



Joint Supervision Mission Report

September 27 – October 15, 2003



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Aide Mémoire

I. Introduction

1. Within the framework of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) for the greater Great Lakes Region, a joint supervision mission comprising three teams of MDRP partners visited Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Uganda between September 27 and October 15, 2003, to assess progress made to date in realizing the objectives of the MDRP partnership. A wrap-up meeting held in Nairobi on October 16-17, 2003, reviewed the individual country reports, synthesized key findings, and made recommendations for future MDRP policy and activities.

II. Key Findings

2. The current overall trend towards peace and stabilization in the region underlines the relevance of the MDRP as a mechanism for coordination and financing of DDR efforts in the region. The establishment of a Transitional Government in the DRC, advanced cease-fire negotiations between the Government of Burundi and the CNDD-FDD of Pierre Nkurunziza, and the consolidation of peace in Angola provide a promising environment for the preparation and implementation of national DDR programs in several countries. The recent strengthening of MONUC's mandate in the DRC and the full deployment of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) demonstrate the increased willingness of the international community to put in place the security framework necessary to consolidate peace in these countries.

3. Overall, the MDRP has already begun to serve as a valuable mechanism for the coordination and financing of DDR activities in support of the various peace processes in the region, and partners agree that the benefits of the Program in terms of unity of voice, reducing duplication, and increasing efficiency in program implementation outweigh the potential gains of unilateral action. DDR coordination mechanisms have been put in place in Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda in the last year. MDRP financing has been approved for national programs in Angola and Rwanda. At this time, the Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Program has already accomplished the demobilization and reinsertion of more than 90,000 UNITA ex-combatants with relative success. In Rwanda, about 13,800 ex-combatants have been demobilized in stage II of the RDRP since December 2001. Furthermore, national program preparations are well underway in Burundi and the DRC, and draft national programs and letters of demobilization policy prepared in the CAR and the Republic of Congo give the MDRP a basis for discussion and substantive input in these countries. Finally, while the current situation in Uganda is not conducive to the preparation of a national program, the imminent completion of a Defense Review will provide the basis for further discussions with the Government.

4. However, the peace processes in the Region remain fragile and the challenges ahead should not be underestimated. The rate of disarmament and repatriation of Rwandese armed groups from the DRC remains very low. The continued presence of these elements in the DRC contributes to instability in the eastern DRC, complicates efforts to restore relations between the governments of the DRC and Rwanda, and has slowed down the rate of implementation of the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration

Program. The relative lack of success of voluntary disarmament and repatriation efforts for these groups in the DRC to date are a serious cause for concern.

5. In the Ituri district of the DRC, the deployment of an EU peacekeeping operation and now MONUC has helped to stabilize a devastating local ethno-political conflict. However, violence persists in many parts of the Ituri district. In Burundi, the unwillingness of the FNL-PALIPEHUTU of Agathon Rwasa to participate in the peace process substantially increases the risks to and costs of the overall national peace consolidation process. Finally, the persistent conflict between the Government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda shows no signs of abating.

6. The mission identified a number of areas of concern or requiring further attention under the MDRP. In particular, the mission recommends that all efforts be made by the respective Governments and MONUC to accelerate the repatriation of foreign armed groups (particularly Rwanda) that remain in the DRC. Partners expressed concern over the proposed rapid cantonment strategy in Ituri and recommended that MONUC engage in joint planning with the agencies that would have responsibility for providing reintegration support to the groups being cantoned. The mission also highlighted the continued potential risk of moral hazard in several countries where the MDRP may serve as a perverse incentive for either the continued recruitment of militia (in Uganda or DRC) or inflation of combatant numbers (Burundi and Congo/Brazzaville), and therefore the need to carefully manage program information. Furthermore, there remains room to improve the coordination of national programs with more general humanitarian and/or poverty reduction initiatives in several countries.

7. To date, seven special projects have been approved by the World Bank for financing in Angola and the DRC. The mission expressed significant concern over delays in finalizing special project agreements and disbursing funds for activities in the DRC in particular. The MDRP Secretariat acknowledged that the time required has been considerably longer than first estimated due to: (i) a lack of appropriate models for legal agreements between the World Bank and UN agencies or NGOs, and (ii) an interest on the part of some recipients to establish certain precedents with the World Bank on such agreements, and therefore prolonging negotiations. However, the MDRP Secretariat reported that five grant agreements had been signed, that \$2.4 million had been disbursed by mid-October 2003, and that it expected that several new grant agreements would be signed shortly. Furthermore, the MDRP Secretariat reassured partners that most of the significant administrative obstacles to more rapid conclusion of legal agreements and disbursement of funds had been overcome and expected. The Secretariat expected that subsequent agreements would thus be processed more rapidly. The MDRP partners strongly encouraged the Secretariat to do everything in its power to expedite disbursements for the special projects by the time of the Kinshasa partners' meeting.

III. Key Recommendations

8. As a matter of priority, the joint supervision mission recommends that:

- (i) the MDRP Secretariat:
 - submits a note to the AC/TFC meeting in Kinshasa on how it plans to reinforce its capacity for political analysis, and for liaison with political levels of donor partners;
 - further strengthens its presence on the ground in Burundi, and considers options for doing the same in Angola and eastern DRC;
 - submits a revised analysis of overall program costs and Trust Fund cash flow projections for next 24 months at Kinshasa meeting;
 - expedites disbursements to grantees of currently approved special projects and to submit a progress report on special projects at the time of the AC/TFC meeting;

- (ii) the World Bank prepares and presents at Kinshasa partners' meeting a timetable of IDA project preparation steps in line with national program planning;
- (iii) the Governments of DRC, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda intensify joint efforts to increase the rates of disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of Rwandese, Burundian and Uganda armed groups from the DRC to their respective home countries with the support of MONUC;
- (iv) the Government of Burundi:
 - presents an analysis of the implication of the Pretoria Protocol for the military integration process and associated public expenditure in medium-term;
 - engages donors in a transparent and systematic dialogue and to provide credible calendar for reduction in defense expenditures;
 - ensures that Executive Secretariat of NCDDR be staffed, equipped and operational as soon as possible;
- (v) the MDRP considers the possibility of a special project approach to the DDR process in CAR in consultation with Government of CAR;
- (vi) the Government of DRC:
 - identifies an MDRP focal point as soon as possible, and
 - presents an update on the status of national DDR and security sector reform program planning, including a clear timetable actions to be taken, at forthcoming AC/TFC/TCG meeting in Kinshasa;
- (vii) No new proposals be considered for financing in the DRC under the special projects financing window until further notice; and
- (viii) UNDP provides briefing at forthcoming Kinshasa meeting on how it intends to manage potential conflict of interest between serving as lead agency and implementing partner for special projects at same time.



Joint Supervision Mission

September 27 - October 15, 2003

Summary Mission Report

9. Within the framework of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), a joint supervision mission (JSM) comprising three teams of MDRP partners¹ visited Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Uganda between September 27 and October 15, 2003, to assess progress made to date in implementing the MDRP. Each team sought to assess the effectiveness of the MDRP as a coordination and financing mechanism in support of DDR activities in the countries of the greater Great Lakes region.² MDRP partners and representatives from each country team held a wrap-up meeting in Nairobi on October 16-17, 2003, to review the individual country reports, draw conclusions, and provided further recommendations on MDRP policy or regional issues. The mission's terms of reference and a list of partners attending the wrap-up meeting are presented in Annex 8.

10. This report summarizes the findings and recommendations of the individual country missions and the wrap-up meeting. The annexes contain the detailed findings and recommendations of the respective country missions. In this respect, it should be recalled that the JSM did not set out to review the technical quality of specific national demobilization and reintegration activities per se, but rather to assess DDR planning or implementation activities in relation to the principles and objectives of the MDRP framework. The mission would like to thank the respective governments, donors, UN partners and other stakeholders for the generous time and assistance provided during its visits. Particular thanks is extended to those partners who provided logistical support to the country teams, and to those agencies (MONUC, AirServe, and WFP) who facilitated air transport to and within the eastern DRC and in Angola.

I. Regional context

11. In the last year, political developments have spurred the region in the direction of peace. The establishment of a broad-based Government of National Transition in the DRC, the signature of a cease-fire between the Transitional Government of Burundi and the CNDD-FDD of Pierre Nkurunziza, the consolidation of a new government in CAR, the cessation of hostilities agreement in the Congo, and peaceful presidential and parliamentary elections in Rwanda are all signs of progress towards greater stability and security in the region.

12. Overall implementation of the Luanda agreement between the governments of the DRC and Uganda, and the Pretoria agreement between the governments of the DRC and Rwanda, has been encouraging. The recent signing of the Pretoria Protocol between the Government of Burundi and the CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza) will hopefully lead to the implementation of a cease-fire and security sector

¹ The MDRP consists of more than 40 bilateral, multilateral and national partners active in the area of demobilization and reintegration in the greater Great Lakes region. Representatives of ... partners participated in parts of this joint supervision mission.

² As outlined in the MDRP Strategy document; *Greater Great Lakes Regional Strategy for Demobilization and Reintegration*, March 2002, World Bank

reform in that country. Nonetheless, a long and challenging road of negotiation and implementation lies ahead. In Burundi, the FNL of Agathon Rwaswa continues to resist inclusion in the negotiation process. In Uganda, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has recently extended its destabilizing operations into eastern parts of the country, further swelling the number of internally displaced in Uganda to more than 1 million.

13. In the eastern DRC, the successful withdrawal of foreign troops was followed by increased instability in Ituri district and parts of the Kivus. In Ituri, large-scale ethno-political violence only abated with the deployment of an EU force, which in turn handed over to a UN peacekeeping force under the command of MONUC in September 2003. The security situation in Ituri and the Kivus remains fragile and tensions remain extremely high. Rwandan armed groups continue to operate in parts of the eastern DRC, which also serves as a rear base for Burundian and Ugandan rebels.

14. Despite advances in the political arena of the region, only Angola has seen significant progress in the implementation of disarmament, demobilization and initial reintegration (DDR) activities, where more than 90,000 UNITA ex-combatants have been successfully demobilized. In Rwanda, the national program has demobilized an estimated 13,800 combatants of the RDF and Rwandan armed groups since May 2001. However, the rate of demobilization and reintegration in Rwanda has slowed due in large part to the slow rate of return of Rwandan armed groups from the DRC. Elsewhere, further political progress is a pre-condition for the large-scale implementation of DDR activities. In addition, extensive security sector reform efforts will be critical to the success of DDR efforts in Burundi, CAR, DRC, and Uganda. The mission therefore continues to encourage MDRP partners to support the political peace processes and security sector reform efforts in the countries of the region.

II. General and country-level eligibility criteria for MDRP assistance

15. At the time of this joint supervision mission, only Angola and Rwanda had met all general and country-specific eligibility criteria for support under the MDRP. In both cases, World Bank assistance has been approved and an MDRP Trust Fund grant has been endorsed by the MDRP Trust Fund Committee, and in Rwanda, the first tranche of \$1.4 million has been disbursed. The Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Project (RDRP) has been effective for approximately one year. However, the Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Project (ADRP) has been delayed by difficulties in finalizing the recruitment of an independent unit to oversee project procurement and financial management. It is expected that the ADRP will become effective before the end of the year. Nonetheless, while both programs meet the MDRP eligibility criteria, in both instances additional capacity building and institutional support is called for to ensure more effective program implementation. The remaining countries visited during the JSM all fulfill to an acceptable degree the general criteria of being *affected by conflict(s)* and continuing to *participate in the regional peace processes*.

16. In terms of country specific criteria, both CAR and Congo have drafted *letters of demobilization policy (LDP)*, and *national demobilization and reintegration programs* that the JSM or earlier MDRP missions had reviewed and commented upon. In both instances, the LDP and the national program documents were found to require significant modifications. UNDP, as lead agency in both countries, was providing support for this purpose. In Uganda, the preparation of both the LDP and comprehensive national program depends on the completion of the Defense Review, the adoption of a defense reform program, and clear progress in resolving the conflict with the LRA.

17. In Burundi, a national program document was recently shared formally with the MDRP Secretariat and donor partners. The program would form the basis for review by an upcoming World Bank technical support mission. An LDP would be a condition of World Bank Board presentation of the IDA financed portion of the national program. In the DRC, UNDP has helped develop an interim strategy for the preparation of the national DDR program. It is hoped that this effort, linked with the recent formation of

the Transitional Government, the identification of the key ministries responsible for demobilization and reintegration (Defense, Social Welfare, and Solidarity and Humanitarian Affairs), and the establishment of the technical committee for planning and coordination of DDR will lead to the development of a national program in the near future. The JSM specifically highlighted to the highest levels of the Government of the DRC and with key partners the need for further political buy-in, appointment of a single focal point, and elaboration of a national DDR policy and program preparation timeline in anticipation of the upcoming Kinshasa partners' meeting.

18. The JSM also noted in the DRC in particular, but applicable to all country programs under preparation, the need to articulate more specifically the reintegration component of the national program, to define linkages with other reintegration and recovery efforts, to engage relevant actors in the development of the component and to begin managing information and expectations of beneficiary groups and the general population with regards to this aspect of the program.

19. While the DRC and CAR are still to clearly define and develop the capacities of an appropriate *institutional framework and structures* for a national DDR program, an implementation structure (for the World Bank supported reintegration program) exists in the Republic of Congo. Recently, Congo also has established a program policy oversight body. The proposed structure in Uganda also appears to be generally appropriate, building upon the government's earlier demobilization efforts and the Amnesty law that targets irregular forces. Nonetheless, any future national program in Uganda would require significant strengthening of these structures. The Government of Uganda also has recently formed an appropriate oversight body to provide policy guidance and monitor assistance to both regular and irregular forces. The Government of Burundi has formally established on August 28, 2003, a National Commission for Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (NCDDR) that will oversee and coordinate the DDR program. However, the Executive Secretary of the NCDDR has still to be staffed and made more operational.

