

**Angola**  
**MDRP Country Update**

April 2003

**Introduction**

1. This review draws heavily on the recent Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Program (ADRP) post-appraisal mission undertaken from January 19 to February 8, 2003. The MDRP Secretariat wishes to thank the Program partners in Angola for their support and assistance in carrying out this review.

**1. Summary of Recent Developments**

2. Angola continues to experience gradual but steady improvement for millions of its citizens since the 27-year conflict between the Government of Angola (GOA) and UNITA ended with the death of Jonas Savimbi in battle during February 2002 and the signing of the Luena peace agreement in April of the same year. To date, the peace has been maintained without any significant setback or violation of the agreement, 1.9 million displaced people have begun to return to their home communities, some after more than a decade, and the demobilization and reintegration of more than 100,000 ex-UNITA combatants and their family members is underway. Government's commitment to the Luena peace process is evidenced by its direct and substantial financing of the demobilization and reinsertion process, investing in excess of \$100 million to date. Meanwhile, Government has indicated a willingness to negotiate with the separatist movement in Cabinda (FLEC) to work toward ending the insurgency in this northern province.

3. The Government has successfully prepared and negotiated with the World Bank an emergency demobilization and reintegration program worth an estimated \$180 million that will target more than 100,000 ex-UNITA fighters and approximately 33,000 GOA army personnel. The ADRP was presented to and approved by the World Bank's Board of Directors on March 27, 2003. The World Bank will provide approximately US\$33 million in grant resources for the project while endorsement of an estimated \$53 million grant will be sought from the MDRP Trust Fund Committee at the Paris MDRP Partners' Meeting (April 2003).

4. As of early April 2003, Government had closed 28 of the 39 gathering areas for the ex-UNITA and family members and approximately 50% of the estimated 500,000 people had or were in the process of resettling. UN agencies and NGOs report some difficulties, particularly in the central highland provinces of the country, with the provision of basic supplies and services in the transit areas being used for this resettlement process. In addition, people have been located in transit areas longer than had been anticipated.

**2. General and country-level eligibility criteria for MDRP assistance**

5. Angola has been a major player in several *conflicts in the greater Great Lakes region*, forming a number of alliances with various regional governments which have generally been a function of UNITA efforts to establish its own military links. With the dissolution of UNITA's

military forces, the need for such alliances ceased and there is already some evidence that Angola now views its role as facilitator of the peace processes—brokering an agreement between the DRC and Uganda, participating on the Ituri Pacification Commission in eastern DRC, and facilitating discussions between the DRC and Rwanda.

6. In addition to its own internal peace agreement with UNITA—the Memorandum of Understanding signed at Luena that constitutes an addendum to the Lusaka Protocol—Angola is also participating in the *regional peace process* through its agreement to the Lusaka ceasefire agreement.

7. As noted above, the Government, with assistance from several MDRP partners led by the World Bank, has concluded the preparation of the Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Program (ADRP). The Government has taken full administrative and financial responsibility for disarmament and demobilization of the UNITA military arm (FMU), and for the provision of transitional assistance, while the MDRP will provide financial and technical support for the reintegration portion of the ADRP. Overall ADRP cost is estimated, on a per capita basis, to be US\$1,300, which is within the projected range under the MDRP<sup>1</sup>.

8. The ADRP design responds to the key MDRP guiding principles: the relevant *institutional arrangements*, with a strong central policy body, a single institution with coordination responsibility, and an effective decentralized implementation structure, exist and are being strengthened under the program; rapid and *flexible implementation* mechanisms are guaranteed through the use of prime contractors for reintegration activities; a high degree of *transparency and accountability* are guaranteed through the establishment of an autonomous financial management and procurement unit; and appropriate *environmental and social safeguard measures* have been incorporated into the program. Nonetheless, while the program design is sound, the current capacity of the Government’s counterpart agency, IRSEM, in terms of *stakeholder consultations, coordination, reintegration and financial management* requires considerable strengthening and support. These areas of institutional support are envisioned under the ADRP and are being contracted for at present.

9. As a condition of Board presentation, the Government prepared and submitted a *letter of demobilization policy* (included in the Advisory Committee meeting materials) acceptable to the World Bank and MDRP partners.

### 3. Relevance and implementation of MDRP guiding principles

10. *National ownership* of the DDR process remains high. Disarmament and demobilization have been conducted entirely by the Government, as has the payment of back salaries and provision of resettlement kits for ex-UNITA combatants and families. The President recently reiterated in his New Years speech the Government’s commitment to continue supporting the resettlement and reintegration of UNITA. IRSEM has the clear mandate and has taken a lead role in the process of preparing the ADRP, and both the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Social Welfare (MINARS), IRSEM’s parent ministry, have been closely involved in and supportive of the program preparation.

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<sup>1</sup> A breakdown of per capita costs by component are as follows: reinsertion \$540, reintegration \$690, program management \$70.

11. Nonetheless, concerns remain that (i) UNITA leadership continues to be disengaged and/or disconnected from the process; and (ii) Government has not done enough to ensure UNITA's effective participation in the ADRP. Government has responded by mandating UNITA participation in the provincial level "Nando" Commissions responsible for the resettlement and reintegration of all displaced populations including ex-UNITA soldiers. However, the fact that in many cases the Commissions are not meeting as regularly as needed has MDRP partners concerned that UNITA remains substantively disengaged. The ADRP will include UNITA representatives as liaison officers in the municipalities that are projected to receive the highest concentration of ex-combatants, and in provincial reintegration project approval committees.

12. The ADRP fits well within the overall *guidelines of the MDRP*, has adopted key elements to ensure transparency and accountability, and is in keeping with the Luena agreement, thus building confidence among other Governments' DDR programs, as well as UNITA, that the Government of Angola is committed to the process.

13. In the context of the ADRP, the Government has agreed on *external assistance* needs in the areas of program operations, financial management and procurement, reintegration and management information systems. MDRP partners are being consulted on coordinated support of such based on this agreed-upon framework.

14. The ADRP will cater for specific *vulnerable target groups* including children and disabled. While the numbers of registered women combatants from the ranks of the FMU are small, certain assistance being provided under the ADRP is designed in support of the family as a whole and not just the individual combatant. The registered numbers of under-aged combatants is considerably lower than estimates and previous experience with UNITA would indicate. Nonetheless, UNICEF and the child protection NGOs are planning a program of family tracing, reunification and reintegration support for a larger expected target group. The levels of disabled combatants is expected to be high based on previous experiences, and assistance to this group would be provided through existing NGO and Government support mechanisms.

15. As a result of delays in finalizing the ADRP, MDRP partners recommended that Government consider a *special project* to address the needs of the ex-FMU who were to be discharged from gathering areas at the end of 2002. In response, UNDP/Angola, in cooperation with three other UN agencies, put forward a special project proposal to support initial reintegration assistance (with a focus on subsistence agriculture) for approximately 55,000 ex-combatants. The special project proposal has been recommended for approval with significant amendments by the local ad hoc committee (which includes representatives of the UK and the Netherlands embassy, WFP, IRSEM and the MDRP Secretariat). The UN agencies are redrafting the proposal to take into account the comments made by the committee.

16. *Coordination and linkages* between the ADRP and national reconstruction efforts are ensured through a number of channels. First, the same MDRP partners active in Angola are working closely to assist the Government in preparing an emergency post-conflict reconstruction program, for presentation to the international community in late 2003. Second, national and provincial level coordination of the various efforts in support of the reintegration of all populations and reconstruction of communities affected by the conflict rests with the "Nando" Commission, on which IRSEM sits. However, the Commission must continue to meet regularly in order to fulfill this responsibility. Third, the main partners and organizations on the ground who will support the implementation of the ADRP are, in general, the same organizations that

are helping implement the more general reconstruction efforts. Hence, close coordination and complementarity between the specific demobilization and more general reconstruction programs can be expected. Partners, however, need to emphasize such in their discussions with Government as well as the ongoing coordination efforts at national and provincial levels. IRSEM also needs to take more of a lead in ensuring appropriate linkages between the general reconstruction efforts and the ADRP.

#### 4. Efforts complementary to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

17. Overall, the *security situation* in Angola has improved dramatically since the signing of the Luena agreement, the disarmament of the UNITA forces, and the formal dissolution of the FMU. While a return to war is not considered likely, criminal activity that threatens personal security, particularly in major urban centers, appears to be on the rise. The Government plans to dedicate a larger percentage of the national budget in support of general public safety through the strengthening of the police force and judicial system. In addition, and in response to the large number of arms believed to be held by the civilian population, a civilian arms collection and registration process is currently being explored by the Angolan police force.

18. General *public safety* is also threatened by the presence of what most observers agree is one of the largest numbers of mines in the world, by the lack of local administration in many areas formerly held by UNITA, and by possible discontent among the ex-FMU. While the ADRP proposes to address this last issue, rebuilding local administration is supported by a few bilateral donors and de-mining activities are supported by a number of NGOs.

19. The Government, through the FAA, is undertaking *security sector reform* with the assistance of the Government of Portugal (through its *Instituto Superior de Estudos Militares*), however the scope of the reform continues to be very limited. Other than the commitment to demobilize approximately 33,000 FAA personnel as part of the ADRP, the letter of demobilization policy suggests that the national security forces would decrease to around 90,000, and importantly indicates the need to include paramilitary forces in the rationalization of the Government's security force. Continuous encouragement from MDRP partners in support of rational reform of the security sector and in the application of public expenditure management principles for defense spending is recommended.

#### 5. Risks and mitigation measures

20. At this time, one year after the signing of the Luena agreement, the risk of a *peace reversal* between the Government and UNITA is considered unlikely by most all observers. While the continuing unrest in Cabinda is of concern, the isolated nature of this conflict and the recent overtures by Government to negotiate with the FLEC suggest that this situation also does not pose a significant risk to the overall peace of the country.

21. There is also a risk that disillusionment or discontent on the part of the more than 100,000 ex-UNITA fighters could disturb local level order and peace. However, the Government's effort to date and the ADRP design help to mitigate this potential situation. At the same time, there does not appear to be any significant concern from Government or from MDRP partners of the program's potential *moral hazard* that the provision of financial assistance to ex-combatants would be perceived as an incentive for future violence. Nevertheless, *balancing the*

*support to be provided to ex-combatants with that which is being provided to the much larger IDP and refugee populations* in order to mitigate possible tensions between these populations has been an on-going concern of the MDRP partners and the ADRP team. The final program has taken into account the levels of support being provided to these other war-affected populations and the proposed reintegration program will focus on community level activities that would also benefit directly and indirectly returning populations at large.

22. The risk of uncoordinated efforts among donor partners, UN agencies, NGOs and Government is always present in Angola where a number of government agencies often have overlapping responsibilities, and where provincial operations are often well removed from central planning and coordination mechanisms. Nonetheless, the relatively high degree of *interaction and coordination* among the MDRP partners during the preparation of the ADRP, and the plans to formally involve a number of key partners including UNDP, ILO, FAO, UNICEF, OCHA and others in the implementation of the program, should help mitigate against duplication or inconsistent actions on the ground. The recent re-posting of the World Bank's Country Manager in Luanda, and the intention to recruit a senior operations staff member for the Luanda office will also help in this regard. However, IRSEM must also strengthen its own efforts to more regularly interact and coordinate with implementing partners to ensure harmonization and efficiency in the multitude of reintegration efforts planned for in the near term.

23. Finally, while the estimated cost of the overall program is significant, confirmed and projected financial resources available from the World Bank, the Government of Angola, bilateral partners and through the MDRP Trust Fund appear adequate to accommodate the estimated US\$180 million cost of the ADRP. Therefore, the risk of a *funding gap* does not at this time appear to be likely.

