral, given its proximity to the government in some cases.

Some of those interviewed had a stronger preference for OCHA coordination, arguing that DDR comes under the humanitarian sector and that OCHA staff have a good track record and understanding in handling these issues; interestingly, there was only praise for the calibre of OCHA staff, most of whom were seen as very effective and capable.

Concern was raised about UNDP's ability in specific cases (and the UN's capacity in general) to handle Trust Funds (for DDR in this case) - too bureaucratic, legalistic etc. The UNDP administered Trust Fund for DDR in Sierra Leone was given as an example - in 1999, the World Bank took this over and indications from at least one bilateral are that it is doing a better job, leading some to conclude that the Bank, as opposed to UNDP, may better positioned to handle DDR Trust Funds.

As far as the other UN agencies are concerned, there was clear support by some for the work of agencies such as UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP in DDR. But again the caliber of some field staff was brought into question. Interestingly, the staffing issue never came up in relation to IOM or ICRC, or in discussions of international NGOs, whose staff were seen as being of a much higher quality, as well as more committed. Reinforcing this point, the representatives of bilateral agencies who were interviewed saw an increasing role for major international NGOs (and their local partners). Oxfam was mentioned (providing excellent running water and sanitation in assembly areas), as were MSF, Save the Children Fund/Radda Barnen etc., given their competence in many aspects of DDR, especially in the components revolving around demobilization and reintegration.

Meetings with the NGOs

The strongest criticism of the UN, not surprisingly, came from some of the NGOs interviewed. However this was balanced, in that they recognised the role that UNDP and OCHA could play in coordinating DDR and supported their role in this area. For some, their preference was for an OCHA co-ordinator, arguing that UNDP is a "development oriented" agency and as such does not fully grasp the humanitarian issues linked to DDR, whereas OCHA specialises in humanitarian issues and understand the dynamics better than UNDP. Moreover, some argued, OCHA staff have a better understanding of the NGO community with whom they inter-act fairly closely on humanitarian issues.

But for most of the NGO staff interviewed, the UN specialised agencies and programs, such as UNICEF, WHO and UNAIDS, were somewhat flawed. Even WFP and UNHCR came under criticism although this was much more muted: there was a willingness to work with both. As far as WHO and UNAIDS were concerned some NGOs felt that they played far too limited a role on DDR.

The general feeling among NGO representatives interviewed is that the NGO community is much better than the UN system at handling the various aspects of DDR - at least, the demobilization and reintegration segments – that require close cooperation with national institutions. A subjective view maybe, but one that seems to be supported by other observers of DDR.

In terms of funding sources for NGO's DDR activities, NOVIB indicted that 69% of its resources came from the Government of the Netherlands and from the European Commission, with the remainder from private and other donations. Oxfam UK's funding was from sales from their shops, private donations and approximately 40% from DFID - the water and sanitation sub-contracting work done in assembly areas for demobilising soldiers was financed by the UN. Oxfam America stressed that it did not accept funding from any Government, and financed its work solely from its private donors and contributors. Christian Aid in the UK depended on private donations, with a small amount of support from DFID. On the whole, the NGOs interviewed were independent of the UN for their funding.

Meetings with Intergovernmental and Regional Organizations

The themes of independence and connectedness also provided a common thread in the discussions with intergovernmental organizations, such as the ICRC, the IOM, and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, as well as regional and sub-regional organizations, such as IGAD. On the one hand, their distinct mandates and constituencies required a certain distance from the United Nations system; on the other, some felt they had much to offer, and wanted to be drawn into the DDR process, contributing their unique expertise.

The ICRC, for example, stressed its excellent working relations with WFP, based on a formal memorandum of understanding. Membership in the IASC was also an important means for sharing information. In many areas where the ICRC works, however, such as Chechnya or Afghanistan, the UN is absent. Collaboration in areas such as reintegration and the tracing of family members required good working level contacts. Similarly, the IOM emphasised the expertise it had developed in certain areas of the DDR process, and stressed the need for closer consultations at the earliest planning stage, so that its competencies would best be utilised.

For some, the increasingly prominent role of regional organizations with regard to conflict prevention (such as ECOWAS's involvement in West Africa) raises questions about their relationship with the United Nations system, both in operational and conceptual terms. Lack of clarity in this regard complicates collaboration in the DDR area, according to some officials interviewed.

Meetings with academics

From the academics came a much less polarised view on who does what best on DDR. There were positive comments about certain NGOs (Oxfam, Save the Children, MSF), but there were less positive observations on some others. Some felt that NGOs were very good at proselytising but less good at taking a broader strategic vision of their input - something that, according to some, inter-governmental organisations were better at doing. Also some academics noted that NGOs tended to develop local political preferences - although not necessarily bad – that could draw them into the local political battles. In other words, some felt that the NGOs could become a factor in the conflict or post-conflict crisis, thereby creating more problems than solutions.

Some academics interviewed argued for a "partnership" between the UN, international NGOs and other international actors (European Commission, ICRC for example) in evolving joint programs to handle DDR. Working in parallel or in separate boxes created a negative process for DDR. Several people in academic and research centres, such as the International Peace Academy, also stressed the wealth of studies and analysis available. This material currently did not always get the attention of practitioners; there was a potential for a more pro-active learning and evaluation strategy on the part of the actors in the field.

For some of the academics interviewed, there was a sceptical approach towards the "African solutions for African problems" philosophy of the United States and certain other OECD countries. This entails the use of regional actors to solve conflicts in Africa. Some of the academics were critical about ECOMOG's involvement in Liberia and Sierra Leone, arguing that it took sides thereby exacerbating the whole arena of the conflict. Similarly some felt the use of SADC in Southern Africa could create the same dilemmas and problems that ECOMOG has given rise to in the Liberian and Sierra Leone conflicts, adding to the burden instead of lightening it.