20. Each national program will develop appropriate *fiduciary safeguards* adapted to local conditions. In Angola, the Government will contract out the financial management and procurement responsibilities to an independent entity. A similar approach is likely in the DRC and CAR. In the case of Rwanda, financial management and procurement systems and controls are more closely integrated into the national commission, and it is expected that a similar model will be used in Uganda where the existing institutional structures have experience and at least minimum capacity for these responsibilities. The arrangements for Burundi and the Republic of Congo will be determined as the national program is finalized.

21. The two existing national programs (Rwanda and Angola) have adopted streamlined *environmental and social safeguard measures* that allow for simplified social and environmental assessments after program effectiveness. The Rwanda assessment has been carried out and a check-list of standard technical specifications or ineligible sub-projects will be developed to screen sub-project proposals. A similar check-list will be adapted and used on all other MDRP programs wherever appropriate. Regarding financial management and procurement, MDRP partners will assess which arrangements are required to ensure the transparent use of funds on a case by case basis.

III. Relevance and implementation of MDRP guiding principles

22. The mission reaffirmed the importance of *national ownership* to the ultimate success of demobilization and reintegration efforts in the region. The JSM generally noted a reasonably high level of ownership or commitment in the existing national programs. The Government of Rwanda exhibits a high degree of program ownership and Angola has demonstrated the same through the significant level of resources dedicated to the demobilization and reinsertion support to UNITA ex-combatants to date. The

Government of Uganda also exhibits a high degree of readiness and commitment for a future national. The Government of Burundi clearly sees the importance of a national program in the overall peace process and has taken its responsibility for designing and developing the program very seriously—to the degree that the only recently have some of the MDRP partners received copies of the program document.

23. The Government of the CAR has initiated a participatory national dialogue process to address a number of issues including security and army reform that is expected to inform plans for demobilization and ultimately a national program. The Government is clearly committed to addressing security sector reform issues and demonstrated initiative in drafting a national program within one month of assuming power in March. In the case of the Republic of Congo, while the High Commission for the Reinsertion of Ex-combatants has taken a leading role in promoting a national program, it seems that the national DDR policy body (*Comité National de Démobilisation et de Ré-insertion*) has not been sufficiently active in the formulation of the national program. The new Government of the DRC has recently taken some important initial steps necessary to assume the responsibility and ownership of a national program by identifying the responsible ministries for the planning and implementation of the demobilization and reintegration program and forming the inter-ministerial *Comité Technique*. The JSM encouraged the Government of the DRC to further enhance efforts to establish a national strategy and draft letter of demobilization policy for discussion at the upcoming MDRP Advisory Committee meeting in Kinshasa. UNDP, as lead MDRP agency, is focusing on more fully incorporating the Government of the DRC representatives in the various technical working groups engaged in the early work in preparation to the formulation of the national program.

24. The JSM found continued interest in and appreciation for **cross-border** exchanges as both a means of **knowledge sharing** and **confidence building** among the national program staff and international partners engaged in DDR activities in the region. Specific cases included a series of visits by the Burundi national program planning team to the Rwanda national program, a visit by the Africa Mission in Burundi (AMIB) personnel to the Rwanda program and demobilization centers, a visit by a DRC delegation to Rwanda on cross-border information and sensitization issues, and the conduct of a monitoring and evaluation workshop in Rwanda for technical staff of all national programs.

25. In addition, MONUC and the RDRP have collaborated on several confidence-building visits of members of Rwandan armed groups to Rwanda, and the collection of material for information and sensitization activities in the DRC. However, the mission noted a certain lack of confidence between the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) and MONUC that could be alleviated by better information exchange and closer interaction. The mission thus recommends that collaboration between the RDRC and MONUC on joint screening procedures, information and sensitization activities be expanded. Furthermore, the mission encourages the Government of the Republic of Congo to explore options to facilitate the repatriation of members of Rwandan armed groups from the Congo to Rwanda, and of ex-FAR/ex-FAZ combatants to the DRC, potentially with the support of MONUC. The mission also recommends that a number of other lessons learned activities or information exchange exercises be undertaken regarding the following: (i) the Muyange cantonment experience, (ii) female combatant drop-out rates in DRC-Rwanda disarmament, demobilization, and repatriation process supported by MONUC, and (iii) the impact of social and economic reintegration efforts in Angola and Rwanda. In this regard, the JSM requested that the MDRP Secretariat propose a plan for lessons learned activities for the upcoming year during the Kinshasa partners meeting.

26. The mission was pleased to note several functioning mechanisms and recent developments in a number of countries that helped in the **harmonization** of DDR activities and the **optimization of external assistance**. In Uganda, the existing donor technical group (for the North, Amnesty, and Recovery from Conflict) serves as a good forum for coordination of external DDR support. In the DRC, the formation and functioning of the technical working groups as part of the DDR interim program has also provided an

appropriate environment to help ensure harmonization and transparency among all key partners and potential programs. It was noted that the DDR Coordination Committee (DDR-CC) in Burundi had improved coordination and information exchange. To further improve coordination efforts, the mission recommends that a representative of the NGO community also be included in the DDR-CC. The establishment of a Technical Working Group to draft a Joint Operations Plan for the disarmament and demobilization phases of the program is also seen as enhancing coordination efforts in Burundi. In Rwanda, the mission noted that a Technical Coordination Committee (TCC) was set up to enhance partner coordination, and welcomed the formation of the social and economic working groups under the TCC. However, the mission recommends that the RDRC strengthen the effectiveness of the TCC by facilitating regular and substantive discussions, and by sharing program data in a more timely manner. The mission calls upon the MDRP Regional advisor based in Kigali to assist in this process.

27. The mission also found instances in Angola, Rwanda and DRC where partner assistance was not sufficiently harmonized with on-going national programs. The mission encourages both the German government and the European Commission to expand their consultations with the Technical Secretariat of the RDRC and the TCC in order to ensure that their proposed reintegration support to Rwandan ex-combatants corresponds with the national program, supports the MDRP objective of minimizing administrative burden on the RDRC, and avoids potential duplication of benefits. The mission recommends that MONUC's proposed disarmament and cantonment exercise of militias in Ituri be more closely coordinated with the local partners who would likely have responsibility for the provision of certain camp services and reintegration support. Furthermore, as these activities affect Congolese combatants, the process must be done within the existing and evolving framework of the national program to avoid subsequent inconsistencies, false expectations, and implementation difficulties. The mission also recommends that the Government of Angola seek to harmonize reintegration support activities by the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Public Administration that are in parallel with the national program.

28. The *special projects* window of the MDRP has become a focus of attention for partners and implementing agencies over the past several months. The mission highlighted the importance of the special projects grants and of the component in general as a symbol of the “flexible” nature of the MDRP financing mechanism. While the Trust Fund has been active since early 2003, as of mid-October only \$2.5 million has been disbursed for special projects.³ The MDRP Secretariat reported that delays in disbursing funds for special projects result from: (i) delays in finalizing special project proposals, (ii) lack of clear World Bank procedures for contracting directly with UN agencies and NGOs, and (iii) effort on the part of some recipients to use the negotiation process with the World Bank to establish new precedents for future agreements. However, the MDRP Secretariat indicated that most major obstacles had been dealt with to establish acceptable procedures for working with both NGOs and UN agencies and that any future agreement would be finalized more quickly. The Trust Fund donors strongly encouraged the MDRP Secretariat and the grant recipients as well to do everything in their respective powers to ensure disbursements for the current group of approved projects by the time of the MDRP meeting in Kinshasa.

29. While partners strongly encourage the MDRP to promptly facilitate disbursements for the special projects approved to date, it was also noted that the expansion of the use of the special projects component to address issues not originally considered for this instrument is beginning to create tensions with key MDRP principles such as national ownership. The mission also highlighted the danger that the

³ A total of 13 special project proposals have been submitted to the MDRP for consideration, of which 11 have been or are being reviewed by the local ad hoc committees (LAC) in four countries. Two proposals were withdrawn. As of October 15, 2003, 10 projects had been endorsed by the LAC, 7 have been approved by the World Bank, 5 grant agreements had been signed, and \$2.4 million disbursed to one grant recipient. On average, special project proposals have taken six months from the date of first submission to the MDRP to the date of grant signature by the World Bank.

special projects could become a poor substitute for a comprehensive national program, especially in the DRC. In this respect, the mission specifically encouraged UNICEF to help ensure that the various special projects targeting child soldiers in the DRC form a coherent national strategy. The mission also expressed concern over the potential conflict of interest that UNDP faces when it serves as both lead agency and implementing partner as in the case in the DRC, and requested that UNDP provide a briefing at the Kinshasa partners' meeting on how it intends to manage this potential conflict. Given the large number of special projects already approved for the DRC, the mission recommends that no further special projects be considered in the DRC until stock can be taken of how those that are approved are being implemented and how quickly the new transitional Government can formulate a national program.

30. All national programs under design or implementation within the MDRP have developed strategies to address the specific needs of *special target groups* within the ex-combatant population. The RDRP, for instance, has a special assistance window that provides support for socio-economically vulnerable ex-combatants (as determined by Community Development Committees) above and beyond the standard reinsertion and reintegration support provided under the program. The RDRP has, however, yet to fully operationalize its child soldier demobilization and reintegration component, which the mission strongly recommends be put in place as soon as possible. The ADRP is adjusting to the fact that there was significant under-reporting of both female and child soldiers among UNITA combatants during the initial demobilization process. The national program is coordinating with the child protection and other specialized agencies dealing with women to see how best the program can support community based assistance efforts in those areas where large concentrations of ex-combatants and families have returned. The design of Burundi's national program has made accommodations for these special target groups. The MDRP will support a special project in both Burundi, and several in the DRC, that will allow assistance to be provided for child soldiers while the national programs are finalized and activated. These special project activities will be fully integrated into the national program as soon as relevant structures and capacities are installed.

31. In discussing special target groups, the JSM reiterated the need to treat child soldiers as a priority group in accordance with the Cape Town principles. The JSM also reiterated a concern that women associated with fighting forces (either actual combatants or dependents) were not receiving adequate or appropriate attention and requested that the issue be looked at more closely as a cross-border initiative. Canada expressed specific interest in supporting such an initiative, particularly in the DRC.

32. The mission reaffirmed the importance of close *coordination with reconstruction and poverty reduction efforts* to facilitating the longer-term social and economic absorption of ex-combatants. National programs will need to pay special attention to ongoing or planned processes for the return and resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, and should seek to develop synergies with community development projects undertaken by partners in the fields of education, health care, HIV/AIDS and social work. The mission considers such linkages particularly important in Angola, Burundi and the DRC. Such linkages would also help to address the needs of other vulnerable groups associated with fighting forces who are not eligible for assistance within the national DDR programs.

IV. Efforts complementary to DDR

33. *Security sector reform* (SSR) stands out as the most important complementary activity to several DDR programs in the region, and in some instances is a pre-condition for an effective demobilization and reintegration program. The MDRP stands to benefit from a greater appreciation of the interdependent nature of SSR and DDR Programs. Possibly the most comprehensive SSR activity in the region, albeit limited to the military, is the Defense Review being carried out by the Government of Uganda with DFID support. The review is scheduled to be finalized and options presented to Cabinet in the next few weeks, leading to a White Paper for Parliamentary debate. This would serve as the basis for a national

demobilization program for the regular armed forces. DFID is also providing detailed assistance to the Government of Rwanda for a similar exercise. In both the CAR and the Republic of Congo, France is assisting the respective governments to review the current status, analyze future needs, and reform the army (including demobilization) and gendarmerie. In the case of CAR, Chad is also providing important support. In the DRC, Belgium is providing technical support to the Government in reforming the army, and is organizing a meeting in November with four other bilateral donors (the US, UK, France, and the Netherlands) to discuss the issue of SSR and possible areas of further collaboration and support to Government's efforts. Efforts at SSR in Angola and Burundi are much less systematic to date. It should be noted that the technical capacity of the international community to provide SSR assistance remains limited. Furthermore, activities in this sphere require a degree of trust among donors and the respective governments that is often difficult to accomplish in conflict or early post-conflict environments.

34. A significant challenge to many post-conflict settings is the reestablishment of *local security* through the strengthening of the police and judiciary systems. While a challenge to several countries in the program, this will particularly be an issue in the eastern DRC. In the absence of local security mechanisms, there will be more opportunity for banditry and lawlessness, as well as a tendency for the population as a whole to arm itself in self-defense. The long-term negative implications for stability and development can be significant. However, regional efforts to strengthen national police forces and improve local security remain fairly modest, with the exception of MONUC's civilian police group. Significant challenges remain, including weak or distrusted state security systems (both police and judiciary), and a hesitancy on the part of some donors to be involved with the sector. Paradoxically, the reinforcement of police capacity may also lead to an increase in security expenditures that conflicts with donor desires for increased share of social sector investment in post-conflict settings.

35. *Civilian disarmament* efforts can reduce the weapons stock and thereby help to reduce the risk of renewed conflict. UNDP has launched activities in the CAR and Congo, will begin work in the DRC under its Great Lakes Regional Small Arms Initiative, and has expressed an interest in supporting a program in Angola (where some observers estimate that as many as 2 million small arms are in civilian hands). Uganda has established a National Focal Point committee involving key ministries, NGOs and civil society representatives to address the issue.