## **6. Baseline for key MDRP monitoring indicators**

### *24. Strategy Indicators*

**1** *Reduction in the number of internally displaced and refugees.* The level of organized and spontaneous return of IDPs and refugees has been massive since the last MDRP status report. OCHA estimates that approximately 2 million people have returned to their communities within the last nine months, presumably in an effort to arrive in time to start the first agricultural cycle and in a desire for good land. A significant portion have returned to the central highlands region of the country. Government is promoting the return of the remaining displaced persons before the end of the year.

**2** *Restoration of the free movement of persons and goods.* The year-long peace has clearly resulted in an increase in the movement of goods and people throughout the country. However, the destroyed or dilapidated infrastructure resulting from years of war and lack of maintenance and the slow pace of critical public works activities that would alleviate key bottlenecks limits further rapid expansion. Several provinces in the eastern part of the country remain nearly inaccessible especially during the rainy season. Landmines continue to pose obstacles to free movement in many parts of the country.

**3** *Evolution of social expenditures, including in relation to security spending.* Classification problems and the fact that as much as 20% of Government revenue remains off-budget make an analysis of Government spending patterns difficult.

Nonetheless, based on recent available data it appears that expenditures on defense and internal security have declined since 2000 (from 18.9 percent of total public spending, to 16.2 percent in 2001, and 16.8 percent in 2002). Social sector expenditures have fluctuated over the same period but are projected to rise slightly in 2003 to 16.0 percent of public spending from a low of 13.7 percent in 2000. While the current 2003 National Budget shows a shift in the pattern of expenditures from defense to security and public order (including police and judiciary), recent indications are that the Government is significantly revising the current Budget. It is therefore not clear if the general shift within security sector expenses, and from security to social sectors will be maintained. Nonetheless, the letter of demobilization policy indicates a commitment on the part of Government to further reduce military expenses to permit an increase in social sector spending. The evolution of social and military expenditure in the near-term will be closely monitored by the MDRP partners and assessed in light of the country's internal and external security needs.

25. *Program Indicators*

- 4 ***Percent of DDR activities undertaken within the framework of the MDRP.*** The ADRP is the main DDR activity in Angola and was prepared within the MDRP framework. Smaller activities focused on ex-combatant and community reintegration are contemplated but generally fit within the reintegration strategy of the ADRP.
- 5 ***Percent of DDR resources channeled through the regional MDTF.*** No MDTF funds are currently disbursed to Angola, and the Government has provided most DDR resources expended to date.
- 6 ***Degree of harmonization of national programs.*** The ADRP closely fits the MDRP framework in terms of principles as well as implementation strategies.

26. *Output Indicators*

- 7 ***Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through national programs.*** Approximately 105,000 ex-UNITA combatants have been registered by the FAA, of which 100,000 are in the process of being demobilized and provided transitional support (in the form of salary payments and resettlement kits). The balance of 5,000 was absorbed into the army and police force as part of the Luena agreement. The program will also provide support for an estimated 33,000 members of the FAA to be demobilized in a second phase under the program.
- 8 ***Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through special projects.*** An estimated 55,000 ex-UNITA combatants will receive support, predominantly for subsistence agriculture, under a special project executed by UNDP.
- 9 ***Effectiveness of technical knowledge sharing activities.*** The program in Angola has not benefited from regional technical knowledge sharing activities since the last supervision report.

**10** *Efficient organization of joint missions and preparation of reports.* Three ADRP missions have been carried out since the last supervision report that formally involved or consulted extensively with the most active MDRP partners in Angola.

**7. Summary of recommendations and proposed next steps**

27. The recommendations and proposed next steps include the following:

- (i) The MDRP Partners endorse a grant to the Government in the amount of approximately \$53 million to complement IDA's \$33 million grant for the ADRP;
- (ii) IRSEM undertake necessary implementation arrangements to ensure timely start-up of the ADRP by the end of June (including finalization of recruitment of FMPU and reintegration advisor, preparation of Program Implementation Manual, setting up of in-house database and program monitoring and benefits tracking system, and recruitment of additional national program staff);
- (iii) MDRP Secretariat finalize approval process for UNDP/Angola special project for reintegration support upon receipt of modified proposal; and
- (iv) IRSEM ensure active participation of ex-UNITA combatants in program implementation and reintegration sub-project review and approval.

**Burundi**  
**MDRP Country Update**

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**Introduction**

1. This updated status report draws upon the MDRP Joint Assessment Mission that visited Burundi from January 20-31, 2003, and the subsequent World Bank technical preparatory mission supporting program design activities from February 20 – March 19, 2003.

**1. Recent Developments**

2. The Burundi peace process has advanced significantly since the completion of the MDRP supervision mission in early October 2002. The signing of cease-fire agreements between the Government of Burundi, the *Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie* (CNDD-FDD) group of Jean Bosco Ndaykengurukiye and the *Front National pour la Libération* (FNL) faction of Alain Mugarabona in October and the CNDD-FDD faction of Pierre Nkurunziza in December 2002, as well as the subsequent signature of the Joint Declaration of Agreement on January 27, 2003, have significantly improved prospects for a consolidation of the peace process. However, implementation of the cease-fire process has remained uneven, and levels of political violence remain high. Furthermore, the continued refusal of the PALIPEHUTU - FNL of Agathon Rwasa to sign a ceasefire remains an important impediment to comprehensive peace in Burundi.

3. The African Union has deployed 43 military observers to Burundi in support of the implementation of the cease-fire. However, to date the movement within Burundi of these observers has been hampered by a lack of security guarantees from the CNDD-FDD. The governments of South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique have confirmed their intention to contribute troops to an envisaged African Peacekeeping Force. These full contingent of troops will likely be deployed within the next 3-6 months, with an initial contingent arriving prior to May 1, 2003. This force is likely to play a critical role in the cantonment and disarmament process.

4. The United Nations (UN) has appointed and deployed an interim chairman for the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC). While not directly addressing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) issues, this mechanism will be a critical forum to identify and resolve differences among parties during the cantonment and initial DDR implementation phase.

5. Security sector reform, and specifically the integration of members of armed groups and the *Forces Armées Burundaises* (FAB) into the defense and security forces, remains to be resolved. Agreement on this question and the establishment of a structure to manage the military integration process, will be critical. Failure to address these issues in advance could lead to a long, costly and risky cantonment process, especially if combatants remain armed or within reach of their weapons. Experience from other countries suggests that long-term cantonment of (ex-) combatants, particularly in the context of ongoing political negotiations, poses substantial security, financing and logistical challenges, increases the risk of political manipulation,



contributes to an inflation of combatant numbers and can ultimately jeopardize the entire peace process. It is vital that the parties and international partners closely coordinate and plan all aspects of a DDR process.

6. With the agreement of Government, some international partners have already financed the provision of limited food and non-food item assistance to CNDD/FDD forces in specified zones with a view to supporting the implementation of the cease-fire agreement. The objectives of this assistance are to build confidence in the peace process, reduce the combatants' need to forage for food at the expense of the civilian population, and limit the risk of military confrontation with the FAB.

7. The recent confirmation by the president of Burundi that he will hand over the reigns of power to his vice-president on May 1, 2003, as agreed in the Arusha accord, may contribute to favorable conditions for the preparation of the national DDR program.

## **2. General and country-level eligibility criteria for MDRP assistance**

8. Burundi is *affected by conflicts* in the greater Great Lakes region. Burundian armed groups have been operating out of the DRC and Tanzania. The *Forces Armées Burundaises* (FAB) have at times initiated counter-insurgency operations in the DRC.

9. Burundi is not part of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement for the DRC. The peace process in Burundi is guided by the provisions of the Arusha peace agreement of August 2000. The Government actively *participates in the regional peace process* for Burundi which has been in place since the beginning of the Arusha negotiations. The aforementioned cease-fire agreements have all been signed within the framework of the Arusha Accord. Furthermore, the Governments of Burundi and the DRC have signed an agreement that determines the withdrawal of FAB troops from the DRC in exchange for a cessation of support to the Burundian rebels by the DRC. The governments of South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda all played an important role in the mediation process. Their efforts have been supported by the United Nations Office for Burundi (UNOB), the African Union, the European Union and several bilateral partners.

10. Following the signing of the cease-fire agreements, Government confirmed its intention to *prepare a demobilization and reintegration program* within the framework of the MDRP, and guided by Protocol III of the Arusha peace agreement. This program foresees the demobilization of combatants not retained in a unified army, and the provision of support to facilitate their return to civilian life. The DDR strategy contains a phased demobilization approach in order to reduce social and economic frictions emanating from the process. The Government is keenly aware that the DDR process will result in the loss of income of those affected, underlining the importance of timely reinsertion and reintegration support. Government requested the World Bank to lead partner efforts to support the preparation, financing and coordination of this national program. To this end, it has established a program preparation committee comprising officials of the ministries of Defense, Planning and Reconstruction, and Finance.

11. Government has decided to await the May 1 transfer before establishing a formal national *institutional structure* to coordinate and implement DDR activities in Burundi. Nonetheless, a planning team has drafted a preliminary document and reflected on institutional options, in order to position itself for timely action as soon as the political situation permits. Government is very conscious of the need to ensure the support of the armed groups prior to the finalization of the

program and the establishment of concomitant structures. Thus, two overarching institutional principles are (i) inclusiveness—representatives of all warring factions to be included in the structure; and (ii) ownership—that the Government leads program coordination and implementation.

12. The MDRP Joint Assessment mission reiterated the importance of including Burundian civil society as an important stakeholder in the preparation and implementation of any future DDR program. To this end, the joint mission recommended that Government establish a mechanism to consult regularly with civil society.

13. Government will have to draft a *letter of demobilization policy* outlining its commitment in order to access MDRP funding for a future national program. At this point in time, the World Bank has shared an outline of such a letter with the Government.

14. *Appropriate environmental safeguards and fiduciary measures* will need to be established to minimize any potentially negative social and environmental impacts and ensure the proper use of program funds. These issues will be addressed in the course of national program preparation.

### 3. Relevance and implementation of MDRP guiding principles

15. The Government expressed its intention to lead preparatory and implementation activities for DDR in order to ensure that national priorities are respected from the outset. *National ownership* is, therefore, an accepted principle. The international community stands ready to assist the Government and other stakeholders as and when requested.

16. *Confidence building* is a central issue in the preparation of the national program. Government has confirmed its intention to consult extensively with armed groups in the finalization of the national program. Information and sensitization activities will play an important role in the confidence-building process, for ex-combatants themselves as well as for the communities where they will settle. Transparency during program implementation will also contribute to the strengthening of trust and confidence.

17. Moreover, confidence building has an important regional dimension. Efforts consistent with MDRP principles may enhance the credibility of the Government's actions vis-à-vis neighboring countries. In this respect, it is notable that MONUC and Government have initiated discussions to support the reintegration of ex-combatants repatriated from the DRC. The Government planning team has also visited the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission to identify possible lessons for the Burundi national program and its implementation arrangements.

18. The visit to Rwanda may also help to facilitate the *harmonization of DDR activities* and the *sharing of knowledge* across MDRP countries. However, the situation in Burundi is quite different, especially as regards the environment for reintegration, and the MDRP needs to allow individual countries to follow planning and implementation processes appropriate to their respective situation.

19. As evidenced in the continuing efforts of the mediators and the imminent deployment of an African peacekeeping mission, the international community's willingness to provide *external assistance* to DDR in Burundi remains strong. Several partners have affirmed their interest to

support the national program. It should be noted that donor financial support for the African Mission through a credible financing mechanism will be critical to its success.

20. Within the framework of the MDRP, and in line with recommendations of the January Joint Assessment Mission, the World Bank in its capacity as lead agency has established a local DDR Coordination Committee (DDR-CC) in Bujumbura to coordinate the provision of external assistance to the DDR process in Burundi. Government will assume the leadership of this forum as soon as appropriate national implementation arrangements have been established.

21. There are a number of *special target groups* among both the FAB and the armed groups. These include child soldiers, disabled combatants, female combatants and chronically ill combatants. Preparations for two *special projects* were initiated following the October 2002 MDRP supervision mission, viz. for child combatants (UNICEF) and for vulnerable combatants (Government). A local ad hoc (LAC) committee was established in Bujumbura to conduct technical reviews of special project proposals. This LAC consists of the following representatives: European Commission, Governments of Belgium/France (on an alternating basis), UNDP, UNOB, one representative from the Government's planning team, and the MDRP Secretariat. The UNICEF special project was submitted on January 31, 2003, and was reviewed by the LAC on February 20, 2003. The committee recommended that the proposal be re-submitted for further LAC review after UNICEF has taken into account substantial committee comments.

22. Government informed the MDRP Secretariat on March 17, 2003, that it intended to incorporate a component for disabled ex-combatants in the national program, and that it would thus withdraw the special project proposal for disabled ex-combatants. Government further announced that it would not endorse any new special project proposals beyond the existing UNICEF proposal. Partners have expressed a concern that this may increase the risk of a gap in the event that DDR efforts don't commence rapidly.

23. The link between DDR and general *reconstruction efforts* is critical in Burundi, given the enormous number of internally displaced persons and returnees. It is generally accepted that such efforts can help prepare the communities for the return of ex-combatants and the displaced alike. Smaller projects are already underway by a variety of international partners, such as UNDP's Community Assistance Umbrella Program, which is supported by various donors, and the World Bank's second Burundi Social Action Program. UNDP and UNHCR have recently established a Reintegration Unit to optimize coordination of these activities. MDRP partners *sur place* should cooperate closely with this unit to ensure consistency across beneficiary groups.

24. In the absence of the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, DDR remains a sensitive issue. The establishment of the DDR-CC and Government's active participation in this committee has somewhat improved *transparency* among various stakeholders in dealing with this topic. The planned consultation process for the national program document, as well as information and sensitization activities noted above, should further enhance transparency.

25. In Burundi, MDRP partners have supported the process in a *flexible* manner to date, of which, the provision of food assistance to CNDD/FDD combatants in support of the cease-fire process is an example. However, Government's decision to reject any further special projects may limit the MDRP's flexibility if national program preparation is delayed. In the event that national program preparation is substantially delayed, Government should be encouraged to review this decision.

#### 4. Efforts complementary to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

26. *Local security* remains a major concern for Burundian citizens, the Government and international partners. At this time, many parts of the country remain insecure. Movement of most international humanitarian and development organizations is severely limited. In such an environment, meaningful reintegration of demobilized combatants may not be feasible. Attempts to establish local security will only be possible with the implementation of a comprehensive ceasefire agreement.

27. *Security sector reform* is at the heart of the Burundian peace process. While Protocol III of the Arusha agreement contains general principles for security sector reform, details remain to be worked out. Protocol III foresees the unification of Government and armed groups, a restructuring of the new armed forces, and the subsequent demobilization of surplus soldiers to reach a target strength that is financially sustainable. Government has confirmed that the planned national DDRR program will be closely linked to security sector reform efforts.

28. It is believed that small weapons are widely available in Burundi as a legacy of an almost decade-old conflict and violent conflict in neighboring countries. In this context, *civilian disarmament* will be important. UNDP's Great Lakes Small Arms Reduction Initiative has recently fielded an assessment mission to Burundi to identify opportunities for civilian disarmament activities.

29. No *involuntary disarmament* is currently planned in the Burundian context. It is expected that any disarmament activities for combatants would be undertaken according to the provisions of the ceasefire agreements.

#### 5. Risks and mitigation measures

30. Burundi faces a real risk of a *reversal of the peace process*. Implementation of the recently signed ceasefire agreements has been uneven. Security conditions have not improved in most parts of the country. At the same time, a military victory is not considered likely for any party. A political solution is thus required.

31. Two developments require special attention by the international community in general, and MDRP partners with the necessary mandate in particular. First, as the implementation of the ceasefire and the reform of the security forces will not be initiated before the second phase of the transition starts on May 1, 2003, the situation is likely to remain fragile in the near future. Confidence-building measures are essential to reduce the risk of a reversal.

32. Paradoxically, the risk of *moral hazard* has increased after the signing of the cease-fire agreements. There are persistent reports that some armed groups have stepped up recruiting of new combatants, with the promise of significant demobilization benefits in the near future for anybody joining. Significant information and sensitization, a robust definition of combatant status, rigorous target group verification and clarity regarding entitlements, will be essential to reduce potential targeting leakages. It is Government's position that nobody recruited following the signing of the cease-fire agreement should be eligible for DDR program benefits.

33. The large number of people uprooted by war in Burundi requires close attention to finding a *balance between support to ex-combatants and assistance to other vulnerable groups*, in particular returning refugees and IDPs and host communities. It is generally acknowledged

that these different groups have different profiles, needs and expectations, and that differentiated assistance is thus appropriate. However, it will be important to maintain an acceptable level of proportionality of assistance between ex-combatants and other war-affected populations.<sup>2</sup>

34. The risk of a *funding gap* is small. The MDRP has set aside adequate funding for DDR in Burundi, to be financed partly through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund linked to the MDRP, partly through bilateral contributions, partly by the World Bank. This arrangement should ensure that funds for a national demobilization and reintegration program in Burundi will be available as and when required.

35. With the initiation of national program preparation, coordination activities have increased. The recent Joint Assessment Mission and the establishment of the DDR-CC have helped to reduce the *risk of a lack of coordination*. However, significant coordination challenges remain. Several partners recently launched missions to address DDR issues without prior consultation with the World Bank or the local DDR-CC. Such actions can complicate dialogue with Government, lead to planning duplication, complicate intra-Governmental coordination, and weaken local MDRP partnership mechanisms. The Secretariat welcomes the efforts of these partners to address this issue without delay and to ensure that it is not repeated. All future actions should be coordinated through the DDR-CC and in consultation with the World Bank, the MDRP lead agency for Burundi.

36. The *risk of non-engagement* of the international community in the Burundian peace process is limited. The international community continues to strongly support the implementation of the Arusha peace accord. The governments of South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, as well as the African Union, European Union and the United Nations are providing important mediation support. The African Union has already deployed 43 military observers and the government of South Africa has deployed 800 soldiers to Bujumbura to protect the government of national unity. The governments of South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique have promised to deploy 3,500 soldiers to Burundi in the near future.

37. The continued support of the international community in the financing of the peacekeeping operation, DDR and the reconstruction process will be essential. As a case in point, if the African mission cannot obtain adequate financing to deploy adequate forces, cantonment and disarmament processes will be extremely difficult to implement.

38. Engagement in Burundi, however, does not only imply a continued dialogue with and among the Government and the armed groups. Equally important is an engagement by MDRP partners with the DRC and Tanzania. Unless this regional dimension is addressed in the dialogue of MDRP partners on the basis of their respective capacities and mandates, the situation in Burundi is likely to remain fragile.

## **6. Baseline for key MDRP monitoring indicators**

### *39. Strategy Indicators*

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<sup>2</sup> It should be noted that many combatants from the FAB and the rebellion have family members either in refugee camps outside the country or who are displaced within Burundi's borders. This fact would need to be considered when designing reinsertion and reintegration assistance.

- 1 ***Reduction in the number of internally displaced and refugees.*** According to OCHA, there are currently about 388,000 IDPs in Burundi and around 839,000 Burundian refugees in neighboring countries (mainly in Tanzania), of whom 200,000 are old caseload.
  - 2 ***Restoration of the free movement of persons and goods.*** The movement of persons and goods is still severely impaired throughout the country. Severe security incidents occur regularly and particularly affect the primary road network. Six provinces are currently under UN security phase IV.
  - 3 ***Evolution of social and security expenditures.*** At the end of 2002, social expenditure was 4% of GDP and military 7.2% of GDP. In 2001 Social expenditures reached FBu 23.9 billion in 2001, or 24.6 percent of Government recurrent expenditures. Military expenditures reached FBu 34.9 billion or 36.0 percent of recurrent expenditure. By comparison, in 1995, i.e., the year before the coup d'état after which regional sanctions were imposed, social and military expenditures amounted to 17.5 percent and 24.4 percent of total recurrent expenditures, respectively. The evolution of social and military expenditures in the near-term should be assessed in light of the country's internal and external security needs and the military integration process.
40. *Program Indicators*
- 4 ***Percent of DDR activities undertaken within the framework of the MDRP.*** No noteworthy activity is currently being undertaken outside of the framework of the MDRP. However, as mentioned above, some uncoordinated assessments and planning missions have taken place.
  - 5 ***Percent of DDR resources channeled through the regional MDTF.*** No MDTF funds are currently disbursed to Burundi.
  - 6 ***Degree of harmonization of national programs.*** There is not yet a national program in Burundi. However, the Government planning team has visited Rwanda to learn lessons from the RDRP.
41. *Output Indicators*
- 7 ***Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through national programs.*** There is currently no national program in Burundi.
  - 8 ***Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through special projects.*** There are currently no special projects in Burundi.
  - 9 ***Effectiveness of technical knowledge sharing activities.*** The planning team carried out a number of study visits to countries with DDR programs. These experiences have been useful in the reflection process within the Government regarding its future program, including possible institutional arrangements.
  - 10 ***Efficient organization of joint missions and preparation of reports.*** The January 2003 Joint Assessment mission has enhanced cooperation among MDRP partners, and has contributed to the establishment of a local DDR coordination mechanism. Future

missions will require more advance planning of meetings, logistical support and prior consultations on terms of reference.

**7. Summary of next steps**

42. Proposed next steps include the following:

- (i) National program preparation should proceed as rapidly as possible. The World Bank and MDRP partners will continue to support Government efforts to prepare a national program.
- (ii) Government should seek to initiate discussions with armed groups about the national program as soon as possible.
- (iii) Government should put in place national implementation arrangements as soon as possible.
- (iv) Government, in consultation with civil society and armed groups, should initiate information and sensitization activities as soon as possible.
- (v) UNICEF should re-submit its special project proposal once it has incorporated comments from the LAC.
- (vi) Partners should support the local DDR Coordination Committee. Terms of reference and timing of any proposed missions should be agreed with Government and the DDR-CC in advance.

**Central African Republic  
MDRP Country Update**

April 2003

**Introduction**

1. The update below, draws from the February/March 2003 UNDP/WB/MDRP mission to Bangui. It reflects the latest consultations with locally represented partners, but also the outcome of initial discussions held with the new government on DDR issues. Since there is as yet no country program, the report focuses on prevailing conditions as they relate to eligibility for MDRP in the special CAR context.

**1. Recent developments**

2. In the past two months, two developments have taken place in CAR that are of significance to the eventual preparation of a country MDRP assistance program. A key development was the coup d'état of March 15, 2003 by General Francois Bozizé, and the subsequent appointment of a new broad-based and mainly civilian government. The new government has announced that DDR will be one of its top priorities and appears to be willing to meet the policy criteria for MDRP eligibility. Despite the expressed intentions of the present government to place DDR and security-related issues at the top of their political agenda, much remains to be done to translate such political will into concrete reform programs.

3. Although the Government has suspended the Constitution and the National Assembly and given itself wide powers to rule by decree, it has also maintained the central role as well as all the prerogatives of the judiciary. The Assembly is being replaced by a broad-based Transition Council which will, among other things, oversee the organization of a national political dialogue and the organization of fresh elections after a transitional period whose duration has been fixed by the President at 24 months at the most.