36. Other complementary efforts include extensive *demining* activities and awareness campaigns in Angola (carried out predominantly by NGOs), in the eastern DRC, and to a much smaller degree in Rwanda. *National reconciliation* and *peacebuilding* efforts, also being carried out by NGOs and church groups, are being undertaken in several countries in support of the national programs.

V. Risks and mitigation measures

37. Overall, the general political and specific peace processes in the Great Lakes region have continued to improve over the last twelve months. The installation of the Government of National Transition in the DRC, the Luanda and Pretoria agreements generally holding, the signing of the Pretoria Protocol between the Government of Burundi and the CNDD-FDD, and the signing of the cessation of hostilities agreement for the Pool region in the Republic of Congo provide many with hope for the region.

38. Nonetheless, the risk of a *reversal of the peace process* in the region remains high. Despite the installation of the Government of National Transition in the DRC, the establishment of the integrated military high command, and the very recent deployment of regional military commanders, the absence of effective governance and security structures in the east, coupled with security problems in Ituri and the slow rate of disarmament of Rwandese armed groups could lead to a reversal of the peace agreements among the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda. And while the mission and the international community in general are cautiously optimistic, the peace process in Burundi is both fragile and incomplete in the

absence of a settlement with the FNL of Agathon Rwasa. Finally, Uganda is experiencing an increase in and spreading of hostilities with the LRA that do not suggest a near term resolution of the conflict.

39. The risk of *moral hazard* in the MDRP varies from country to country and deserves careful monitoring. While it is felt that linkage of national DDR programs to security sector reforms would reduce the risk that the MDRP national programs are used to reduce the costs of war to governments (or to finance military pensions schemes), the Government of Uganda's current recruitment of militia to combat the LRA poses a real dilemma for the MDRP. Furthermore, national programs in Burundi, the DRC and Congo will have to take particular care that the promise of potential financial assistance does not lead to an inflation of militia and rebel forces. Similarly, the balance of assistance to ex-combatants vis-à-vis civilians in war-affected communities will demand careful and inclusive planning, especially in Angola, Burundi, Congo and the DRC. The integration of reintegration assistance for ex-combatants in decentralized and community-based mechanisms, as applied under the RDRP, can help to mitigate this risk.

40. There is currently no *funding gap* for DDR activities within the MDRP framework. The financing of the RDRP has been secured through an IDA credit, the MDTF and bilateral financing, though in the last case some expected German financing has been channeled for previously unplanned program activities. However, given anticipated disbursements under the second national program grant to Angola (\$50 million total approximate value), coupled with the approximately \$30 million expected to be disbursed for approved special projects, the MDRP will need to seek further disbursements from its donors either at the next Partners' meeting in Kinshasa or no later than the next AC/TFC meeting to be held in May, 2004. The partners requested that the MDRP Secretariat prepare a revised analysis of overall program costs and cash-flow requirements for the next 24 months.

41. *Coordination* of DDR activities at both regional and national levels in MDRP countries has improved considerably in the last year. This has been accomplished through (i) the establishment of the interim strategy framework by UNDP in DRC, (ii) the posting of the MDRP regional specialists in Kigali and Kinshasa, and (iii) the establishment of country-level coordination bodies such as the TCC in Rwanda, DDR-CC in Burundi, and the DTG in Uganda. Nonetheless, coordination problems still arise as evidenced by parallel programs being approved outside the agreed upon framework and without input from national program staff or key local partners. Some existing or new coordination mechanisms (such as the CTPC in DRC and CONADER in Congo) will clearly need further strengthening. Given the complex and dynamic nature of the current situation in Burundi, in particular, the mission recommends that the MDRP Secretariat ensure a longer term "permanent presence" in Bujumbura.

42. It is clear that the effectiveness of the MDRP also requires a close working relationship and effective coordination with MONUC. While cooperation has improved significantly between MDRP partners and MONUC in Kinshasa, there remain some concerns that other points of interaction are less effective, notably in the eastern DRC and in Kigali. The mission calls for closer working relations, and joint planning of MONUC disarmament and repatriation activities so that the partners who will be responsible for subsequent demobilization and reintegration can fully prepare for these events.

43. The *risks of non-engagement* vary by country, but in general the international community remains committed to the Lusaka ceasefire agreement and follow-up efforts and accords. The recent visits to the region by the Dutch Ministers of Development Cooperation and Foreign Affairs, the Belgian Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Development Cooperation, the French Foreign Minister, and the Canadian special envoy all indicate that key partners remain committed to the challenges of the greater Great Lakes region. A number of partners (such as Germany, UK and the EC) provide (or are considering) significant additional bilateral support to the MDRP national programs. The continued involvement of South Africa

and Uganda in helping broker and maintain momentum on the peace process in Burundi, of Angola on the Ituri Peace Commission.

44. Continued international support of the process is also reflected in the approval by the UN Security Council of a new mandate and expanded force strength for MONUC, which is essential to the ultimate success of the mission. Furthermore, the African Union's deployment of AMIB bears testament to the commitment of African governments to support regional stabilization. However, donor fatigue could set in quickly if substantial progress in disarming and repatriating foreign armed groups is not realized in the near future as part of this expanded mandate and capabilities. Furthermore, the financing of AMIB, whose presence is a pre-condition for the success of DDR activities in Burundi, remains precarious. Finally, those countries not considered central to the conflict in the DRC—particularly Angola, CAR and the Republic of Congo—are already witnessing waning support from the international community.

VI. Baseline for key MDRP monitoring indicators

45. *Strategy Indicators*

- 1 ***Reduction in the number of internally displaced and refugees.*** Progress in this area is mixed throughout the greater Great Lakes region. Angola has seen the most noticeable improvement with more than 3 million IDPs and 200,000 refugees returning home since last year. Burundi has also experienced a relative improvement in terms of IDP numbers, which have fallen from 387,500 to 281,600 from July 2002 to July 2003. However, the number of Burundian refugees has remained approximately the same (839,000) during the same period. While estimates in the CAR are very rough, the general impression is that increased security has allowed many IDPs, and some refugees to return home. Improvements in the Pool region has led to a reduction of IDPs in Congo, currently estimated at 115,000, while the numbers of Congolese refugees remain approximately the same. However, reflecting on-going instability in eastern DRC, the IDP caseload has increased more than 40% since last July to approximately 3.4 million. Uganda as well has seen an upsurge in the numbers of IDPs (by more than 50% to a little over 1 million) due to the violent clashes in the north with the LRA.
- 2 ***Restoration of the free movement of persons and goods.*** Rwanda enjoys almost completely free movement of persons and goods. The situation in Angola has also improved tremendously--though mines and deteriorated roads and bridges still hamper access to certain areas of the country. The situation in CAR has improved somewhat since the last joint assessment mission but banditry continues to hamper movement in some areas of the country. The Republic of Congo has also experienced some improvement, especially with the opening of the railway line between Pointe Noire and Brazzaville, but the lack of further progress of disarming armed groups in the Pool region constrains movement in that area. The relatively good overall situation in Uganda has worsened, specifically in the north where the Government is expanding its war efforts against the LRA. The arrival of the international force in Ituri district, the gradual expansion of MONUC presence in the east, and the formation of Transitional Government has resulted in a small improvement in the DRC, but deteriorated infrastructure and lack of consistent internal security arrangements makes movement difficult, risky and expensive. Finally, security remains volatile in most parts of Burundi, notwithstanding the recent signing of the Pretoria Protocol.
- 3 The ***evolution of social expenditures, including in relation to security spending*** will be presented under separate cover.

46. *Program Indicators*

- 4 ***Percent of DDR activities undertaken within the framework of the MDRP.*** In Angola and Rwanda, most DDR activities are undertaken within the MDRP framework. In all other countries visited by the mission, DDR activities are being brought under the MDRP umbrella.
- 5 ***Percent of DDR resources channeled through the MDTF.*** The percentage of funds for DDR activities currently channeled through the MDTF as compared to other sources of financing remains low.
- 6 ***Degree of harmonization of national programs.*** The two national programs currently under implementation in Angola and Rwanda, and the program recently drafted in Burundi, have similar structures yet correspond to the respective social, economic and political environment of these countries.

47. *Output Indicators*

- 7 ***Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through national programs.*** To date, a total of 13,800 combatants have been demobilized under the RDRP, Stage II, and 24,200 (including those demobilized under Stage I) have received reintegration assistance; and approximately 95,000 under the Angola program financed by the Government have been demobilized and have received initial reinsertion support. No other national program is active as of the time of the joint supervision mission.
- 8 ***Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through special projects.*** No combatants have yet been demobilized under special projects.
- 9 ***Effectiveness of technical knowledge sharing activities.*** A number of bi-lateral cross-border knowledge sharing activities have been organized between DRC and Rwanda, and Burundi (including AMIB) and Rwanda, and one large-scale event for all national program technical staff in Kibuye (August 2003) on monitoring and evaluation of DDR programs. National program management and staff indicated that these events were useful and follow-up applications were evident in Angola and Burundi.
- 10 ***Efficient organization of joint missions and preparation of reports.*** The MDRP partnership has maintained its schedule of semi-annual program reviews and partners' meetings, preparation and distribution of quarterly progress, annual joint supervision mission and program update reports, and preparation of other ad hoc technical missions and reports as originally proposed in the Strategy document. Some earlier difficulties with notifying partners with sufficient time to participate in supervision and other missions have been corrected (with updated partner lists both from headquarters and in country embassies or development offices). Nonetheless, more can be done to further improve this area.

VII. Mission assessment

48. Overall, the joint mission provided an opportunity to further strengthen the MDRP partnership by bringing partners closer together at both the headquarters and field level to analyze developments, assess progress, identify challenges remaining under the Program, and to chart a joint course of action forward.

49. Partners noted an improvement in the logistical preparations for the mission from the last JSM, and that the field visit arrangements to the eastern DRC, from there to Kigali, and to the provinces in Angola had been very well managed and supported by partners. Nonetheless, some problems persist in communications among several partners' headquarter and field levels, leading to some confusion at times. The mission regrets that its schedule conflicted with the timing of the UNDP Resident Representative

annual retreat in New York, especially for those missions where UNDP is the lead agency. It was appreciated, however, that the Resident Representative in CAR postponed his departure for New York in order to overlap with the mission, as was the participation of UNDP/BCPR staff in the DRC and Burundi country missions and wrap-up. The mission also regretted the absence of the World Bank's Country Manager for the DRC.

VIII. Summary of recommendations and proposed next steps

50. The key recommendations of the Joint Supervision Mission are as follows:

I. Strategic

- (a) Ensure better harmonization of technical and political efforts related to DDR activities in the region with a view to informing political decision-making (including peace negotiations) and timely financing and implementation of DDR activities that support the political process;
- (b) MDRP partners should strengthen advocacy role in political discussions and program design to ensure the early release and future non-recruitment of child soldiers by armed forces, the application of the Cape Town principles, and a more community based reintegration approach for child ex-combatants;
- (c) Governments and MDRP partners to ensure that all targeted reintegration assistance for ex-combatants should be provided within the framework of national programs. Broader rehabilitation, reconstruction and development initiatives should be coordinated with the national programs and vice versa; and
- (d) MDRP European partners to release a joint “*coreu*” regarding the MDRP to highlight importance and seek further political/financial support.

II. Regional/Cross-border

- (e) The Governments of DRC, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda should intensify joint efforts to increase the rates of disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of Rwandan, Burundian and Uganda armed groups from the DRC to their respective home countries with the support of MONUC; and
- (f) Government of the Republic of Congo encouraged to expedite the repatriation of Congolese (DRC) and Rwandan combatants currently in its territory through MONUC or other mechanisms, and requested to brief the AC/TFC/TCG in Kinshasa on its plans to facilitate their repatriation

III. Knowledge-sharing

- (g) MDRP Secretariat to present a proposal at the AC/TFC meeting in Kinshasa for cross-border learning exercises for 2004 (e.g., reintegration, gender, dependents) and seek specific partner interest in supporting specific efforts-- of immediate interest: MDRP Secretariat to contact MONUC to share lessons learned from AMIB's cantonment experience in Burundi to inform MONUC's planned cantonment activities in the Ituri district of the DRC;
- (h) MDRP Secretariat to share SSR position paper with MDRP partners as soon as possible in view of planned SSR meeting in Kinshasa on November 10-11; and
- (i) MDRP Secretariat to prepare briefing note on how to ensure closer linkages with broader reconstruction efforts ongoing in the region.

IV. Country Level

Angola

- (j) Government of Angola to fulfill conditions of effectiveness for access to IDA grant and MDTF resources as soon as possible.

Burundi

- (k) Regional facilitation, Government and MDRP Secretariat to ensure coherence among Force Technical Agreement, Joint Operations Plan and national program document in final round of negotiations in Burundi;
- (l) Government to present an analysis of the implication of the Pretoria Protocol for military integration process and associated public expenditure in medium-term, and to engage donors in a transparent and systematic dialogue and provide a credible calendar for reduction in defense expenditures;
- (m) Government to update partners on status of national program planning, including program target group, and budget parameters at forthcoming AC/TFC/TCG meeting in Kinshasa;
- (n) Government to ensure that Executive Secretariat of NCDDR is staffed, equipped and operational as soon as possible;
- (o) Government to initiate information and sensitization of combatants and civil society as soon as possible; and
- (p) Government and MDRP Secretariat to refine pre-disarmament gap analysis in consultation with local partners.

Central African Republic

- (q) MDRP to consider possibility of a special project approach to DDR program in CAR in consultation with Government of CAR.

Democratic Republic of Congo

- (r) Government to identify an MDRP focal point as soon as possible;
- (s) Government to advance preparation of national program in order to fulfill eligibility criteria for MDRP financing as soon as possible;
- (t) Government to present update on status of national DDR and security sector reform program planning, including a clear timetable actions to be taken, at forthcoming AC/TFC/TCG meeting in Kinshasa; and
- (u) World Bank to prepare and present at Kinshasa AC/TFC meeting a timetable of IDA project preparation steps in line with national program planning

Republic of Congo

- (v) .The draft PNDDR be reformulated in a participatory manner that includes the involvement of CONADER, and that carefully reviews beneficiary numbers in accordance with MDRP criteria and available data from local partners.

Rwanda

- (w) MDRP Secretariat to support efforts to enhance collaboration between MONUC and the RDRC;
- (x) Government of Rwanda to ensure that all reintegration assistance specifically targeting ex-combatants is provided within the framework of RDRP; and

- (y) Encourage MDRP partners to respect MDRP principles of national ownership and to provide targeted assistance to ex-combatants through the RDRP.

Uganda

- (z) MDRP Secretariat to continue close liaison with the Defense Review and reform process in determining next steps in supporting development of potential national program.

V. Financing

General

- (aa) MDRP Secretariat to submit a revised analysis of overall program costs and Trust Fund cash flow projections for next 24 months at AC/TFC/TCG in Kinshasa; and
- (bb) MDRP Secretariat to submit comparative unit cost analysis of programs supported within the region with a view to ensure harmonization and equity of assistance across countries.

Special Projects

- (cc) MDRP Secretariat to expedite to the extent possible disbursements to grantees of currently approved proposals by the Kinshasa AC/TFC meeting;
- (dd) MDRP Secretariat to submit disbursement progress report in the forthcoming AC/TFC in Kinshasa, including outlining recommendations for how donor partners can support process;
- (ee) MDRP Secretariat to prepare a briefing note explaining how special project proposals approved to date fit with original purpose of special projects and how target groups for special projects could be diversified;
- (ff) MDRP Secretariat to draft options note on how to ensure that special projects are integrated into national programs once these are put in place;
- (gg) UNICEF/DRC to help ensure consistent/coherent implementation of activities under various child-soldier special projects;
- (hh) MDRP Secretariat to prepare an analysis of special project overhead costs in projects approved to date, and suggest strategies to ensure that a reasonable balance of direct recipient benefits and overhead costs is maintained;
- (ii) No new proposals to be considered for financing in the DRC under the special projects financing window until further notice; and
- (jj) UNDP to provide briefing at forthcoming Kinshasa AC/TFC on how it intends to manage potential conflict of interest between serving as lead agency and implementing partner for special projects at same time.

VI. Program Administration/Management

- (kk) MDRP Secretariat to submit note to AC/TFC/TCG in Kinshasa on how it plans to reinforce its capacity for political analysis, and for liaison with political levels of donor partners;
- (ll) MDRP partners to prepare note on possible measures to improve flow of information from embassies/missions to capitals; and
- (mm) MDRP Secretariat to submit proposal to AC/TFC/TCG in Kinshasa on how to reinforce its presence on the ground in Angola, Burundi and the DRC.



Joint Supervision Mission

September 27 - October 15, 2003

ANNEXES

Annex I

Angola Country Report

September 10 – October 3, 2003

1. The Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) Joint Supervision Mission (JSM) visited Angola from September 30 to October 3, 2003, in order to assess the overall progress made in implementing the MDRP and related Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Program (ADRP). The specific objectives for the Angola mission, as shown in Attachment 1 and as confirmed by MDRP partners at the start of the mission in Luanda, were to: (i) assess progress made in implementing the MDRP in the context of Angola, (ii) review the status of the special project between the World Bank and UNDP, and (iii) make recommendations as to how best to move forward.
2. The members of the mission (see Attachment 2) wish to thank the representatives of the Government of Angola (both at national and provincial level), IRSEM management and staff, UN agencies, NGOs and other partners who generously assisted the mission to better understand the current situation and challenges for the MDRP in Angola (see Attachment 1). The remainder of this document contains the main findings and recommendations of the JSM mission to Angola.

A. Country Context

3. In general, the overall situation in Angola has continued to improve for millions of Angolans since the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Angola (GOA) and UNITA in April 2002, and the effective end of the decades' long struggle. Demobilization of more than 90,000 UNITA fighters has been completed, and more than 4 million people (including IDPs, refugees, the demobilized and their families) have, for the most part, returned home after many years of displacement. While significant numbers of people are still considered food insecure, all observers agree that the major humanitarian crisis has passed. People, goods and services are circulating widely throughout most regions of the country, though some areas remain inaccessible due to damaged or deteriorated infrastructure or mines. UNITA has consolidated its own position as the most viable opposition party following a very successful party congress in June, 2003, where Isaias Samakuva, a UNITA diplomat from Savimbi's Ovimbundu tribe, won the UNITA leadership in a landslide victory over interim leader Paolo Lukamba. National elections are projected for 2005. Regionally, the Government and the armed forces have been supportive of the regional peace processes through peace-keeping activities in Congo/Brazzaville, facilitation of the Luanda accords between DRC and Uganda, and participation on the Ituri Peace Commission.
4. However, Government is faced with a number of challenges in consolidating these gains and moving into a phase of broad economic recovery and development. Fiscal difficulties will constrain efforts to support the reconstruction of basic services in the provinces to meet minimum conditions of return for all displaced, and support on-going reintegration efforts for ex-combatants. At the same time, the absence of agreement with the IMF over a Staff Monitored Program will delay debt relief discussions and longer-term donor support to Government's recovery efforts. Nonetheless, Government is in the process of preparing a large-scale rehabilitation and reconstruction program with a priority phase from 2003-2006 valued at an estimated \$2 billion. While the overall impression is that there is no possibility that UNITA would resume the war, there is concern that criminal activity or social unrest will emerge as a growing problem. And the conflict in Cabinda, though not likely to boil over, will nonetheless put further financial strain on Government as it analyzes options for reintegration program support.

5. A national program, the Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Project (ADRP), has been prepared by the Government based on the MDRP framework, negotiated and signed with the World Bank, and should begin implementation in the near future. A supervision mission to the ADRP immediately preceding the MDRP joint supervision mission found that (i) Government was well-advanced in finalizing all conditions of effectiveness and expects that effectiveness would be declared before the end of the year; (ii) work under the UNDP/FAO/ILO special project has begun and though support to the current agriculture campaign was not possible, a reorientation of the on-going vulnerable group distribution efforts would cover an estimated 30,000 ex-combatants; and (iii) IRSEM's existing management information system is adequate to ensure basic tracking of benefits and beneficiaries while the overall monitoring and evaluation system is being strengthened. DFID has offered to support the provision of technical assistance to the national program for monitoring and evaluation.

B. Meeting Program Eligibility Criteria and Application of MDRP Guiding Principles

6. The Government of Angola has met or is in the process of meeting all eligibility criteria to receive support under the MDRP for a national program. This includes continuing to *participate in the regional peace process*, in addition to the bilateral Luena Agreement with UNITA; having prepared a *letter of demobilization policy* acceptable to the World Bank and MDRP partners; and having developed an appropriate *national program* consistent and in *harmony* with other demobilization and reintegration efforts in the region. Through the process of finalizing the national program, the Government has shown a high degree of *national ownership* of the program to the extent to which the recommendations of the MDRP partners were not always readily accepted. Government contribution of an estimated \$138 million to the demobilization and initial reinsertion phase also reflects the level of commitment to the program.

7. *Appropriate institutional framework and structures* to oversee and execute the national program also exist in Angola. However, capacity constraints of the national executing agency, the Institute for Social and Productive Reinsertion of Ex-combatants (IRSEM), exist and are the focus of current technical support under the national program. The mission found that further effort and support is needed to rapidly strengthen priority provincial operations where the largest concentration of ex-combatants have returned, extend IRSEM's institutional presence to the municipal level, and define and launch the process for involving local implementing and strategic program partners. *Suitable fiduciary, social and environmental safeguard* arrangements also have been developed as part of the national program, which nonetheless still need to be tested. In particular, the fiduciary arrangement under the national program have been designed to ensure the highest level of *transparency* in the delivery of program benefits and management of MDRP resources.

8. The national program will support assistance to *special target groups*, including women, children and disabled. A particular challenge of the Angola program, however, is the significant under-reporting of these groups, as well as a concern for certain non-military dependents (including widows of ex-combatants) that were not considered in the estimated numbers of project beneficiaries. In response, the national implementing agency is working closely with the relevant technical working groups to see how best to support on-going activities that target these vulnerable groups. Counseling and voluntary screening for *HIV/AIDS* was also noted as an area where the national program should try and expand efforts. Initial indications from the team working with Government to prepare the Emergency Multi-sector Recovery Project suggest that HIV/AIDS will emerge as a larger challenge for Government than earlier suspected. Given the generally higher risk among military forces, the national program needs to more actively respond to this issue.

9. The overall program design remains sufficiently *flexible* to allow for these and other accommodations to the local context (for instance, the possible inclusion of the FLEC in reintegration efforts). *Coordination* of the national program with more general support to returning populations is strengthened through links to the child protection working group, as well as for agriculture activities through links with FAO under the special project (see below). However, coordination with other efforts more generally targeting IDPs, refugees, rehabilitation or recovery is not evident.

10. A *special project* to be implemented by UNDP, FAO and ILO to assist Government in accelerating the support to ex-combatants under the program was approved in August. Despite having been finalized too late to take advantage of the current agriculture campaign, work has begun in the area of economic reintegration, in helping strengthen IRSEM, and in procuring inputs for the upcoming agriculture campaign that will begin in January 2004. The special project will also serve to elaborate and pilot operating strategies for the national program.

11. Overall, *coordination* among partners in support of the national program has remained good. With the exception of some support being provided by the German Government for reintegration of ex-combatants, most international efforts and financing fit within the MDRP framework of the national program. However, there exist large-scale national efforts on the part of the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Public Administration and Social Security that are not closely linked to the national program. The mission therefore recommends that IRSEM work closely with MINADER, MAPESS and GTZ to improve *harmonization* of these efforts with the national program.

C. Program Performance Indicators

12. Through predominantly Government led and financed efforts, more than 90,000 UNITA combatants have been *demobilized* and assisted to return home, and an estimated 85% of these have received cash payments in support of their initial *reinsertion*. However, to date a much lower percentage (estimated at 50% and 25% respectively) have received resettlement kits and contingency allowances under the Government program. At the time of the mission, a very small number of ex-combatants had received *reintegration* assistance as defined in the national program.

13. The end of fighting coupled with the disarmament and demobilization of UNITA has had a direct and significant impact on the well-being of a much larger population group. OCHA reports that approximately 3.2 million *IDPs and refugees* have returned home over the past 12 months, while around 700,000 more remain in transit. Partners noted, however, that only an estimated 30% of the areas of return met the minimum standards in terms of basic needs, security and access to services established by Government. OCHA also reports that there has been a significant increase in the *movement of goods and services* in most of the country, though some areas remain inaccessible due to mines and deteriorated road and bridge infrastructure.

14. The end of the war is projected to have a further positive impact on *reducing defense and internal security expenditures*. While, according to government analyses, the overall security sector has absorbed around 15% of Government expenditures over the past several years, the revised 2003 budget indicates a 13.4% share for the security sector. This decline is also accompanied by a projected shift of emphasis from military to non-military (i.e., police, judiciary) elements. And while expenditures on social sectors have fluctuated between 6.5% and 12.4% during the past 3 years, they are also projected to increase for the current fiscal year. Nonetheless, any discussion of relative levels of public expenditures in Angola must be greatly qualified due to the still high percentage (28.9% for 2002) of unclassified expenditures in the national accounts.

D. Efforts Complementary to the MDRP

15. A number of efforts complementary to the national program and DDR in general are relevant in the case of Angola. Most importantly, several international NGOs and UN agencies are involved in *de-mining* and landmine awareness activities throughout most of the country. The Angolan Armed Forces are also involved in mine clearing work. While work for most agencies has expanded significantly since April 2002, estimates suggest that there is still at least 5 years of additional work to address the known mine areas of the country. The national police consider the collection of small caliber weapons among the civilian population to be a priority issue and a program of *small weapons collection and civilian disarmament* is currently being developed. UNDP has indicated that it would support such a program and has budgeted \$1 million for this purpose.

16. Though the Government has committed itself to a fairly large reduction of their armed forces as part of the overall national program, a comprehensive *security sector review and reform* process is not currently being undertaken. Portugal is providing some military administration training assistance and the Government of the United Kingdom has offered support for both security sector analysis as well as peacekeeping training. Finally, several *peace building and reconciliation* efforts are underway throughout Angola, most being carried out by NGOs in cooperation with local church and other CBO networks.

E. Risks and Mitigation Measures

17. As noted above, it is the overwhelming consensus among MDRP partners that there is little or no risk that the *peace process* will be reversed in Angola, nor that the situation in *Cabinda* will have a significant negative impact on consolidating peace in the country. And while most development partners are happily surprised by the relative peacefulness of the process to resettle more than 4 million IDPs, refugees and demobilized, there remains some concern that tensions over access to land, abandoned homes, or underlying community or individual conflicts will arise as time passes.