4. In February/March 2003, a joint UNDP/MDRP/WB exploratory mission took place to examine the adequacy of the policy environment for an MDRP program. Although the mission was a follow-up to a government request for MDRP assistance, it was conducted in a particularly difficult atmosphere, with the government unwilling to make the key policy decisions needed to address the eligibility concerns raised by the mission. As part of the outcome of this mission, a decision was made, in consultation with the previous government to undertake a reformulation mission for the UNDP-supported National Disarmament and Reintegration Program.

**2. General and country-level eligibility criteria for MDRP assistance**

5. Although not directly involved in the regional Great Lakes conflict, the CAR has been heavily *affected by conflicts*. CAR has been experiencing internal armed conflict since the first army mutiny in 1996. DRC rebel forces (MLC) were actively involved in the fighting on the side of the former government. In addition, the CAR suffered from the effects of conflict in neighboring countries. It hosts 50,000 refugees from countries in the region.



6. The participation of the CAR in the *regional peace process* is limited, since it is not a party to the Lusaka agreement. The resolution of the conflict in the CAR is guided by the Bangui and Libreville accords, and by CEMAC Summit declarations.

7. The *preparation of a national demobilization and reintegration program* (PNDR) formulated with the assistance of UNDP following the series of mutinies that occurred during the second half of the 1990s suffered multiple project redesign efforts that resulted in a focus on voluntary civilian disarmament. The previous government has requested MDRP to consider using this program as groundwork for the formulation of a country DRP. However, the UNDP/WB/MDRP mission concluded that the program in its present form would need to be substantially revised if it were to serve as the entry point for the MDRP.

8. The *institutional structures* put in place for the National Disarmament and Reintegration Program consist of two national commissions, one for disarmament and the other for reintegration, each supported by a technical committee. These two national commissions are supervised by a joint national commission for disarmament and reintegration. This institutional structure would need to be reviewed to take into account the new environment and MDRP criteria.

9. One area in which partners have had difficulties getting the previous government to commit to has been the *preparation of a Letter of Demobilization Policy*. One important reason for this has been the government's reluctance to commit to a position regarding the fate of the 500 or so soldiers that had fled the CAR during previous coup attempts, preferring to consider all of them as "self-demobilized". Without such a commitment, the only targets of disarmament are civilians, who are not considered for support by the MDRP. Initial discussions with the new authorities indicate a more open and positive approach to DDR issues.

10. With regard to the *establishment of appropriate safeguards and fiduciary measures*, these still need to be put in place at the level of the government. Nonetheless, the management of the national disarmament and reintegration program resources in line with established UNDP guidelines has helped ensure that the absence of such measures does not immediately constitute an obstacle to establishing a regionally-supported MDRP initiative.

### **3. Relevance and implementation of MDRP guiding principles**

11. All MDRP guiding principles are highly relevant to the CAR context. Their implementation will only be possible once DDR planning is actually underway.

12. By announcing its willingness to prioritize DDR, the new authorities have shown a readiness to ensure *national ownership* and leadership over future DDR programs.

13. There are signs that initial *confidence building measures* by the new government are having an impact on the population. However, the true test of the sustainability of this confidence among the population will undoubtedly come when the Transition Council is finally set up and starts to steer important processes, such as the drafting of a new constitution and the organization of fresh elections. The new Government has indicated that the transitional period would last between 18 and 30 months.

14. Work is being undertaken to ensure the *optimization of external assistance*. Current funding for the national disarmament and reintegration program is provided by UNDP and by bilateral partners who are also MDRP partners and contributors. Following the February 2003

UNDP/WB/MDRP mission, it was decided that the PNDR will be reformulated with a new emphasis, thus ensuring that MDRP funding, when it comes, is complementary.

15. Since the coup d'état of March 15, 2003, and in spite of the work that remains to be done to ensure security in the entire national territory, the CAR is presently under central government control. This means that the only category of *special projects* to be considered would be those targeting ex-combatants from foreign countries. In the CAR context, these would be Chadian combatants who helped General Bozizé succeed in his coup d'état. There were also soldiers of foreign origin in the former presidential guard. Many of these fighters were already political exiles and may not be able to return to their respective countries and therefore might require a separate approach. Their numbers and exact status should be clarified in the government's demobilization policy. Child soldiers have not been an issue in CAR other than within the MLC forces. However, HIV/AIDS is known to be a huge problem that needs confronting.

16. In regards to *coordination with reconstruction efforts*, the new CAR Government is yet to issue its priority policy framework for the transition period. It is expected that DDR will be part of a broader strategy for reconciliation and rehabilitation, including UN-supported humanitarian assistance through a Consolidated Appeal process.

#### **4. Efforts complementary to DDR and potential roles of different partners**

17. The newly installed government in the CAR has stated its intention to make *local security* a top priority in its policy framework for the transition period that is currently being prepared. Following the total breakdown of law and order and the looting that took place in Bangui during the first week of the regime, drastic measures taken with the help of the Chadian army have now enabled the return of a reasonable level of law and order in the capital. In addition, the Government is presently initiating missions into the interior of the country to suppress armed bandits who have been taking advantage of the vacuum to harass the civilian population.

18. The new Head of State has decided to head personally the Ministry of Defense, which will be responsible for army restructuring and security sector reform. As part of the ongoing efforts to restore law and order to Bangui and the rest of the country, the government, with the help of Chad, is conducting regular raids on residential areas in the capital in an effort to disarm civilians and has so far collected some 2,300 light weapons. Such *involuntary disarmament* of both civilians and combatants is set to continue within the framework of the CEMAC contingent whose mandate is expected to be expanded to include support for the restructuring of the army.

#### **5. Risks and mitigation measures**

19. It is probably too early to arrive at any conclusions on the sustainability of the arrangements envisaged by the new authorities to facilitate the transition back to constitutional rule. A *reversal of the peace process*, thus, cannot be ruled out. First indications, however, are that the present authorities have reasonable control over the security situation in the country, although it is clear that the support of external actors, especially CEMAC (together with the assistance of France), will be indispensable in maintaining law and order in the short and medium term. The political support currently shown by these key partners for the new authorities

in the CAR can be seen as evidence of the medium-term viability and credibility of the new government.

20. ***Balance between support for ex-combatants with assistance to other vulnerable groups*** will be a strategic priority for any special programs to be formulated within the MDRP framework. The ongoing UNDP disarmament project does constitute one such opportunity. In effect, as the government places more and more emphasis on involuntary disarmament of civilians, the PNDR will need to shift its focus away from voluntary disarmament and reintegration of individual civilians. The alternative currently being considered following the most recent UNDP/WB/MDRP mission is to adopt a broader community development approach that addresses disarmament as one component of a peace consolidation and national reconciliation program involving communities.

21. Just over US\$1 million from bilateral donors remains currently available for the National Disarmament and Reintegration program. This is likely to be insufficient in view of needs that are expected to emerge following the reformulation of the project. There thus exists the risk of a ***funding gap***.

22. One key criticism of the national disarmament and reintegration program has been its focus on individuals. The current approach envisages investing over US\$1,500 per person in the training and reintegration of civilian individuals handing in a single weapon, while poor communities where they live do not stand to receive anything. Much of this criticism has come from the community level where the Disarmament Committees operate, and who see the program as rewarding the illegal possession of weapons. They have asked whether they would each need to obtain and hand in weapons in order to benefit from UNDP and government assistance. This perception, and the ***moral hazard*** related to it, would be quickly dispelled if the current peace process proved sustainable. The reformulation of the current program recommended by the UNDP mission will make it more a component of broader community development and national peace building and reconciliation and rehabilitation efforts.

23. The ***risk of non-engagement*** by the international community in helping resolve the CAR conflict is real. Apart from the obvious financial difficulties in which the country presently finds itself, engaging with the MDRP will be vital in terms of fully integrating the CAR into this important regional initiative, and providing it with an appropriate mechanism to monitor its peace and reconciliation process. As is the case with other crisis countries in the greater Great Lakes region, the conflict in the CAR, though brought about by internal governance problems, has been sustained essentially by external actors, and cannot be resolved on a sustainable basis without necessary linkages to, and coordination with, a broader regional peace building and consolidation framework such as the MDRP.

24. The linkages being established within the MDRP is an important step towards strengthening DDR ***donor coordination*** since all bilateral partners that have contributed so far to the national disarmament and reintegration program are also MDRP partners.

**6. Baseline for key MDRP monitoring indicators:**

25. *Strategy Indicators*

1. ***Reduction in the number of internally displaced and refugees.*** Due to the current unstable situation and the fact that IDPs are dispersed among the population, it is difficult to establish the number of IDPs or identify them. Through the end of 2002, there were approximately 50,665 refugees (37,375 from Sudan; 10,798 from DRC; 1,892 from Chad; and 600 from other countries) according to UNHCR statistics.
2. ***Restoration of the free movement of persons and goods.*** In the last six months movement between the capital and the provinces and neighboring countries has been either completely cut or severely disrupted. The last few weeks have seen an improving trend but bandits are still a major problem on all roads.
3. ***Evolution of social expenditures, including in relation to security spending.*** Due to the change in government, new trends in social and security spending are hard to determine. As it stood previously, however, budgeted social expenditures reached FCFA 17.5 billion in 2002, or 37.0 percent of Government recurrent expenditures. Military expenditures reached FCFA 7.4 billion or 15.6 percent in the same year. By comparison, in 1995, i.e., the year before the first mutiny, social and military expenditures amounted to 31.1 percent and 12.1 percent of total recurrent expenditures, respectively. In case of MDRP engagement, the evolution of social and military expenditure in the near-term needs to be assessed in light of the country's internal and external security needs.

26. *Program Indicators*

4. ***Percent of DDR activities undertaken within the framework of the MDRP.*** The national disarmament and reintegration program is the only important DDR activity in the CAR. It is currently under review in order to find complementarities between this program and the MDRP-supported program.
5. ***Percent of DDR resources channeled through the regional MDTF.*** No MDTF funds are currently disbursed to the CAR.
6. ***Degree of harmonization of national programs.*** There is currently no national program as defined by the MDRP in the CAR.

27. *Output Indicators*

7. ***Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through national programs.*** The national program, though intended to target ex-combatants, ended up only disarming civilians.
8. ***Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through special projects.*** There is no special project in existence in the CAR.
9. ***Effectiveness of technical knowledge sharing activities.*** The former CAR Government participated in the partners meeting in the Hague and benefited from the exchange of experiences and lessons learned.

10. *Efficient organization of joint missions and preparation of reports.* A joint UNDP/WB/MDRP mission was conducted in February under difficult circumstances. Although unable to travel, it was able to meet all the relevant parties other than the rebel faction. Despite the change of government the mission seems to have managed to put the principle of the MDRP on the national agenda. It also established a good working relationship amongst local partners on the issue of DDR. An aide memoire was circulated to both governments and partners.

**7. Summary of recommendations and proposed next steps**

28. The change in regime that occurred in the CAR on March 15, 2003 does present the country and its partners with a potential opportunity to embark on a sustainable peace and reconciliation process through a multi-pronged approach that includes DDR. To take full advantage of this opportunity, the following next steps are suggested over the next three months:

- (i) Engage the new authorities in a dialogue to obtain further clarification from them on their DDR and security sector reform plans. This includes briefings to the new authorities on the opportunities offered by the MDRP and steps needed at the national level to fulfill established eligibility criteria;
- (ii) In-country advocacy and donor encouragement should be aimed at submission by the Government of a draft Letter of Demobilization Policy, with related technical support being provided by MDRP/UNDP/WB if requested;
- (iii) There may be a need for a mission to assess the new situation, to review the current UNDP supported disarmament and reintegration program in line with the recommendations of the report of the February UNDP/WB/MDRP mission, to ensure coherence with MDRP guiding principles;
- (iv) At a later stage, there may be the need for an MDRP identification mission by MDRP, UNDP, WB, Government and donor partners.

**Republic of Congo**  
**MDRP Country Update**

April 2003

**1. Country Context**

1. An encouraging development was the signing of a Cessation of Hostilities in the Pool region on March 17, 2003 between the Government and the leader of the rebel group, the Rev. Ntoumi. Part of the agreement promised the rebels immediate reintegration into the armed forces and other DDR benefits at a later date. Representatives from both sides are now working on the practicalities of implementing the agreement.

2. Until recently, the conflict in the Pool district continued to lead to loss of life and a disruption of the economic and social life of the country. However, the country has made some visible progress both socially and economically. At the same time, strategic infrastructure remains in poor condition and sustainable employment opportunities in the productive sectors are extremely limited. Youth unemployment in certain parts of the country reaches 80%. As opposed to many other African countries, the Republic of Congo (RoC) has only a very small informal agricultural sector to absorb rural unemployment.

3. In order to palliate these problems, the government has recruited massively into the public sector (for example, the army and the police have incorporated some 67,000 former militia men giving an armed forces strength of some 27,000 for a population of 2.8 million) and continues to press the international community for programs that can absorb ex-combatants, or youth in general, into sustainable productive activities.

4. Little more has been done since the last mission in September 2002 to deal with, or assess, the problem of foreign combatants who have taken refuge in RoC. Only the Angolan forces that were officially present in RoC have now been repatriated. The MDRP framework could be used for supporting initiatives in this area.

5. Some instability remains at the eastern border and, more recently, particularly across the northern border. However, there have been no serious incidents between the RoC and its neighbors.

**2. General and country-level eligibility criteria for MDRP assistance**

6. The Republic of Congo's *institutional framework* for dealing with DDR, The '*Haut Commissariat pour la Reinsertion des Ex-combattants*' (HC) has continued to execute and develop its program for the reintegration of ex-militiamen with the support of IDA funds. However, much remains to be done to prepare an overall national demobilization and reintegration plan that would qualify for MDRP support. Basic information, such as the number and definition of beneficiaries for DDR assistance, would be required as a key planning tool for such a national plan.

7. In principle, a national DDR plan would be outlined by the government in a formal *letter demobilization and reintegration policy* to donors that would also include its overall policy

towards the regional peace process and security sector reform. Partners have encouraged the Government to produce a draft letter of policy and the MDRP Secretariat has offered its assistance in this regard.

8. The government has created, by decree, a new institution to assist with DDR, the *Commission Nationale de Démobilisation et de Réinsertion des Ex-combattants* (CONADER). This body is supposed to coordinate, guide and monitor the activities of the HC, rather than formulate policy. The commission's composition has not yet been clarified and it appears it has yet to meet. Advice and assistance may eventually be required to adjust these institutions so that they meet MDRP requirements. The government would also need to advise MDRP partners on its current technical capacities in order for both parties to evaluate and agree upon what further capacity building may be required.

9. There is a unit within the HC which deals with the *financial management* of the IDA credit. Its recruitment profile was established, and fiduciary issues are managed, by this team according to World Bank rules. An initial independent financial audit is being carried out presently.

### 3. Relevance and implementation of MDRP guiding principles

10. The establishment of the Haut Commissariat has been a positive development that enhanced *national ownership* of the DDR process. However, the intended participation of non-national bodies in CONADER may dilute this.

11. The hope expressed in the last report of October 2002 that the IOM-executed DDR project supported by UNDP would be closely coordinated with the new reintegration program being implemented by the Haut Commissariat has not been entirely realized. An efficient means of excluding the beneficiaries of one program from the other has yet to be devised, allowing for continued risk of 'double-dipping'.

12. Following the joint, independent evaluation as well as the cessation of hostilities in the Pool Region, the European Commission has approved Euro 731,000 through its rapid reaction mechanism for disarmament and initial reintegration of the ninjas in the Pool region. These funds will be challenged through UNDP, with whom the Commission has worked on an earlier disarmament project.

13. As the situation improves in RoC, more development and private enterprise activities are slowly being made available (including IDA credits) increasing the need for DDR efforts to be *coordinated with other development initiatives*.

14. The loss of UNDP funding for DDR activities has also led to a disruption of the IOM initiative to assess the numbers and needs of foreign ex-combatants in RoC. IOM had established an agreement between the RoC and the DRC to repatriate certain ex-combatants. This project (which might very well be the sort eligible for MDRP support as a *special project*) currently appears to be inactive. There is also a need to investigate the possible presence of Congolese ex-militia now present in Gabon and waiting for repatriation.

15. The current HC program has some small funds available for dealing with beneficiary health problems but it does not have the sort of resources necessary to offer the special

contingencies for *vulnerable groups* or for HIV/AIDS problems related to ex-combatants that are expected of an MDRP supported program.

#### 4. Efforts complementary to DDR

16. The recent peace agreement in the Pool region has already been mentioned as a major step forward towards lasting peace in RoC. Nonetheless, however expedient the reintegration of Pool's ex-combatants into the army might be, it is not tenable as a long term solution to the country's problems. In particular a large army and police force are a drain on scarce resources. The government has continued to express a desire for the *reform of the armed services and police* but is waiting for the French assisted 'army census' process to be completed before contemplating any long-term reform policy. Apparently this might take until next year. This important reform process will almost certainly require foreign assistance.

17. A recent survey shows that some 40,000 weapons are still 'illegally' in circulation in RoC. Unfortunately, since the closure of the IOM project there is no longer any *disarmament* facility available. The HC is neither financed, nor equipped to offer this service. The EC is considering supporting this activity bilaterally.

18. The HC program offers *micro-projects* to returnee communities. However these are very small and do not go far enough to mitigate the impression that assistance favors only ex-combatants to the detriment of the communities that bore the brunt of the war. MDRP and other partner-funded projects need to bear this in mind for the future.

#### 5. Risks and mitigation measures

19. It is evident that despite the cessation of hostilities and the guarded economic improvements, the country is *still very fragile*. Weapons are still widely distributed and despite the nominal amnesty and demobilization of 1999, it would not take much de-stabilization to see a return to civil strife, or even worse. According to interviews with former militia, politico-ethnic animosities endure close to the surface and former militia commanders remain in close contact and may be ready for re-mobilization. In this respect the settling of the on-going conflict in the Pool is a very positive development. It is also hoped that pursuing policies that promote good governance, justice, financial transparency and social democracy will, with time, promote stability.

20. The ever-increasing numbers of the armed forces and police and the inherent problems of paying and maintaining discipline amongst such an expanding number of people is of grave concern and a long-term threat to stability. Now that the immediate threats to the *security* of the state have abated it is urgent to review the size and role of the security forces. The MDRP could assist with the reintegration of those soldiers that were superfluous to requirements.

21. The issue of significant *moral hazard* for a future MDRP supported program remains a high risk. It has been over three years now since the official demobilization of the militias (excluding those from the Pool). When the current IDA credit has been expended, some 18,000 ex-combatants will have had access to reintegration initiatives. It is estimated that at least another 6-7,000 ex-combatants have been drafted into the armed forces or police. Finally, there are those that have gone back to civilian life unassisted. This would almost account for most of



the often quoted 25,000 total number of ex-militia that needed to be reintegrated. However, the government claims that there are still many more that require reintegration. At the very least, this highlights the need to review the figures and above all the registration procedures.

22. The difficulties that confronted the IOM project and that are currently facing the HC and its project are a clear indication of the limitations of operating a DDR program without an overall letter of policy.

## 6. Baseline for key MDRP monitoring indicators

### 23. *Strategy Indicators*

1 ***Reduction in the number of internally displaced and refugees.*** There are currently about 140,000 IDPs in the Republic of Congo and around 13,700 refugees in neighboring countries. RoC also harbors 110,000 refugees from the DRC, CAR, Chad, Rwanda and Angola.

2 ***Restoration of the free movement of persons and goods.*** The movement of goods has apparently improved dramatically since the March agreement that brought hostilities to an end in the Pool province.

3 ***Evolution of social expenditures, including in relation to security spending.*** Social expenditures have reached US\$75million in 2002, or 7% of Government recurrent expenditures. Military expenditures have reached US\$71million or 6.5% in the same year (UNDP figures). In case of MDRP engagement, the evolution of social and military expenditures in the near-term needs to be assessed in light of the country's security needs.

### 24. *Program Indicators*

4 ***Percent of DDR activities undertaken within the framework of the MDRP.*** At this time, no DDR activity in RoC is being undertaken with MDRP financing. The European Commission will provide Euro 731,000 for DDR activities in the Pool region within the MDRP framework. The ongoing activities by the *Haut Commissariat a la reinsertion des Ex-Combattants* are funded by a \$5 million IDA credit outside the MDRP framework.

5 ***Percent of DDR resources channeled through the regional MDTF.*** No MDTF funds are currently disbursed to RoC.

6 ***Degree of harmonization of national programs.*** Since the recent closure of the IOM project, the HC project is the only DDR initiative in RoC.

### 25. *Output Indicators*

7 ***Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through national programs.*** Close to 3,700 ex-combatants have been demobilized by the government's *Haut Commissariat a la Reinsertion des Ex-Combattants*. A total of 12,000 have been registered of which 9,000 have been 'validated'. Registration continues. A further 8,000 ex-combatants have been demobilized by the UNDP/IOM project.

- 8 *Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through special projects.* There are currently no special projects in the Congo.
- 9 *Effectiveness of technical knowledge sharing activities.* No activities since last report.
- 10 *Efficient organization of joint missions and preparation of reports.* The EU and UNDP funded an independent joint evaluation to review the recently completed UNDP/IOM and on-going GoRoC, IDA funded DDR initiatives (16 February – 6 March). The World Bank, in view of its role as MDRP Secretariat joined in the review process to assess the current possibilities for MDRP involvement in RoC. A formal evaluation report will be shared with MDRP partners.

## **7. Summary of recommendations and proposed next steps**

26. The key recommendations and proposed next steps include the following:
- (i) Government should formulate and engage partners in discussing a comprehensive DDR and SSR policy, as soon as possible. This should include a comprehensive review of beneficiary groups, their eligibility criteria and their estimated numbers;
  - (ii) MDRP partners should carry out an identification mission with a view to preparing a program within the MDRP framework that could become operational before current funds run out;
  - (iii) Donors should encourage and support efforts to resume an effective and transparent weapons collection and destruction program outside the MDRP framework;
  - (iv) The IOM, UNDP and Haut Commissariat should develop their cooperation further in order to share: (i) their experiences; (ii) their operating practices; (iii) their lessons learned; and (iv) information on their case loads, in order to avoid wasting resources, creating double standards and possibly confusing beneficiaries.

**Democratic Republic of the Congo**  
**MDRP Country Update**

April 2003

**Introduction**

1. This review draws heavily on the Joint Mission that was undertaken from February 10-15, 2003. The MDRP Secretariat wishes to thank the Program partners in the DRC for their support and assistance in carrying out this review.

**1. Country Context**

2. The DRC is facing an unprecedented opportunity to establish a durable peace in the country. There has been significant progress in the implementation of the “*Accord global et inclusive sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo*” signed in Pretoria on December 17, 2002. All parties to the conflict formally endorsed and committed themselves to the realization of the Accord in Sun City on April 2, 2003. The key elements of the agreement for immediate follow up include the establishment of the transitional government and finalizing the restructuring of the national army.