18. There is also little or no evidence that the existence of the MDRP has lessened significant the *cost of the war* (and the peace) to Government nor an indication that the program has created a *perverse incentive* for increased participation in armed conflict. There continues to exist a risk that the demobilization and reintegration program is not sufficiently *well-linked* with efforts to support a wider population of displaced, however, ties are currently being strengthened particularly for special target groups and in the area of agriculture. A concern also exists among some partners that the *balance between targeted and non-targeted assistance* to demobilized and other vulnerable groups could create tensions at the community level, but to date no significant instances were noted. Nonetheless, IRSEM is reviewing its strategies, particularly for special target groups, to see how best to link to and partially support on-going community based efforts.

19. There is a small projected *funding gap* for the program in Angola, but it is not considered a risk to the overall program given efforts at coordination of special target group assistance previously noted and indication of interest on the part of local level partners (the EC in particular) to possibly finance such a gap. However, finalization of the MDRP grant to the national program is awaiting successful conclusion by Government of the World Bank grant conditions of effectiveness. For the most part, MDRP partners *closely coordinate* efforts in support of the national program, though there exists small instances of less well *harmonized reintegration support*, which is being discussed between the MDRP Secretariat, IRSEM and the partners in question.

F. Recommendations and/or Agreed-upon Next Steps

- The World Bank track closely the completion of ADRP conditions of effectiveness to help ensure prompt project start-up;
- IRSEM take further action on key institutional strengthening and implementation readiness issues, including: (i) provide logistical support and hire new staff to strengthen priority provincial operations where the largest concentration of ex-combatants have returned, (ii) hire key municipal liaison officers (*asistentes rurais*), and (iii) launch requests for expressions of interest to begin process of identifying strategic and implementing partners;
- IRSEM to identify an appropriate HIV/AIDS counseling strategy with appropriate national and international partners for inclusion in reintegration support efforts; and
- IRSEM to harmonize reintegration support and beneficiary tracking efforts under national program with those initiatives of MINADER, MAPESS and GTZ.

Attachment 1:
**Angola JSM Terms of Reference
and Mission Organization**

A. Mission Terms of Reference

The overall terms of reference for the Joint Supervision Mission is to jointly assess, with major partners, progress made in implementing the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), including national program and/or special project efforts. All missions will:

- Assess and update as appropriate the status of MDRP criteria and indicators regarding program (i) benefits, (ii) risks and mitigation measures, (iii) eligibility criteria, (iv) guiding principles, (v) performance, and (vi) complementary efforts as outlined in the MDRP Strategy document and detailed in the attachment to these SMOs; and
- Prepare country-specific reports summarizing status of program and identifying key issues and recommendations for consideration by the Government and MDRP partners.

Specifically in Angola, the mission will:

- Review progress made in launching the Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Program, in particular related to: (i) establishment of suitable institutional structure, (ii) participation of UNITA in program process, (iii) plans and activities for reintegrating ex-combatants; and
- Assess arrangements for and progress with the special project.

B. Mission Schedule

Tuesday, September 30:

- Mission organizing meeting (all partners)
- International Organization for Migration (Mike Pillinger)
- UNITA, Secretary for Social Reintegration (Leonel Gomez)
- Development Workshop, Peacebuilding Unit (Eunice Inácio)

Wednesday, October 1:

- Field visit, Bié Province; meetings held with Provincial Governor and Vice Governor; IRSEM Provincial Director; OCHA Provincial Coordinator, NGOs and Government Ministries working in areas of resettlement, reintegration and recovery; UNITA provincial delegate and staff; Municipal administrator and staff of Kunhinga; community representatives of Belo Horizonte

Thursday, October 2:

- Ministry of Social Reintegration; National Directorate for Assistance to Children and Adolescents (Ana Alfonso) and child protection working group (including representatives of UNICEF, ICRC, SCF/UK, SCF/Norway, and CCF.
- IRSEM (General Andrade)
- National Police (Commissioner Ambrosio de Lemos)
- Ministry of Planning (Vice Minister De Morais)

Friday, October 3:

- Halo Trust (Christian Richmond)
- Ministry of Public Administration and Social Security, National Directorate for Employment and Professional Formation (Manuel da Costa)
- Partners wrap-up meeting

Attachment 2
Angola JSM Members

Mission Member	Partner Organization
Sean Bradley	MDRP Secretariat/World Bank
Walter Viegas	European Commission
Iolanda Fortes	UNDP
Olaf Handloegten	Germany (GTZ)
Margarida Fawke	UNHCR
François Croville	France
John Thompson	United Kingdom
Martin Johnston	DFID
Ana Paula Moreira	Portugal
Cecilia Gjerdrman and Harriet Bengtsson	Sweden
Jeffrey Clark	for USAID
Robert Brink and Quirine Timmerman	Netherlands
Manuela Gonzales	OCHA

Annex II

Burundi Country Report

October 12-15, 2003

1. Within the framework of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), a joint partner mission visited Burundi from October 12-15, 2003 to assess MDRP implementation progress to date and identify next steps.⁴ The specific objectives of this mission were to:

- (i) Review the effectiveness of DDR coordination mechanisms in country, especially with respect to the JCC and AMIB processes;
- (ii) Assess progress made in preparing the national program, Government capacity to carry out the program, and links to restructuring of the armed forces; and
- (iii) Assess arrangements for and progress with the special project proposal for child soldier demobilization, reintegration and recruitment prevention.

2. The mission would like to thank the Transitional Government of Burundi (TGOB), members of the Government Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (DDRR) planning team, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), donor and UN partners, for the generous time and assistance provided during its visit.

A. Country context

3. There has recently been noteworthy progress in negotiations between the TGOB and the *Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie* (CNDD-FDD) of Pierre Nkurunziza. A bilateral cease-fire was first signed on December 3, 2002. However, its provisions and implementation timetable were not respected and hostilities *de facto* resumed in January 2003. With the support of the regional facilitation, a protocol for the implementation of the cease-fire (the Pretoria Protocol) was signed on October 8, 2003. This has improved prospects for the political and military incorporation of the largest Burundian armed political movement into the peace process. However, it should be noted that key implementation provisions, including the Forces Technical Agreement (FTA), remain to be finalized.

4. At the same time, several instruments to facilitate the implementation of the cease-fire have been put in place in the past year. The AMIB, which has significant cease-fire monitoring as well as disarmament and demobilization responsibilities, began to deploy in Burundi in January 2003. With the recent arrival of Ethiopian and Mozambican contingents, AMIB is now fully deployed. Furthermore, the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC), which is mandated to oversee the implementation of military aspects of the Arusha accord and subsequent cease-fire agreements has been established under the chairmanship of the United Nations (UN).

5. In accordance with the provisions of the Arusha Accord, the transfer of power from the former UPRONA president to the FRODEBU vice president took place as scheduled on May 1, 2003. This successful transfer of power reassured Burundians and the international community alike about UPRONA and FRODEBU's commitment to implementing the Accord.

⁴ See attachment 1 for a list of mission members and attachment 2 for the mission schedule.

6. In the absence of the implementation of the cease-fire agreements to date, the security situation in most parts of the country remains unpredictable. The number of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) continues to exceed 281,600 (OCHA – August 2003). Serious security incidents occur regularly, and there was a major attack on Bujumbura by the Forces National pour la Libération (FNL) of Agathon Rwasa in July 2003. The refusal of the FNL (Agathon Rwasa) to engage in a negotiation process with the TGOB continues to complicate the stabilization process. At this time, six provinces remain in UN security phase IV. However, the mission noted that there had been a relative improvement of security since September 2003, and that Government and the CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza) declared a cessation of hostilities on October 8, 2003, which has been widely (though not fully) respected.

B. Eligibility criteria for MDRP assistance and application of MDRP guiding principles

National Program

7. Following the signing of the cease-fire agreement between the TGOB and the CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza) of December 2002, Government formally initiated the ***preparation of a demobilization and reintegration program*** in February 2003, and requested the assistance of the World Bank to provide planning and financial assistance to the Program, as well as to lead partner coordination efforts within the framework of the MDRP. This followed an MDRP Joint Assessment Mission that visited Burundi in January 2003 and confirmed that MDRP ***external assistance*** would be available for the program.

8. In view of the continuing hostilities and the sensitivity of the ongoing political negotiation process, Government insisted on elaborating the Program with great discretion, and shared the document with the World Bank only on a confidential basis. Government also indicated that it wished to secure the feedback of the CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza) before sharing the document with the international community. The latter was accomplished in the context of the regional facilitation process in Dar es Salaam in September 2003. The mission welcomes Government's decision to make the document available to MDRP donors in the course of this joint supervision mission. In the interests of ***transparency*** and ***participation***, the mission further recommends that Government make the document available to other MDRP partners as soon as possible.

9. Due to the confidential nature of the program preparation process to date, the program's objectives, timeframe, and benefits are not known to the members of the national armed forces, other combatants and the population at large. The mission strongly recommends that Government initiate information and sensitization activities as soon as possible in order to manage combatants' expectations, limit the scope for disinformation, and reassure combatants that they will receive support to re-establish civilian livelihoods after their demobilization. The mission considers this to be an urgent and important confidence building measure.

10. Government has legally established a ***national institutional structure***, the National Commission for Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration (NCDRR), to lead planning, coordination and implementation of DDR activities in Burundi, on August 28, 2003. The decree establishing the NCDRR includes provisions for an Executive Secretariat (ES) with primary responsibility for technical planning, coordination and implementation. The mission strongly encourages Government to establish the ES/NCDRR as soon as possible in order to finalize program preparation and establish critical national implementation capacity.

11. The mission was briefed about the elaboration of a Joint Operations Plan (JOP) for the disarmament, verification, military integration and demobilization of combatants of armed movements by a Technical Working Group (TWG) comprising the AMIB, UNOB, UNICEF, the office of the UN HC/RC, the Government DDDR planning team and the MDRP Secretariat. The mission welcomed this

effort to harmonize the planning process for these complex tasks. The mission stressed the importance of addressing the needs of children and women during the JOP implementation process, and welcomed the inclusion of UNICEF in the TWG.

12. The mission notes that the **Pretoria Protocol** appears to suggest an integration of the majority of CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza) into the new defense and security forces as a first step prior to any large-scale demobilization. The mission encourages Government and the regional facilitation to clarify the operational and financial implications of this approach as soon as possible. If an integration is to precede the initiation of large-scale demobilization activities, it may have significant implications for the nature and timing of the national DDRR program. It could also have significant implications for defense expenditures. Several donors noted that assistance for increased defense expenditures would be difficult to justify and finance. The mission encouraged Government to engage the donor community in a transparent, consistent and strategic dialogue on this issue, taking into account security sector reform, public sector expenditure management and demobilization issues, and providing a credible implementation calendar for a significant reduction in the medium-term. Furthermore, the mission recommended that the MDRP Secretariat be present in the final round of technical discussions on the Forces Technical Agreement (FTA), in order to ensure that the national program and the Joint Operations Plan are synchronized with the FTA.

13. Government has confirmed that it will draft a *letter of demobilization policy* outlining its commitment in order to access MDRP funding for the planned national program. Sample letters have been shared with Government in the course of preparatory work to date.

14. Appropriate *environmental safeguards and fiduciary measures* are envisaged within the draft national program document to minimize any potentially negative social and environmental impact and ensure the proper use of program funds. These will be reviewed in the context of a World Bank / MDRP appraisal mission.

Special Projects

15. Following the last MDRP supervision of October 2003, and prior to the initiation of the national program, the preparation of two *special projects* for *special target groups* (child soldiers and disabled ex-combatants) commenced. After the initiation of national program preparation, Government decided to provide assistance to the reintegration of disabled ex-combatants within the framework of the national program, and thus declined to submit this special project proposal. In addition, Government informed the MDRP Secretariat in early March 2003 that it would not endorse any new special project proposals because of the initiation of national program preparations.

16. UNICEF has prepared the special project for Child Soldier Demobilization, Reintegration and Recruitment Prevention in partnership with the Ministry of Human Rights. The special project was endorsed by the MDRP Local Ad Hoc Committee in Bujumbura in June 2003. However, the finalization of the project proposal and its financing have been delayed significantly. The mission expressed strong concerns about these delays, and urged the MDRP Secretariat and UNICEF to finalize project preparation and expedite financing as soon as possible. Donors requested an update of progress in this regard at the forthcoming Advisory and Trust Fund Committee meetings in Kinshasa. To this end, the MDRP Secretariat and UNICEF agreed on joint next steps.

Coordination

17. The mission observes that DDR *coordination* has improved significantly in Burundi in the past year. Coordination mechanisms have been established at political, donor and inter-agency, as well as technical levels. At the political level, the JCC (and especially its sub-commission for DDR) provides a

forum for the discussion of DDR issues among all parties to the process. However, the JCC's effectiveness has been limited to date by the non-participation of the CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza). The mission encourages the CNDD-FDD (Nkurunziza) to send a delegation to participate in the JCC as soon as possible in order to advance the overall DDR planning process. Furthermore, the mission urges the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) to ensure that the JCC is adequately staffed. Finally, local MDRP partners requested that the minutes of JCC meetings be shared in a more systematic manner.

18. In the course of the MDRP Joint Assessment Mission in January 2003, the World Bank initiated a formal DDR Coordination Committee (DDR-CC) to facilitate the participation of MDRP partners in the national program planning and supervision process. According to local MDRP partners, the committee has enhanced partner coordination with respect to DDR planning as well as overall information exchange on DDR issues. However, its usefulness has been limited by the unavailability of the national program document to date. In view of Government's decision to share the document with MDRP donors and the dynamic character of the peace process at this time, the mission encourages the World Bank to ensure that the DDR-CC meets on a regular basis. In view of the likely role of NGO's and civil society in reintegration and information and sensitization activities, the mission further recommends that an NGO representative be invited to participate in the DDR-CC.