3. The National Implementation Committee (NIC)<sup>3</sup> composed of representatives of the signatories to the Sun City Agreement, has been set up and will be responsible to ensure the establishment of the transitional government. It is scheduled to meet as soon as the security framework for the non-Kinshasa based representatives is clarified. MONUC is examining this issue and its proposals should be made public soon. The swearing in of Major General Joseph Kabila as President, and the adoption and promulgation of the transitional constitution, will provide momentum to the effort of the international community to expedite the assistance in the preparation of a comprehensive national framework for DDR. Furthermore, there has been progress in the discussions between the Chiefs of Staff on the restructuring of the National Army, with a final agreement to be finalized. This is critical to the installation of the transitional government in Kinshasa.

4. However, there have been serious setbacks as well, including reports of serious human rights abuses as well as outbreaks of violence in the Eastern regions. In response, the establishment of the Ituri Pacification Commission (IPC), which aims to create an interim authority, has been accelerated. The continued presence of Ugandan troops continues to create tensions with Rwanda, although recent reports indicate that the Governments of Uganda and DRC have arrived at an arrangement for the eventual withdrawal of Ugandan troops.

5. MONUC’s Disarmament, Demobilization and Repatriation of foreign-armed groups has resulted in approximately 1,500 foreign combatants being disarmed, demobilized and repatriated along with dependents. This process has encountered serious difficulties as a result of intransigence of several groups (including RCD, Mai Mai, local militias and others) throughout the East, as well as the refusal by some foreign combatants to disarm. Also, given the small

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<sup>3</sup> Also known as Follow Up Committee.

numbers of foreign troops being disarmed, resources originally designated for the planned DDRRR of foreign troops are also being used to address the urgent needs in Ituri, security for the transitional government in Kinshasa, as well as the verification of Rwandan presence.

## 2. General and country level eligibility criteria for MDRP assistance

6. The conflict in the DRC has been marked by immense human suffering and the involvement of various Congolese groups and external actors. A large number of Congolese have been killed or displaced in this conflict. An already poor infrastructure base has been further eroded, and movement of trade and persons has been severely hampered.

7. The DRC continues to *contribute to the regional peace process*, as a signatory of the Lusaka, Luanda and Pretoria agreements. Recent substantial progress in the implementation of these agreements, and the current window of opportunity offered by the transitional period make the preparation of a comprehensive national DDR program even more pressing. It is vital that MDRP partners and other interested parties apply both pressure and support to the members of the transitional government to ensure the success of this process.

8. *National program.* Currently, there exist several national ministries, commissions and committees, which are engaged in activities involving disarmament, demobilization and reintegration within their various mandates. One such institution (BUNADER) has circulated a draft document for a national DDR program. UNDP has attempted to co-ordinate the response within the inter-agency technical committee (IATC). However, this draft document will be reviewed along with other activities, documents and initiatives to ensure linkages with ongoing processes, in particular the restructuring of the national army, the national framework for community revitalization, DDR of foreign armed groups, as well as the establishment of civilian authority. This work is being undertaken in the preparatory phase for the development of the comprehensive national DDR program that should in due course lead to a *letter of demobilization policy*. Both the strategy for the development of a national program and the work program for its implementation—including terms of reference, composition, reporting links with the political level, and consultations with appropriate national transitional structures representing the armed groups—will be developed jointly and shared with MDRP partners.

9. UNDP is in the process of developing an interim strategy leading to the development of a comprehensive national DDR program within the timeframe of three to six months, in consultation with representatives of the transitional government, bilateral missions, UN agencies, and MDRP partners. It is expected that this will be presented to the MDRP advisory committee meeting in Paris April 28, 2003.

10. In relation to *vulnerable groups*, more than 300 child soldiers have been demobilized and others are reported to be awaiting demobilization in various camps, in recognition of the urgency and expected incoming caseloads, UNDP is working closely with UNICEF in the development of a strategy for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of child soldiers, to ensure sound linkages between interim activities for child soldiers and the broader comprehensive framework for a national DDR program.

11. Appropriate *environmental safeguards and fiduciary measures* will need to be established to minimize any potentially negative social and environmental impact and ensure the

proper use of program funds. These aspects will be discussed with Government counterparts in the context of a national DRP preparation.

### 3. Relevance and implementation of MDRP guiding principles

12. There is presently a strong consensus on the part of the Government and the international community to accelerate planning, development and implementation of a demobilization and repatriation program for the national armed groups. There is also recognition from all sides of the need for a coordinated approach to a well-targeted national program.

13. In general, there is a high readiness to assume *national ownership*, though political commitment is not yet fully reflected in an appropriate *institutional framework*. Responsibility is currently scattered among various agencies, making the development of the national program quite difficult, further exacerbated by the delay in formation of the transitional government. There may be a need to provide support for capacity building in the process leading to a transitional government, which should include viable institutions for the management of a DRP. According to the General Agreement of December 17, the responsibility for demobilization of ex-combatants will rest with a vice-minister of defense.

14. Currently, activities of the international community related to DDR are being undertaken jointly. A joint inter-agency mission, led by UNDP with MONUC, UNICEF, and MDRP partners, established contacts and held a series of initial consultations with representatives of RCD (Goma), MLC (Gbalodite) and Government to present the MDRP and DDR, as well as to convey the need for their participation in the initial technical preparations. During the discussions, a comprehensive and coherent approach to DDR activities was emphasized. The reactions of the two movements were very positive and constructive.

15. The international community also needs to *coordinate closely its technical support* with the political processes in support of the development of a comprehensive framework for a national DDR program. In this regard, UNDP has made a request to the SRSG for participation in the monitoring committee at the technical level. The secondment to UNDP of a program coordinator by DFID in preparation of the interim strategy for the development of a national DDR program, and implementation of its work program will further enhance capacity to assist the transitional government.

16. The Resident Coordinator will continue to be the focal point to link the advance work of the technical co-ordination committee to the political process by providing a monthly briefing to MDRP partners and the Local Multi-Donor Coordination Committee for DDR.

17. Given the challenging environment in terms of political commitment and logistics, setbacks and delays are likely to occur during the implementation of the interim DDR strategy. These need to be managed in close consultation with partners, and with much flexibility.

18. Activities in support of *special groups/special projects*. Initial DDR related pilot projects were launched in July 1999 in anticipation of a national program resulting from the inter-Congolese dialogue. The Government issued a decree for the demobilization and reintegration of vulnerable soldiers in Government occupied areas in early 2000. These efforts along with the activities of UNDP, USAID, European Union, and others will be reviewed, within the MDRP framework, in the course of the coming months. The lessons learned will be incorporated into the preparatory work for development of a comprehensive framework for a national DDR program.

19. A *Local Ad Hoc* (LAC) committee was formed and has met twice – December 2002 and February 2003. The first meeting returned three proposals for revision to be resubmitted in January 2003. The second meeting recommended these three proposals for approval—Two of these proposals, both for support to the demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers, are in the final stages of approval; The third proposal, for Community reconstruction and reintegration of ex-combatants, is presently being amended and updated (as recommended by the committee) for final presentation.

20. Current pilot projects carried out by UN partners or specialized agencies target vulnerable groups; World Bank-funded ILO pilot project in support of the reintegration of vulnerable groups; and Reintegration and Rehabilitation of war wounded, carried out by the Social Fund.

21. In response to a spontaneous demobilization of combatants from Mai Mai in Kindu, a joint assessment was carried out in February with the participation of USAID/IFES, FAO, MONUC and UNICEF, led by a short-term specialist made available through the Rapid Response Mechanism. It was agreed that in the absence of a national program, the basic humanitarian needs of ex-combatants, dependents and the host community will be covered through a community reintegration approach within the MDRP framework.

22. Lastly, as part of several cross border issues and in response to formal requests from the Governments of the Republic of Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo within the framework of the Shared Border Tripartite Commission, a feasibility study was undertaken by UNDP to address the needs of approximately 4,000 ex-FAZ and FAC combatants and their dependents settled in ROC. This will be discussed with MDRP partners in the coming months as part of the linkages necessary to the development of the comprehensive framework for a national DDR program.

#### **4. Efforts complementary to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration**

23. Based on country experiences, a sound *security framework*, including peacekeeping and political commitment, is critical to create an environment conducive to successful disarmament and demobilization. Subsequently, the restoration of civil authority and good governance consolidates the process whereby reintegration of ex-combatants, resettlement of IDPs, refugees, community recovery are possible. Towards these ends, the Government would need to be assisted in continuing the dialogue with the population and in launching local peace-building initiatives.

24. A national DDR program is essential, but not sufficient to support the peace process and facilitate social and economic recovery. Additional measures will be required to address emergency humanitarian needs and ensure sustainable development (e.g., small arms recovery efforts, rapid developmental assistance and reconciliation will be encouraged in the development of a comprehensive framework for national community recovery efforts). In this regard, the office of the Humanitarian Coordinator, UNOCHA and UNCHR will review these issues with Government and donors as they will have a significant impact on the resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees. It is recognized that the risks to a national DDR program are great if the issue of *balance of support to ex-combatants with the needs of the civilian population* is not addressed.

25. *Local security* poses a considerable challenge, partially to be addressed through the DDR program in the immediate future, but in the long term through an inclusive government, good governance, provision of social services and reform of the security sector.

26. In the context of the DRC, the *reform of the armed forces* is necessary in order to have a national professional force as a complementary requirement to the design and implementation of a national DDR programs. This will be one of the key initial links between the technical preparatory and the political process.

## 5. Risks and mitigation measures

27. The *risk of non-engagement* of the international community in the DRC is very limited. The additional deployment of MONUC, the formation of the International Committee in Support of Transitional Government (ICST) and the interim strategy for the development of a national program of the DRC all exhibit commitment to support efforts to consolidate peace in the DRC. However, it is unclear if the current delays in the process are due to genuine concerns, or due to a lack of political commitment to the peace process. This further adds to the uncertainty and anxiety, which could jeopardize the gains made thus far. It is a joint responsibility of all stakeholders to reinforce current dialogues between the parties to the conflict, in order to minimize delays and fulfill commitments.

28. The presence of *foreign armed groups* in the DRC continues to pose a security risk that may impede the process of demobilization and reintegration of Congolese combatants. In this regard, new approaches may need to be considered for the DDRRR of these foreign groups.

29. The humanitarian situation can worsen if there is a return to violence, thus close *coordination* between demobilization and repatriation efforts (MONUC), humanitarian assistance (OCHA) and early DDR efforts (MDRP partners) is absolutely critical for the success of the peace process. This is particularly important, as support to former combatants needs to be balanced with support to the war affected communities of the return in the coming months. Thus it is expected that humanitarian assistance would be continued.

## 6. Baseline for key MDRP monitoring indicators, including:

30. *Strategy Indicators*

1 *Reduction in the number of internally displaced and refugees.* According to OCHA, the number of displaced persons in DRC is currently about 2,7 million. Approximately 2 million are displaced in North and South Kivu, Katanga and Ituri. There are currently 335,000 refugees in DRC, originating from six countries, the majority of whom are from Angola. There is a reported 336,500 Congolese Refugees in border countries.

2 *Restoration of free movement of goods and persons within and between countries.* The movement of persons and goods is still very restricted in many areas of the country. This is primarily due to continued outbreaks of violence, control of movement by local authorities, extremely limited road networks and their deterioration. Security incidents continue in the northern and eastern parts of the country

3 ***Evolution of social expenditures in participating countries, including in relation to security spending.*** At the end of September 2002, social expenditure represented only 7 percent of primary expenditure, whereas the objective for the year was 15 percent. Defense/security expenditures related to the peace process represented 50 percent of primary expenditure compared with 23.5% program for the year. Contingency social expenditure tied to net external financing was not made.