19. The mission welcomed the collaborative nature of the TWG in the elaboration of the JOP. Local MDRP partners requested that information on TWG activities and outputs be shared in a more systematic manner. The mission also encouraged the MDRP Secretariat, AMIB and UNOB to clarify in greater detail the relationships among the existing political and technical coordination structures.

20. The link between DDR and general *reconstruction efforts* is critical in Burundi, given the enormous number of internally displaced and refugees. It is generally accepted that such efforts can help prepare the communities for the return of ex-combatants and displaced people alike. Smaller projects are already underway by a variety of international partners, such as UNDP's Community Assistance Umbrella Program, the EC's PREBU, and the World Bank's Burundi Social Action Program. The mission encouraged the MDRP Secretariat and the NCDRR to ensure that reintegration activities for ex-combatants be coordinated closely with ongoing activities targeted at communities or other war-affected populations (e.g., *sinistrés*).

C. Regional Issues

21. The Government of Burundi has participated in several regional knowledge sharing activities in the past year. The Government DDRR planning team has visited the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program (RDRP) twice with a view to drawing lessons for and *harmonizing* demobilization procedures, reintegration options and program management. In addition, two members of the Burundi DDRR technical team and one member of the Child Soldier Demobilization, Reintegration and Recruitment Prevention project participated in the MDRP Technical Coordination Group (TCG) workshop on monitoring and evaluation in DDR programs that took place in Kibuye, Rwanda, in August 2003. The Government team appreciated the value of the TCG as a regional networking and confidence-building mechanism. In addition, the MDRP Secretariat informed the mission that it facilitated the visit of an AMIB team to the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program, with a view to helping AMIB learn more about Demobilization Center planning and management.

22. The mission noted that important lessons had been learned from the **Muyange cantonment experience** initiated by AMIB in June 2003. The experience illustrated the possible risks and pitfalls of initiating a cantonment process without having clear definitions for combatants status, procedures for combatant verification, procedures for child soldier identification and separation, camp management,

reintegration “exit strategies” and partnerships (peacekeeping, humanitarian and development) in place. The mission recommended that the MDRP Secretariat ensure that these lessons be communicated to other countries and partners active in the region. In particular, some partners felt that the Muyange lessons could be relevant to the cantonment process planned by MONUC in the Ituri region of the DRC. In this regard, the mission requests that AMIB and the TGOB invite MONUC to visit the Muyange center, and calls on MONUC to ensure that relevant findings are taken into account in its planning of DDR activities in the DRC.

23. MONUC briefed the mission about its wish to expedite the repatriation of Burundian ex-combatants currently in the DRC. At this time, an estimated 80 Burundian ex-combatants have been disarmed and encamped by MONUC in the DRC. The mission encourages the Government of Burundi to establish mechanisms and procedures to facilitate the reception of Burundian ex-combatants repatriated from the DRC with the help of MONUC as soon as possible. The Government of Burundi confirmed that the reception and reintegration of such ex-combatants would in future be addressed within the framework of the planned national program.

D. Efforts complementary to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

24. *Local security* remains a major concern. Although the Geneva Conventions oblige warring parties to protect the civilian population in any circumstances, civilians have repeatedly been killed by both Government and rebel forces in the course of the conflict. Attempts to establish lasting local security will only be possible with the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement.

25. *Security sector reform* is at the heart of the Burundian peace process. Protocol III of the Arusha agreement spells out general principles for security sector reform, the details of which will need to be worked out during and after the ceasefire negotiations. In broad terms, Protocol III foresees the unification of Government and rebel forces, a restructuring of the new armed forces to meet the new challenges of a post-conflict country, and the subsequent demobilization of surplus soldiers to reach a target strength that is financially sustainable. The Pretoria Protocol is consistent with this logic, establishing a joint defense staff tasked with determining the ultimate size, composition and structure of the future force. This will in turn inform the nature and scale of the national DDRR program. However, the mission noted with concern that Government has not yet engaged with the international community on the nature of this security sector reform exercise.

26. No *involuntary disarmament* is currently planned in the Burundian context. It is expected that any disarmament activities for combatants would be undertaken according to the provisions of an eventual ceasefire agreement.

E. Risks and mitigation measures

27. Burundi still faces a significant risk of a reversal of the peace process. Notwithstanding the signing of the Pretoria Protocol, several key issues (e.g., the FTA, temporary immunity for CNDD-FDD personnel) remain to be addressed before the disarmament, military integration and demobilization process can proceed. In the absence of a resolution of these issues, the risk of a resumption of hostilities is likely to increase over time. The mission thus strongly encourages the parties to the negotiations and the regional facilitation to address outstanding questions as soon as possible and to fully support the functioning of the IMC and the JCC.

28. The potential risk of a coup by disaffected elements of the armed forces remains. This would clearly jeopardize the peace process. The mission encouraged bilateral partners to promote adherence to the process and provide disincentives for any contrary action.

29. There is a potential risk that the continued rejection of the peace process by the FNL (Rwasa) in Burundi and the gradual consolidation of peace in the eastern DRC could encourage Rwandan armed groups (including ex-FAR and interahamwe) to enter Burundi, potentially in alliance with the FNL (Rwasa). This could in turn jeopardize the consolidation of the peace process in Burundi, and hamper the implementation of the cease-fire process between the CNDD-FDD and the Government.

30. With peace potentially in sight, there is a clear *moral hazard* that parties will seek to recruit new combatants in order to bolster their political claims, increase their representation in the new defense and security forces, and develop patronage networks in anticipation of elections. This risk should be mitigated by clear communication about combatant status definitions (i.e., having been part of an armed movement and/or the armed forces before the signing of the relevant cease-fire agreement), strong communications from donors and the facilitation discouraging such conduct among the relevant political and military leaderships, robust combatant status verification on the ground, and sensitization that an increase in numbers will simply lead to a reduction in assistance levels per beneficiary.

31. The large number of people uprooted by war in Burundi requires close attention to finding a *balance* between support to ex-combatants and assistance to other vulnerable groups, in particular returning refugees and IDPs and host communities. It is generally acknowledged that needs differ between these target groups and that, therefore, differentiated assistance should be provided. However, the mission considers it important to maintain a reasonable level of proportionality between ex-combatants and other war-affected populations.

32. The risk of a *funding gap* for demobilization and reintegration activities in Burundi is small. The World Bank informed the mission that it is preparing a grant in the amount of US\$33 million in support of the national program. Project Preparation Facility (PPF) resources in the amount of US\$596,000 are available to the Government to finalize program design, establish implementation arrangements, and respond to contingency needs. Furthermore, the MDTF Trust Fund has adequate resources in the short-term, and at least one bilateral donor has already expressed a firm interest in providing substantial bilateral support to the future national program.

33. However, as identified in the MDRP Secretariat's "Minding the Gap" note (August 27, 2003), there may be a need for supplementary funding for the provision of **pre-disarmament** assistance. Like many development and humanitarian actors, the World Bank (and any trust funds it administers) is legally precluded from providing assistance to armed combatant groups. Government repeatedly stressed to that financing for this purpose may become an urgent peace-building priority in the near future. The mission encouraged Government to submit a financing request, in consultation with the local "gap committee", once the implications of the Pretoria process had become clear. Donors agreed to respond to any related Government requests in a coordinated manner. The mission notes that the deployment of the AMIB and the rapid establishment of the Executive Secretariat of NCDRR may help to limit this gap to US\$2-3 million.

34. Insufficient financing of AMIB is a critical risk, as the deployment and functioning of AMIB is a **prerequisite** for the implementation of the cease-fire process and for DDR activities. At this time AMIB's financing status remains uncertain. The mission thus strongly encouraged donors to support timely and adequate financing for AMIB. In this context, the mission urged AMIB, Government and donors to synchronize resource mobilization activities for Burundi planned for December 2003.

35. The risk of a lack of coordination has been mitigated by the establishment of mutually reinforcing policy and technical coordination mechanisms (JCC, DDR-CC and TWG). However, there is still some risk of a *lack of coordination* between the political and technical levels of the peace and DDR planning processes. Linkages between the FTA and the DDR processes have improved recently, with the transfer of information through UNOB and AMIB as well as the technical contribution of the World Bank in support of the technical team of the regional facilitation in Dar-es-Salaam. The mission recommends that this close linkage be sustained in the final round of negotiations.

36. Apart from the adequate financing of the AMIB, the *risk of non-engagement* of the international community in the Burundian peace process is limited. The international community strongly supported the Arusha peace process and has a responsibility to assist in its implementation. South Africa, Tanzania, and the United Nations are providing important mediation support to the process. The full deployment of the AMIB force is a clear indication of the commitment of the African Union to supporting the peace process in Burundi.

F. Summary of key recommendations and proposed next steps

37. The mission's key recommendations and proposed next steps include the following:

Recommendation	Responsible Party
1. Analysis of implications of Pretoria accord for military integration process, as well as scale, nature and timing of DDR activities	WB / MDRP Secretariat in consultation with DDR-CC
2. Ensure coherence between FTA, JOP and national program document in final round of negotiations.	Regional facilitation, UNOB, Government, and WB / MDRP Secretariat
3. Submit analysis of public expenditure implications in next 5 years of Pretoria Protocol to donors	Government
4. Secure comments from CNDD-FDD on national DDRR program and JOP as soon as possible	WB / MDRP Secretariat and bilateral partners
5. Establish Executive Secretariat of NCDRR as soon as possible	Government
6. Establish mechanism and procedures to facilitate reception of Burundian ex-combatants from the DRC as soon as possible	Government, in consultation with MONUC
7. Initiate information and sensitization campaign for combatants and civilian population as soon as possible	ES/NCDRR and Government
8. Review need for pre-disarmament assistance in light of Pretoria Protocol.	Government, with support of MDRP Secretariat
9. Review JOP and adapt as required to contingency needs on the ground as well as implications of Pretoria Protocol	Technical Working Group
10. Finalize Child Soldier Demobilization, Reintegration and Recruitment Prevention Special Project financing	UNICEF and MDRP Secretariat. Donors to

Recruitment Prevention Special Project financing	review progress at Nov. 2003 Advisory Committee meeting.
11. Sensitize donor governments of need to finance AMIB as pre-condition for DDR activities	All partners and African Union
12. Synchronize resource mobilization strategies for AMIB and Burundi	Donors, AMIB, Government and African Union
13. Undertake rapid lessons learned exercise of Muyange cantonment experience for dissemination with other countries	MDRP Secretariat / AMIB / MONUC
14. Recruit a full-time staff to serve as MDRP presence in Burundi	MDRP Secretariat
15. Include NGO representative in the DDR-CC in Burundi	DDR-CC

38. Below is an update on progress made against the recommendations of the **previous October 2002 MDRP JSM**.

Recommendations of September -October 2002	Current Status
1. The World Bank should re-launch coordination efforts among MDRP partners <i>sur place</i> shortly but on a more informal basis for the time being.	Establishment of DDR-CC and TWG following January 2003 MDRP Joint Assessment Mission
2. The Trust Fund Committee at its next meeting should discuss support to the two special projects. If MDTF partners agreed on such support:	Done at April 2003 TFC meeting.
(i) UNICEF should revise its special project for child combatants	Final proposal expected shortly. MDRP Sec and UNICEF strongly recommended to minimize further delays in financing.
(ii) the Government should launch preparation for a special project for vulnerable combatants, focusing at the beginning on the handicapped	Government withdrew special project proposal after initiating national program preparations.
(iii) a joint preparation mission should be carried out in late 2002/early 2003. This mission would, <i>inter alia</i> , help the Government prepare the special project for vulnerable combatants and review the project proposed by UNICEF.	MDRP Joint Assessment Mission completed in January 2003.
3. UNDP should initiate a planning process for civilian disarmament activities complementary to a future national	Unknown.

program under the MDRP.	
4. The mission also encourages civil society groups to organize themselves and to engage authorities in a dialogue on MDRP-related issues.	Unknown.
5. Initiation of activities for youth (providing economic livelihoods) and for host communities (stimulating local economies to prepare them for the return of the displaced and ex-combatants).	Various complementary community-based recovery activities under way, including projects of Belgium, EC, UNDP and World Bank

Attachment 1

Team Composition

1. Mr. Gregory Alex, Senior Demobilization and Reintegration Specialist, MDRP Secretariat, Kigali
2. Mr. Joris Beerda, Senior Policy Advisor, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Hague
3. Mr. Andrew Brooks, UNICEF, Dakar
4. Mr. Ibrahima Dia, Political Affairs Officer, MONUC, Kinshasa
5. Mr. Francesco D’ovidio, Vulnerable Groups Unit, International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC), ILO, Geneva
6. Ms. Sophie da Câmara Santa Clara Gomes, Senior Expert for Central Africa, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brussels
7. Mr. Laurent Joseph, Inter-agency Reintegration Coordination Cell, UNDP, Bujumbura
8. Mr. Kees Kingma, Senior Demobilization and Reintegration Specialist, MDRP Secretariat, Washington
9. Mr. Dittmar Krissler, Burundi Desk Officer, European Commission, Brussels
10. Ms. Stephanie Kuttner, Strategic Planning Unit, BCPR, UNDP, New York
11. Ms. Ellen van der Laan, Senior Advisor, World Bank, Washington
12. Mr. Hans Poley, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kigali
13. Ms. Catherine Ransquin, Protection Project Officer, UNICEF, Bujumbura
14. Mr. David Rhody, Consultant, CIDA, Ottawa
15. Mr. Pardeshi Praven Sing, Transition Recovery Cluster Head, BCPR, UNDP, Geneva
16. Mr. Cheaka Touré, Reintegration Specialist, ILO, Yaoundé
17. Mr. Tharcisse Urayenzeza, Senior Advisor, CIDA, Kigali
18. Mr. Jan Wanderstein, Consultant, MDRP Secretariat, Bujumbura
19. Mr. Ingo Wiederhofer, Senior Operations Officer, World Bank, Washington