31. *Program Indicators*

4 ***Percent of DDR activities undertaken in the region within the framework of the MDRP.*** No activities are currently being undertaken with the framework of the MDRP. There are however activities for demobilized combatants (especially with child soldiers), currently in place. With the finalization of the national strategy for the demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers (UNICEF/UNDP) and the funding of a number of these activities as special projects, they will be integrated under the MDRP framework. Coordination on demobilization and reintegration activities has been strengthened with MONUC, USAID, ILO and international organizations to ensure transparency, effective collaboration and inter agency coordination.

5 ***Percent of DDR resources channeled through the regional MDTF.*** No MDTF funds are currently disbursed

6 ***Degree of harmonization of national programs.*** There is presently no National Program in the DRC.

32. *Output Indicators*

7 ***Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through national programs.*** No national program in DRC.

8 ***Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through special projects.*** Two special projects are in the process of final approval.

9 ***Effectiveness of technical knowledge sharing activities.*** Following the last MDRP/ multi-donor/agency mission (February 2003), the technical aspects of demobilization and reintegration are currently being discussed and elaborated within the framework of the interim strategy.

10 ***Efficient organization of joint missions and preparation of reports.*** Following the joint assessment mission in February 2003, there has been two in-country joint inter-agency missions, mission reports have been shared with all partners before final distribution.



## 7. Summary of recommendations and proposed next steps

33. Key recommendations and next steps include the following:

- (i) In the preparation of a national DDR program, UNDP as lead agency and the MDRP Secretariat are ready to assist the Transitional Government in the areas of institutional frameworks, technical and operational issues, policy formulation and strategic development;
- (ii) In the absence of a national DDR program, the Government and MDRP partners should support the interim strategy for the development of a national program;
- (iii) International partners should continue to raise awareness among the parties in the DRC of the MDRP framework and the support that it can provide to the peace process.
- (iv) MONUC and the international community should continue to create conditions that would allow the DDRRR of foreign armed groups.

**Rwanda**  
**MDRP Country Update**

April 2003

**Introduction**

1. This review draws on the results of a World Bank supervision mission that visited Rwanda from November 10-22, 2002. MDRP partners were invited to participate in this mission, which consulted extensively with partners on the ground.

**1. Country context**

2. The governments of Rwanda and the DRC signed the Lusaka Agreement in July 1999. However, implementation of the agreement was limited until the signing of the bilateral Pretoria Agreement of July 2002, which directly addresses the stated core concerns of the two governments: a withdrawal of the RDF from the DRC in exchange for a dismantling and repatriation of Rwandans armed groups by the government of the DRC with the support of the international community. The government of Rwanda completed the withdrawal of its forces from the DRC on October 5, 2002, and the government of the DRC has initiated measures to dismantle the Rwandan armed groups present on its territory. However, allegations of direct or indirect RDF military presence in the DRC persist.

3. Relations between the Governments of Rwanda and Uganda have failed to improve since 2001, when RDF and Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF) contingents in Kisangani clashed repeatedly. In recent months, accusations of mutual political subversion have resurfaced and there has been a notable increase of a risk of further military confrontation in the Ituri province of the DRC. Despite various external efforts and dialogue between the respective leaderships, a military escalation is still a risk that could hamper the implementation of MDRP activities in Rwanda and elsewhere.

**2. Eligibility criteria for MDRP assistance**

4. *Eligibility confirmed.* The meeting of MDRP partners in The Hague on November 8, 2002 confirmed that Rwanda is eligible for MDRP support. The eligibility is based on the fact that: 1) Rwanda has been affected by conflict in the Great Lakes Region since the genocide of 1994; 2) Rwanda participates in the regional peace process; 3) The RDRP Stage II has taken the MDRP framework into account; 4) The Government has established a suitable institutional infrastructure by establishing the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) to oversee the implementation of the national demobilization and reintegration program and a Technical Secretariat to coordinate and implement the program; 5) The Rwanda Government submitted a Letter of Demobilization Policy to the World Bank on March 14, 2002; and 6) Appropriate safeguards and fiduciary measures have been put in place.

### 3. Relevance and implementation of MDRP guiding principles

5. The MDRP principle of *national ownership* has been integral to the preparation and implementation of the RDRP II. The Government has mandated the RDRC to oversee all demobilization and reintegration activities in Rwanda. The Technical Secretariat (TS) of the RDRC leads implementation of demobilization and reintegration support activities and is *coordinating* the inputs of all governmental and external partners of the RDRP through a Technical Coordination Committee (TCC), which meets on a regular basis.

6. The regional mechanisms established under the MDRP, especially the Technical Coordination Group (TCG), has helped to facilitate *confidence-building* and *knowledge sharing* among technical personnel engaged in the RDRC. RDRC discussions with DRC counterparts, which began in the course of the Luanda TCG meeting in July/August 2002, led to subsequent bilateral technical meetings between the Governments of the DRC and Rwanda, focusing on *cross-border technical planning* of the disarmament, demobilization and repatriation activities. The MDRP provided financial and facilitation support to these meetings, in which MONUC, South African representatives of the Third Party Verification Mechanism (TPVM) and UNDP also participated. These meetings have culminated in the definition of a joint sensitization strategy, which both Governments have endorsed. In spite of capacity constraints which have hindered efforts to operationalize this strategy, some progress has been made toward implementation, including preparations of materials to be disseminated, establishment of a dissemination network in the DRC (local administration, NGOs, faith-based organizations) and campaign logistics planning.

7. *MONUC and cross border DDR activities.* MONUC has the responsibility to effectively disarm, demobilize and repatriate the Rwandan armed groups still present in the DRC. To date, however, the current voluntary disarmament strategy has yet to yield a large-scale disarmament and repatriation of Rwandan armed groups. As the Kamina experience suggests, these can be hazardous activities and the lack of mandate and capacity to implement a robust disarmament strategy may limit MONUC's effectiveness in these efforts.

8. The RDRP contains specific provisions for the following *special target groups*: (i) child soldiers; (ii) chronically ill ex-combatants; (iii) physically disabled ex-combatants; and (iv) female ex-combatants. In Phase II of the RDRP, about 2,500 underage combatants are expected to be demobilized. RDRP demobilization activities include health counseling, medical screening, HIV/AIDS sensitization, and voluntary counseling and testing for HIV/AIDS. In addition, the RDRP will provide specialized reintegration assistance for the chronically ill and the disabled. The RDRP also contains a Vulnerability Support Window to provide supplementary assistance to socio-economically vulnerable ex-combatants. Finally, the Program seeks to ensure that female ex-combatants are able to fully access all program benefits.

9. The RDRP reintegration activities are closely *coordinated* with the Government's decentralization program. In particular, the Community Development Committees (CDCs) play a central role in the approval and monitoring of reintegration benefits for ex-combatants. The RDRP encourages ex-combatant participation in more general poverty reduction and employment activities.

10. *Transparent* use of RDRP resources is assured by the utilization of financial management and procurement procedures in accordance with World Bank requirements.

Transparency issues related to the *security sector* were addressed by Government in its Letter of Demobilization Policy of March 14, 2002.

**4. Efforts complementary to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration**

11. There are several Government agencies and partners that are engaged in activities *complementary to the RDRP*. The Joint Commission for the Repatriation of Rwandan Refugees (JCRRR) and the UNHCR support the repatriation of Rwandan refugees from neighboring countries. The Government has initiated a large-scale community-based post-conflict justice initiative (*gacaca*) to address the judicial legacy of those accused of participation in the 1994 genocide. The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) is supporting reconciliation and trust-building exercises.

**5. Risks and mitigation measures**

12. The overall social, economic and political situation within Rwanda is relatively stable. However, the risk of a *reversal of the peace process* remains, especially if Rwandan armed groups are able to operate freely in the eastern DRC following the withdrawal of the RDF. An effective disarmament and repatriation of Rwandan armed groups from the DRC to Rwanda and the re-establishment of security in the eastern DRC would significantly reduce the security threat to Rwanda. In early April 2003, the President of Rwanda warned that the RDF could re-enter the DRC if Rwanda's security continued to be threatened. There is also a real risk of a military escalation of tensions with Uganda.

13. The risk of *uncoordinated DDR activities* within Rwanda is low. The RDRC is well established, and the TCC has proved to be an effective mechanism for partner coordination at national level. Coordination of cross-border DDR activities with the Government of the DRC and MONUC have improved substantially in the course of the elaboration of the joint sensitization strategy.

14. There is *sufficient funding* for the current RDRP (Phase II). Within the MDRP framework, the following financing breakdown has been agreed. The IDA credit of US\$25 million for the RDRP became effective on September 23, 2002. The UK Government has agreed to provide UK£2 million directly to the RDRC, and the German Government has confirmed that it intends to provide a bilateral contribution of approximately Euro 4.7 million. The remainder is financed through the regional MDRP Trust Fund (MDTF). On April 18, 2003 a grant agreement for US\$14.4 million was signed.

**Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program Financing Plan - (Stage II)**

Source	Million US\$	Percent
Government of Rwanda	2.7	5
IDA	25.0	47
Bilaterals (parallel)	11.2	21
MDTF	14.4	27
Total	53.3	100

15. Various international and national *partners* are playing an important role in supporting the RDRP. WFP has provided food assistance to ex-combatants in the demobilization phase. UNICEF is working with the RDRC and MINALOC to provide specialized assistance for child soldiers. The German Government is discussing with the RDRC the possibility of financing the medical rehabilitation component of the RDRP. In addition, numerous partners are engaged in the provision of community-based development, public works and vocational training programs and services in Rwanda, which could facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants.

## 6. Baseline for key MDRP monitoring indicators

### 16. *Strategy Indicators*

- 1 ***Reduction in the number of internally displaced and refugees.*** The number of internally displaced in Rwanda is hard to determine and figures range broadly. The total number of Rwandans living abroad as refugees is estimated by UNHCR at 2.5 million through the end of 2002, including approximately 297,800 in Burundi, 1.4 million in DRC, 18,300 in Uganda and 733,400 in Tanzania.
- 2 ***Restoration of the free movement of persons and goods.*** There are currently no limitations on the movement of goods or persons within Rwanda. However, the impact of the conflict in the DRC on the western part of Rwanda has been significant. Historical trade routes from the eastern DRC to the ports of Kenya and Tanzania and migrant labor patterns have been disrupted.
- 3 ***Evolution of social expenditures, including in relation to security spending.*** Social expenditures have more than doubled in the past four years, while defense expenditure has declined at a modest rate. The evolution of social and military expenditure will need to be tracked in light of the country's internal and external security needs, budgetary constraints and the impact of the RDRP.

### 17. *Program Indicators*

- 4 ***Percent of DDR activities undertaken within the framework of the MDRP.*** All demobilization and reintegration activities in Rwanda are currently conducted within the RDRP.
- 5 ***Percent of DDR resources channeled through the regional MDTF.*** The MDTF grant finances 21% of overall RDRP II costs.
- 6 ***Degree of harmonization of national programs.*** The RDRP and Angola DRP, the only national programs approved to date, are harmonized to the extent possible with implementation arrangements adapted to the respective contexts.

### 18. *Output Indicators*

- 7 ***Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through national program.*** A total of 8,648 RDF soldiers and 2,525 members of Rwandan armed groups (thus 11,173 combatants in total) have been demobilized in a structured manner through

the RDRP II since December 2001. Of the members of armed groups that have been demobilized, 456 were children.

- 8 ***Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through special projects.*** As there is a national program in place in Rwanda, there is no scope for a special project in Rwanda.
- 9 ***Effectiveness of technical knowledge sharing activities.*** The Rwandan Government confirmed its interest in learning more from the experiences of other countries as well as sharing its own experience with other regional stakeholders. For instance, it recently hosted a Burundian delegation
- 10 ***Efficient organization of joint missions and preparation of reports.*** The November 2002 supervision mission produced a comprehensive aide memoire that was shared with MDRP partners.