The following local partners participated in several mission meetings:

1. Mr. Walter Ehmeir, Attaché de Coopération, European Commission, Bujumbura
2. Mr. Mathurin Gbetibouo, Country Representative, World Bank, Bujumbura
3. Mr. Philip Heuts, Attaché de Coopération, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bujumbura
4. Mr. Cyrus Nersy, Chef du service de coopération et d’action culturelle, Ambassade de France, Bujumbura
5. Ms. Georgina Yates, Country Representative, DFID, Bujumbura

Attachment 2

Mission Program

October 12, 2003

19.30 Mission planning meeting

October 13, 2003

9.00 Government DDRR planning team
10.00 UN Security Briefing
11.00 General Samba, Chairman of the Joint Ceasefire Commission, UNOB
14.00 DDR Coordination Committee
16.30 Mr. Athanase Gahungu, Minister of Finance
17.30 Luc Vanderlinden, Attaché militaire, Belgium
19.00 MDRP donor dinner

October 14, 2003

9.00 Ambassador Bah, Head of Mission, African Mission in Burundi
10.00 Technical Working Group for the Joint Operations Plan
12.30 Lunch at the invitation of Mr. Philip Heuts, Attaché de cooperation, Belgium
14.30 MDRP donor meeting
16.00 Mission team meeting
17.00 Meeting with UNICEF to discuss status of Child Soldier Demobilization, Reintegration and Recruitment Prevention special project
19.00 Dinner with Ministers of Defense and Finance, and Government DDR planning team

October 15, 2003

8.30 General Vincent Niyungeko, Minister of Defense
9.30 Team wrap-up meeting
11.15 Wrap-up meeting with Government DDR planning team

Annex III

Central African Republic Country Report

September 28 – October 1, 2003

1. Members of the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) Joint Supervision Mission visited the Central African Republic (CAR) from September 28 to October 1st, 2003. The objectives of the mission were to:

- (i) familiarize themselves with the major developments in the political and security situation that have occurred since the previous joint mission of June 2003 and;
- (ii) to assess the eligibility of the CAR for support for a DDR process within the MDRP framework.

2. The members of the mission¹ wish to thank the President of the Central African Republic, Gen. Bozize for receiving them, as well as the Prime Minister Prof. Goumba, the Minister for Security, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Vice President of the Transitional National Council, the President of the National Dialogue, donor partners, diplomatic missions, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, UN agencies, local and international NGOs and ex-combatant groups.

A. Country Context.

3. CAR is one of the most isolated and poorest countries in the world and has suffered chronic political instability and a deteriorating economic situation for many years. A series of army mutinies and failed coups over the last three years had gradually dragged the country into a civil war (involving Congolese (MLC) and Chadian proxies), which culminated in Gen. Bozize seizing power from Pres. Patasse in March 2003. The Aide Mémoire from the last MDRP joint mission in June highlighted the extremely precarious economic and security situation that prevailed following the coup.

4. Even though the mission only had limited time in-country; did not travel outside the capital and only talked to a limited number of people, it feels confident in affirming that since June there has been a relative stabilisation of the political and security situation.

5. It has now become apparent that Gen. Bozize's seizing of power was backed by main opposition parties on the conditions that the change in power did not result in a "witch-hunt" of opponents, that a multi-party government was installed, that a National Transitional Council (CNT) be accepted, and that former mutineers to be amnestied and re-admitted into the army. There was also to be a National Dialogue to tackle the underlying problems of the country. So far the new regime appears to have respected these commitments.

6. The CNT has established a road map for the electoral process, which is to be completed by 2005. However some key considerations await the deliberations of the National Dialogue. It has also continued to advise the President on all major issues but apparently not on DDR or SSR.

¹ The mission members were : Richard Wyatt, EU; Philippe Maughan, MDRP; Assadi Ahamadi, UNDP Fabrice Boussalem, UNDP.

7. The National Dialogue is a process in which some 350 delegates from a cross-section of Central African society have come together to debate and propose solutions to the underlying problems that have resulted in CAR's recent political, social and economic problems. They have convened in six commissions looking at all the major facets of CAR life, including national security and the reform of the army. The findings of each commission will then be debated in a plenary session, which in turn will formulate recommendations to the Government and the CNT. The mission was impressed with the scope of the issues debated and the candour of participants. Even a contentious issue as the role of the army in politics was raised. It is expected that some of the fruits of the National Dialogue will be incorporated into the awaited re-draft of the Letter of DDR and SSR policy, something the mission viewed as very positive.

8. On attaining power, the new regime promised to pay monthly salaries of public sector workers (some of whom having not been paid for 30 months). This has been done for April through August but the Government has already begun to default in September. The basic problem is that the Government's expenditures for salaries and other essential items/services requires 2.7 billion CFA. However, it's but revenues are only 2.2 billion. Initially it received support to cover the shortfall from China, Gabon, Congo and Chad but these 'one-off' payments are now less forthcoming. An attempt to call in company taxes early, was thwarted by the realisation that the previous regime had already claimed these and next years taxes. Thus, despite a genuine effort to tighten the belt, public finances remain an area of serious concern.

9. The injection of capital through salary payments has done little to revive the economy. Foreign and domestic investors remain wary. However, the main economic axis to Cameroon has remained open. On the other hand, the river border with DRC remains closed as a result of the refusal of the MLC to return a plane it apparently stole from CAR.

10. The security situation has enjoyed a relative improvement since June but it is by no means perfect. The UN security level has remained at a level 3 (on a scale of 1 to 5). The Government states it has re-established civil administration as well as police and military presence in all the main provincial towns and claims control of over 80% of the country. According to international NGOs and traders, vital road links are now mostly secured, often thanks to help from CEMAC forces. Nonetheless, due to lack of resources Government presence in the provinces is often more token than effectual. Parts of the country are clearly not under government control; bandits (some of foreign origin), elements of the former regime's militias and even uncontrolled, or disaffected, elements of the force that put the current President in power, still loot and pillage villages, rob travellers at impromptu check points, successfully evading ill-equipped government troops. The population is reluctant to assist in the capture of criminal elements for fear of reprisals.

11. Supporters of the previous government do not appear to pose an organised military threat, despite rumours to the contrary. Also, many exiled supporters of General Kolimba have returned and many have been re-incorporated into the army (General Kolimba himself was scheduled to return shortly). Despite these positive signs there is still a tense atmosphere of suspicion on the part of security forces. This may have resulted in some over-zealous arrests and some arbitrary killings (including of foreigners). The justice system is barely functioning, thereby depriving citizens of means to seek protection of their human rights.

12. The international community still appears somewhat ambivalent about the situation in CAR. Whereas France and CEMAC countries appear increasingly forthcoming, others, such as the EU, are still considering their position while its existing programmes are continuing. Japan has closed its embassy and the US embassy has remained closed. CAR was only able to achieve observer status at the recent Dubai Bank meeting, much to the regret of the Government and some local partners.

B. Eligibility Criteria and Implementation of MDRP principles.

13. The general security situation has been outlined above, as have the efforts of the Government to resolve the underlying problems of the country and return to constitutional rule.

14. In terms of *DDR and SSR* there have been some significant developments since June. There is now recognition at all levels that the army and security forces need a thorough overhaul. There is also an understanding that DDR activities need to consider more than just the army but also other armed groups and that the disarmament of the civilian population goes beyond just police actions, but also includes reconciliation and community based development that would offer alternatives to the use of weapons as a survival strategy.

15. The existing National DDR Programme was previously recognised as inadequate for the purposes of the present situation. This UNDP supported programme (which was essentially a civilian arms buy back and re-insertion programme) is in the process of being closed. Some 220 beneficiaries are being re-integrated as part of a re-integration pilot project. Though interesting, results are unfortunately not encouraging and reveal the very limited capacity of the professional training sector and the severe limitations of the CAR economy to create employment opportunities.

16. The Government, with UNDP, is now working on a new DDR and civilian disarmament initiative and will need to prepare a Letter of DDR and SSR policy (which awaits the conclusion of the National Dialogue) before being able to go into any substantial programme details. The institutions of the previous PNDR still exist in that the PNDR has yet to close. They will be reviewed in the light of the Letter of Policy and the ultimate approach chosen for DDR.

17. The issue of how to approach an MDRP supported DDR in CAR presents a certain dilemma. Traditionally MDRP encourages a Government led and managed programme for which the Government would enter into legal agreements with the World Bank for funding and execution. However, a number of factors in CAR weigh against the traditional “national programme” approach, including:

- the relative lack of national capacity to implement a national DDR programme and to manage the funds involved;
- the relatively small numbers of likely beneficiaries;
- the need to get the programme underway rapidly (it should be fully effective before the electoral period); and
- the current Government’s relations with the IMF/World Bank, other international institutions and donor countries.

18. Therefore, the mission proposes that DDR initiatives in CAR continue as UNDP sponsored *special project*. Partners have already broached this subject with Government and have largely secured an agreement that a special project approach would be the best strategy. Nonetheless, this does not imply that the programme would not be based on government policy as outlined in the Letter of Government Policy, which would have received input from the National Dialogue and the approval the CNT. Nor would it preclude the need for a National DDR consultative body, or a process of widespread consultation when drawing up and executing the DDR programme. The main difference would lie in the funding arrangements and the fact that resources would be made available for Government and UNDP to include support for previously excluded special groups (HIV/AIDS, war wounded etc.).

19. In such an arrangement, an agreement would be signed with UNDP which would make it the implementing agency for issues as procurement, partner sub-contracting, programme personnel

recruitment and logistic management and for financial reporting. This approach would have the added advantage of building not only on an existing relationship between Government and UNDP in the field of DDR but also between UNDP and donor partners most of whom are MDRP partners and already coordinate closely with UNDP on DDR and other programmes (especially micro-projects). Germany, for instance, is seeking particular synergies between its funding and DDR activities.

C. Complimentary Efforts.

20. Even if a clear written policy has yet to be produced, the Government has made tangible moves towards *security sector reform*. A plan is being prepared with the assistance of France that would include: (i) the demobilisation of a sizeable part of the army that is either over-age or unfit; (ii) the disarmament, demobilisation and re-integration of irregular forces and former government militias; and (iii) the recruitment and training of new soldiers and gendarmes. Ultimately the Ministry of Defence claims that 6,500 soldiers and irregulars will require DDR and hopes that by 2010 it will have a new army of 6,000 and a gendarmerie of 4,000. This projection was considered somewhat financially over ambitious by some local partners.

21. At the moment the national army consists of some 4,150 mostly demoralised men and women of uncertain effectiveness who are poorly equipped, led and paid. Efforts to improve this situation are already underway with new recruits undergoing training in CAR and in Chad. France is to re-equip three new battalions and non-lethal equipment is to be provided by Morocco, Sudan and Chad. Apparently, initial demobilisation of over age and sick soldiers were slated to begin on October 1, 2003 and other soldiers would be pensioned off beginning January 1, 2004. However, this has yet to be confirmed and a source of funding identified, as CAR claims to have no resources for DDR, or even to honour the pension commitments to retiring soldiers. The Police - numbering some 1,500 - have not recruited for 10 years. Many of its officers are over aged and require retirement. Some 200 new recruits are receiving training in CAR and 80 inspectors are training in Cameroon.

22. By and large, it seems that with the return of the MLC to Congo, *child soldiers* are not a major issue in CAR. Women combatants seem also to have been a Congolese phenomenon and not an issue in CAR.

23. Unfortunately HIV/AIDS is likely to be a huge problem amongst potential DDR beneficiaries, based on a statistical extrapolation of a national figure of 14% prevalence. The National HIV/AIDS programme has been severely disrupted by the war and is in need of considerable support.

24. The effects of the war outside Bangui have yet to be properly assessed due to the security situation. Since June improved security has allowed many *internally displaced* and some *refugees* to return home. Improved access has allowed the handful of humanitarian agencies to resume their activities. However, a UN humanitarian flash appeal went unanswered and only three donors plan any rehabilitation activities. The start of activities funded by MDRP thus could create an *imbalance* between DDR and activities targeted at non-combatants that could become a source of resentment and thus instability.

25. Weapons held illegally by the civilian population remain a problem. At the moment government policy on the issue is unclear, particularly on where the line lies between voluntary and involuntary civilian disarmament. The current reality seems to be one of involuntary recovery through police action. UNDP, which intends to develop a community based arms reduction programme, is awaiting official clarification of the policy on this issue.

D. Programme Indicators

26. In this area, few reliable data are available. For example, no systematic assessment has been completed to provide comprehensive IDPs figures throughout the country. During its last meeting, however, the “Comité National d’Accueil et de Réinsertion des Rapatriés” (which mandate also covers IDPs) mentioned that the committee undertook such an exercise but data is still not available at this stage.

E. Risks and Mitigation Factors.

27. In the area of security, a counter-attack by forces loyal to the previous regime seems unlikely. However, the current inefficiency and lack of capacity of the government security forces leaves considerable room for action by various bandit groups to disrupt the country, its economy and its development – including a DDR programme. Hopefully, the continued presence of French and CEMAC forces will provide a stable platform from which newly trained and equipped CAR forces can improve the security. A DDR process could in fact contribute to this.