## **7. Summary of recommendations and proposed next steps**

19. Proposed next steps include the following:
  - (i) The MDRP should continue to encourage the implementation of the joint sensitization strategy developed by the Governments of Rwanda and the DRC to support the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement.
  - (ii) MONUC and the international community should continue to create conditions that would allow the DDRRR of Rwandan armed groups.

**Uganda**  
***MDRP Country Update***

April 2003

**Introduction**

1. This review draws heavily on the recent MDRP fact-finding mission undertaken in Uganda from March 11-14, 2003.

**1. Country Context**

2. The Government of Uganda (GOU) has taken some important steps to improve security and further the peace process in the region since the time of the last MDRP Supervision report. GOU initiated the withdrawal of its troops from the eastern DRC as a result of the Luanda Agreement signed with the Government of the DRC in September 2002. In December 2002, the GOU also finalized a peace agreement with UNFR II that provided for structured reintegration support to approximately 2,450 ex-combatants. In addition, the Ministry of Defense has initiated a comprehensive defense review aimed at systematically reforming and modernizing the Ugandan military to be more responsive to the actual security situation which the country faces.

3. However, some ground has also been lost recently. Concerns that the withdrawal of Ugandan forces from eastern DRC may result in a substantial influx of refugees and destabilization of boarder areas, the Ugandan Peoples Defense Forces (UPDF) have redeployed to Ituri province. This new deployment has further strained relations between the GOU and the Government of Rwanda and has resulted in escalating tensions that have only been kept in check through the on-going efforts of the Government of the United Kingdom.

4. Nonetheless, the largest security concern in Uganda at present is the insurgency of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the north where the situation has deteriorated significantly since July 2002. On-going efforts to initiate direct peace negotiations with the LRA have yet to yield concrete results. Deteriorating security in northern Uganda has also set back Government programs to extract illegal arms from armed pastoralists in the Karamoja sub-region.

5. Since the MDRP Joint Supervision mission of September 2002, the Government of Uganda (GOU) formally requested technical and financial assistance from the World Bank and the MDRP in support of a comprehensive national demobilization and reintegration program (DRP) targeting both regular and irregular forces. In view of changes in the security environment in northern Uganda and the northeastern DRC, sensitive defense expenditure discussions between Government and donors, and progress in the defense review, the Secretariat decided to carry out a fact-finding mission in March rather than a joint identification mission. The mission found positive institutional progress on the part of Government to move ahead with a national DRP and support for such a program from the main MDRP partners. Subsequently, Government announced that it is preparing a proposal for support to ex-LRA combatants with a view to submit it for funding under the MDRP's Special Project window.

## 2. General and country-level eligibility criteria for MDRP assistance

6. Uganda has been and continues to be affected by the *regional conflict* and actively *participates in the regional peace processes*, most recently, with the signing of the Luanda Agreement with the Government of the DRC in September 2002.

7. The Government has formally indicated to the World Bank and MDRP its interest in preparing a *national demobilization and reintegration program* and is taking steps to establish an appropriate *institutional structure* for the program. The Prime Minister's Office (PMO) has been charged with coordinating the development of a national program and has initiated the process to better integrate the work of the Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB) and the Amnesty Commission (AC). It is expected that the revised institutional arrangements will serve as the basis for preparing and overseeing the implementation of a national DRP, and would ensure the appropriate *fiduciary controls* and *safeguard measures* in the program. The need for a *letter of demobilization policy* has been discussed with Government and the on-going defense review is ideally suited to inform such a policy letter.

8. The ongoing work of both UVAB and the AC will serve as the basis for developing an integrated national program. In this regard, the Government has agreed to undertake a lessons learned analysis of earlier reintegration efforts carried out from 1992 to 1996.

## 4. Relevance and implementation of MDRP guiding principles

9. Though a national program is not yet underway, the GOU maintains clear *ownership* of and commitment to the process of demobilization and reintegration in the country as reflected in the creation and maintenance of UVAB and the Amnesty Commission. UVAB institutional expertise has been maintained from the Government's previous demobilization and reintegration program from 1992 to 1995, and the Amnesty Commission was created by Government with the specific purpose of addressing non-regular forces. The Government's request to move ahead with a *special project* under the MDRP to allow for the rapid provision of reintegration support to the LRA combatants if and when a peace agreement is reached is yet another indication of the Government's commitment to this process.

10. The Government has also undertaken several *confidence-building measures* in regards to its demobilization and reintegration efforts including the withdrawal of UPDF forces from the eastern DRC and the signing of the peace agreement with the UNRF II forces in December 2002.

11. Uganda continues to benefit from a strong *donor coordination mechanism*, in the form of the Donor Technical Group (DTG) on Northern Uganda, Amnesty and Recovery from Conflict. The DTG currently serves to *harmonize DDR efforts, optimize external assistance, and coordinate DDR activities with broader reconstruction efforts* in the country—responsibilities that the Government and the MDRP partners assume will continue under a national DRP. Close coordination with the DTG will help ensure application of these core MDRP principles.

12. While the national program has yet to be conceived of in detail, the existing efforts and institutions involved in the process suggest that certain *vulnerable groups* (women, children and disabled) will be catered for; access to benefits will be defined based on equitable, objective and *transparent* criteria; and provision of assistance would be done in a *flexible* manner that would draw upon existing structures and implementation partners.



#### 4. Efforts complementary to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

13. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) is undertaking a comprehensive *defense review* with the support of the UK Department for International Development (DFID), including an analysis of personnel management and procurement procedures. This review provides an excellent opportunity to more closely link the DRP for Uganda with the broader issue of *security sector reform*. A White Paper should be available for parliamentary consultation by August 2003 and the entire review should be completed by December 2003. The fact finding mission recommended closer coordination between UVAB and the Defense Review Unit of MOD. The precise scope and nature of synergies would need to be explored in the context of program preparation.

14. The Government continues to support reintegration of formally demobilized UPDF soldiers through UVAB. The Amnesty Commission is supporting the reintegration of irregular forces who have surrendered under the Amnesty Act and the UNRF II combatants with the support of a number of the bilateral donors represented on the DTG.

15. Neither *involuntary* nor *civilian disarmament* are currently considered in the context of the Uganda national program.

#### 5. Risks and mitigation measures

16. The overall social, economic and political situation in the Uganda remains relatively stable, and conditions for peace in the north have improved over the past several months. However, mounting tensions in the west with the redeployment of UPDF to Ituri, as well as the situation with Rwanda, threaten the fragile state of the regional peace process. It is therefore important that the GOU continue in discussions with the Government of Sudan, and that the international community continue supporting confidence-building measures aimed at reducing tensions with Rwanda, to avoid a *reversal of the peace process*.

17. The risk of *uncoordinated DDR activities* within government appears to be minimal, with recent efforts to more closely link UVAB and the Amnesty Commission. The possibility that DDR activities would take place without proper reference to the defense review also appears remote. As noted above, *donor coordination* of DDR activities is effectively secured through the DTG. The World Bank has disseminated information on the MDRP through the DTG and as a result of four technical MDRP missions. These contacts and efforts appear to have overcome earlier misunderstandings and miscommunications on the role and focus of the MDRP.

18. It is not currently believed that a national program would run a large risk of *moral hazard* by serving as an incentive to increase numbers of irregular forces. However, some observers consider that a DRP for Uganda reduces the cost of the war waged by the Government in eastern DRC. While overall not of great concern, the challenge of *balancing assistance to ex-combatants and other vulnerable groups*, particularly in the North, is best addressed through the DTG.

19. The risk of *non-engagement of the international community* appears small in the case of Uganda given keen donor interest in supporting the Government's demilitarization efforts. However, a potential *funding gap* may arise depending on how the Government decides to

allocate available World Bank resources. Furthermore, depending on the timing of the national program, there will likely be a need to replenish the MDRP Trust Fund given existing and projected commitments for Rwanda, Angola, Burundi, and special projects.

**6. Baseline for key MDRP monitoring indicators**

20. *Strategy Indicators*

1 ***Reduction in the number of internally displaced and refugees.*** Based on estimates from OCHA and WFP, the number of IDPs has increased significantly since last reported in September (892,000 versus 657,000) while the number of refugees has remained approximately the same at 200,000. The vast majority of these displaced persons are found in the north and northeast of the country due to the spreading instability in these regions.

2 ***Restoration of the free movement of persons and goods.*** The impact of the conflict in the DRC on the western border has been significant, affecting historical trade routes from the eastern DRC to the ports of Kenya and Tanzania, though extensive smuggling persists. In addition, the LRA continues to disrupt the free movement of goods and persons in the north. Government has also indicated that it may require civilians to resettle in camps and restrict their movement as part of its counterinsurgency strategy.

3 ***Evolution of social expenditures, including in relation to security spending.*** Education and health expenditures have reached US\$ 618.6 billion in 2001/02, or 33 percent of Government recurrent expenditures. Defense expenditures have reached US\$ 238 billion or 13 percent in the same year. While relative expenditures for defense have fallen since the 1997/98 budget, so too have social expenditures. Furthermore, the current level of military expenditures exceeds the cap of two percent of GDP that was negotiated with donor partners, raising considerable debate with the Government's partners over ongoing ODA support. While donors have agreed with Government to the current projections for the 2002/03 budget, they will continue to monitor the war in the north, its impact on defense spending, and the management of the budget as whole, and would link subsequent defense expenditures to the defense review.

21. *Program Indicators*

4 ***Percent of DDR activities undertaken within the framework of the MDRP.*** The demobilization and reintegration of "reporters" through the Amnesty Commission is the only DDR activity in Uganda today, and is currently outside the MDRP framework.

5 ***Percent of DDR resources channeled through the regional MDTF.*** No MDTF funds are currently disbursed to Uganda.

6 ***Degree of harmonization of national programs.*** There is currently no national program as defined by the MDRP in Uganda.

22. *Output Indicators*

- 7 *Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through national programs.* To date, the Amnesty Commission has provided reintegration assistance to approximately 1,500 ex-combatants on an ad hoc basis and to approximately 2,000 UNRF II combatants.
- 8 *Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through special projects.* There is no special project as defined in the MDRP in existence in Uganda.
- 9 *Effectiveness of technical knowledge sharing activities.* No additional knowledge sharing exercises have been conducted under MDRP since the last supervision mission.
- 10 *Efficient organization of joint missions and preparation of reports.* No additional joint MDRP missions have been carried out in Uganda since the September supervision mission. MDRP technical missions since then have consulted extensively with partners and shared resulting aide-memoires.

**7. Summary of recommendations and proposed next steps**

23. The review recommends the following actions and next steps:

- (i) Government to prepare a roadmap to coordinate the development of a national program with the defense review;
- (ii) Government to finalize the institutional arrangements between UVAB and the Amnesty Commission for the effective preparation and implementation of a national program;
- (iii) UVAB establish a national program preparation team including the Amnesty Commission;
- (iv) A schedule for a joint MDRP identification mission is to be discussed and agreed to by the MDRP Partners at the semi-annual Advisory Committee meeting in April;
- (v) The MDRP consider supporting the preparation of a special project by the Amnesty Commission for non-regular forces (including the LRA) that fits within a comprehensive plan of assistance for this group;
- (vi) The MDRP local ad hoc committee (LAC) to process the anticipated special project proposal from the Amnesty Commission as soon as it is received;
- (vii) Government undertake an analysis of lessons learned from previous reintegration efforts to help inform the preparation process for the national DRP;
- (viii) Government and partner efforts to strengthen the Amnesty Commission be promoted and expanded, possibly under the proposed special project to target the LRA.