28. Politics, good governance and human rights: The process for a return to constitutional and democratic rule is clearly defined but the process is at a very early stage. Power is clearly in the hands of the President and a core group of so-called ‘patriots’. Open debate on such issues as the constitution, eligibility to elected President and the return to normal party politics (as opposed to the current Government of national reconciliation), while necessary, could also heat up the political environment and lead to division and instability.

29. There have been clear signs of some over-zealous security methods and unconfirmed reports of a more significant abuses occurring. This needs careful monitoring especially in view of the President’s admission that human rights would be only upheld within current means.

30. Financial and economic issues: CAR faces dramatic economic challenges. It is evident that even if it displays rigorous control over government spending and absolute fiscal probity, the country will hardly be able to face these challenges without outside help. The lack of economic progress could easily lead to a loss of morale and confidence in government and eventually contribute to instability.

31. DDR and SSR programming and the risk of *moral hazard*: The figures for proposed beneficiaries are relatively small but the process would still be at risk of abuse. Some militias are ill-defined entities and some soldiers have already been demobilised once before. There is also the question of whether or not to include the so-called ‘Bandits’ (‘coupeurs de routes’) and if so, how such irregular forces would be disarmed and by whom. While such disarmament is outside the remit of MDRP, it would need to be considered in the Letter of Demobilization Policy (and ultimately require funding). Finally, one might be faced with a significant caseload of foreign (mainly Chadian) nationals who may not wish to return home.

G. Recommendations.

32. The mission and the partners in the field have carefully weighed the relative advantages and dangers of going ahead with a MDRP supported programme in CAR. They unanimously recommend that MDRP should support a DDR process in CAR.

33. However, the above recommendation is made in the assumption that the Government and partners agree upon a Letter of DDR and SSR policy and that the MDRP concurs with a special project approach to the process of DDR.

34. It is also highly dependent on continuing efforts by the Government to improve the security situation across the country; allow the current process of national dialogue to conclude; respect its promises to return to constitutional rule in the proposed timeframe; respect and protect human rights; and to restrict inappropriate public sector spending;

35. The Letter of Demobilization Policy may be ready before the Partner meeting in Kinshasa meet. UNDP is already working with the Government on the details of a revised DDR programme. Should the Letter of Policy be acceptable and the special project approach is agreed upon, a Programme should be running by the first quarter of the new year.

36. The mission recognises the cost and sacrifices of the CEMAC and French forces in bringing stability to CAR and urges them to maintain their presence. Partners should continue to support the financial needs of the CEMAC forces as necessary.

37. The mission urges the International Community to recognise the current efforts of CAR to respect its commitments to restore constitutional rule and financial good governance and to consider, at the very least, the dangers of NOT providing a genuinely impoverished CAR any balance of payments support in this interim period. It also urges donor partners to provide a balance to DDR activities through programmes that support the victims of the fighting (IDPs , refugees dislocated and traumatised communities).

F. Proposed next steps :

1. Preparation of a Letter of Demobilization Policy and agreement thereon between Government and MDRP partners.
2. Reformulation of PNDDR by Government/UNDP.
3. Agreement on Approach between Government and MDRP partners.
4. Proposal of appropriate parts of PNDDR as special project by UNDP to MDRP.

Annex IV

Democratic Republic of Congo Country Report

October 6-11, 2003

1. The Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) Joint Supervision Mission (JSM) visited the Democratic Republic of Congo from October 6 to October 11, 2003. The overall objective of the mission was to assess the progress made in implementing the MDRP, including the development of a national program, special projects efforts and the implementation of the interim strategy.. The specific objectives for the DRC mission were to:

- Review overall political and economic progress during the transitional phase, including national reunification and the security situation in Ituri and other areas;
- Review the implementation of the interim strategy and current partner coordination mechanisms;
- Discuss with Government and partners the progress made in preparing for a national DDR program, including how this is linked with reform of the armed forces; and
- Assess arrangements for and progress in the approval and implementation of special projects.
- Review recommendations from previous supervision mission and progress made in addressing these.

2. The members of the mission (Attachment1) wish to thank the representatives of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo, UNDP management and staff, donor partners, World Bank and diplomatic missions, MONUC, the UN agencies, NGOs and other stakeholders who generously assisted the mission to better understand the current situation. The mission would like to also extend their special appreciation to MONUC, UNICEF Goma, Airserve, OCHA Bukavu and Bunia, UNDP Goma and Bunia and UNDP Rwanda for all the logistical support provided during the missions travel to the east of DRC.

3. The remainder of this document contains the main findings of the JSM team in the Democratic Republic of Congo related to the country context, MDRP eligibility criteria, guiding principles, performance indicators, risks and mitigation measures.

A. *Country Context*

4. Following the signing of the “*Accord global et inclusive sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo*”, Vice-Presidents were sworn in on July 17, 2003 and the Ministers and Vice-Ministers on July 23, 2003. The Government of national unity operating under a transitional constitution for a period of two years came into full effect on July 29, 2003. The mandates of the various Ministries was defined by a decree issued on September 16, 2003.

5. The establishment of the Government of Transition has provided the necessary momentum to the efforts of the international community to expedite the preparation of a national program and the establishment of an appropriate institutional framework.

6. There has been progress in the installation of the integrated military high command (September 4, 2003) and decisions relating to the distribution of the regional command are being finalized. The new regional commanders are currently been deployed to their new areas. One of their key priorities is to

carry out an identification exercise of the current forces in these areas and to also identify sites to be used for the screening of combatants to be integrated into the army. The government explained to the mission that the new armed forces will be established in three phases

Phase 1: Sensibilisation, Identification.

Phase 2: Encampment, Screening, Selection for the army, training – those not selected during this phase would be demobilized

Phase 3: Forming of the military units and deployment.

The Ministry of Defence acknowledged that a number of difficulties would need to be addressed in implementing this plan. These are: the question of signatories and non signatories, budget, continued security problems in certain areas of the country and geo-political interference, and lack of expertise in reconstruction of military forces. The Mission acknowledged the challenges in this area and stressed the need for strong coordination between the two processes - integration into the national army on the one hand and demobilization of adult combatants on the other.

7. Security Council Resolution 1493, adopted on July 25, 2003, “Authorizes MONUC to assist the Government of National Unity and Transition in disarming and demobilizing those Congolese combatants who may voluntarily decide to enter the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process within the framework of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program, pending the establishment of a national DDR program in coordination with the United Nations Development Program and other agencies concerned.”

B. Eligibility Criteria and Implementation of MDRP Principles

8. With the recent establishment of the Government of Transition, the only eligibility criteria that the Government has fully met is their continuing efforts to *participate in the regional peace progress*. Where country level criteria are concerned, the mission welcomes the recent establishment of the Technical Committee for Planning and Coordination of DDR, which has been tasked with the finalization of the National Program for DDR. The mission considers this a positive step toward the creation of the necessary institutional arrangements required for the undertaking of comprehensive DDR in the country.

9. In view of the progress made in such a short time, the Mission has highlighted to the Government a number of key issues which are essential to the development of an appropriate integrated national program.

- Government needs to develop a draft DDR policy paper to be presented at the next MDRP Advisory Committee Meeting which will be held in Kinshasa mid November.
- The UNSRSG, UNDP Representative, World Bank Representative, international technical advisors and a bi-lateral military advisors need to give a technical briefing to the President and the 4 Vice Presidents on options and next steps and the linkages between army reform and demobilization. This meeting should take place as soon as possible. Following this meeting, the Government should then be in a position to:
 - Establish the necessary policy and program institutional framework with the Government to implement the program.
 - Identify a manager of the DDR program who will be responsible for the program and representing the Government (e.g. at the MDRP Advisory Committee)
 - Prepare a letter of demobilization policy for consideration by the World Bank and the MDRP partners.

- Once the above has been clarified, MDRP can provide the necessary technical experts to the Government.
- Government needs to fully support the capacity building of the CTPC and the establishment of a national DDR institutional framework in cooperation with MDRP Partners and bi-laterals who wish to assist the Government in this endeavor.

10. The mission held discussions at various levels with regard to the estimated number of combatants that would be demobilized from the various categories, i.e., (i) members of groups signatories to the Lusaka Accord and/or the Dar es Salaam accord (Ituri), (ii) child soldiers, (iii) war wounded, (iv) elderly, (v) volunteers, and (vi) members of non-signatory groups. There is little clarity as to what overall figures might be at this stage. Broad estimates currently range from 100,000 to 140,000.

11. In the absence of a national program, there is no comprehensive framework in which to address the complexities and many challenges to be faced on the ground. The mission appreciates the efforts by the Technical Group on Reintegration in ensuring cohesiveness and consistency in partner responses during the interim period. It was however concerned by possible further implications of 'ad hoc' reintegration packages and the absence of an appropriate framework for the formulation and dissemination of messages in regard to reintegration assistance. The mission was concerned at the mention by Government and some partners of allowances, training, micro-projects, income generating activities for ex combatants in the absence of a fully developed national program, reintegration strategy/program, socio-economic profiling and related national policies. The mission advises due caution in this regard and recommends that the technical group on sensitization and communication be reinforced in order to develop appropriate guidelines on sensitization and dissemination of information in regard to the development of the national program and to emergency response program at field level.

12. Government stressed to the mission the need for immediate assistance in carrying out the appropriate studies required for the development of a national reintegration strategy. The mission recommends that the technical group on reintegration, which combines a number of agencies with existing experiences (GTZ, ILO) in the reintegration of combatants, should examine the different studies that need to be undertaken (taking into consideration activities been carried out by a number of NGOs in the east). Support for these studies will be incorporated under the UNDP rapid response mechanism.

13. The humanitarian community showed concern about the equity in assistance to ex combatants versus the rest of the community. They also raised the issue of their neutrality, perceived or otherwise. They voiced the concern that their humanitarian principals might be compromised if ex-combatants were an explicit beneficiary group. The mission takes note of the concerns of the humanitarian agencies but informed them that NGOs have been actively involved in reintegration programs for ex-combatants in other countries. The mission acknowledges the need to continue to address the issue with the humanitarian agencies in DRC.

14. Lessons learnt to date on pilot programs initiated by UN agencies and NGOs should be incorporated into all further planning. The mission was advised that some of the lessons learnt included a) high cost of logistics, b) per beneficiary unit costs cannot be calculated as per other countries, c) creating expectations when program is not in place and financing not available can cause serious problems, d) high cost of skills training, and e) investment in local capacities is essential but requires adequate training budgets.

15. ***Appropriate institutional framework and structures*** to oversee and execute the national program do not yet exist in DRC. Once the institutional framework has been defined, issues pertaining to

financial support, capacity and human resources both at the national and provincial levels can be further elaborated. Decree N° 03/025 (September 16, 2003) outlines the attributions of the various Ministries. While the Ministry of Defence is responsible for all aspects of demobilization of combatants, child soldiers and vulnerable groups who have not been incorporated into the new army, the Ministry of Social Welfare has been given the responsibility for all reintegration aspects. The Ministry of Solidarity and Humanitarian Affairs will work with both Ministries to coordinate reintegration activities. On October 3, 2003, Government established the Technical Committee for Planning and Coordination–DDR (CTPC). The Minister of Defence informed the mission members that besides establishing the CTPC, an inter-ministerial commission comprised of the four Ministers with DDR responsibilities had been set up.

16. The mission members acknowledged the key role to date of UNDP and the technical committees established under the interim strategy. It would also like to congratulate the government on the creation of the CTPC which will now incorporate the existing technical committees under the leadership of the Government. Although the establishment of the CTPC is a positive step towards the development of a national program, the mission also highlights the importance of establishing the institutional framework and of identifying of a program manager as soon as possible.

17. *Suitable fiduciary, social and environmental safeguard* arrangements will be developed within the framework of the national program and in line with the establishing of the institutional framework. Adequate fiduciary arrangements to ensure *transparency* and management of MDRP resources in program development, management, implementation and delivery of benefits to the target groups will be discussed with the Government over the coming weeks and in line with the development of the National program.

18. *Special target groups*. The mission was informed by the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Social Affairs that priority at this stage in the DDR process was the demobilization of children, war wounded, elderly combatants and volunteers. The Ministers thanked the MDRP mission and the international community for their efforts to date. The mission commended the work of UNICEF in coordinating the development of the Interim Operational plan for children and of UNDP in coordinating the development of the Ituri Interim Operational Plan and the Operational plan for Voluntary disarmament which will be implemented in collaboration with Government and other partners.

19. *Special projects*. To date, a total of six special projects have been approved for the DRC, and four grant agreements have been finalized and are presently awaiting signature of recipient organizations. The grant agreements for the two approved UNDP special projects are being finalized and a meeting will be held on the 23rd of October between the World Bank and UNDP to finalize outstanding issues in regard to the grand agreement. World Bank clearance and approval of the special project from the Belgium Red Cross is currently in process, and an eighth project from UNICEF has been recommended for approval by the ad hoc committee in Kinshasa; the MDRP Secretariat is awaiting final revisions based on comments made by the committee.

20. The mission was briefed by the MDRP Secretariat on the current status of special projects that have been approved by the local ad hoc committee in Kinshasa. A number of mission members from donor countries voiced their serious concern over delays in the grant review and approval procedures by the World Bank which has resulted in the non disbursement of funds to a number of organizations. The MDRP secretariat noted that the delays are in part due to the process of negotiations between the Bank and recipient agencies (who confirmed this to the mission members). The MDRP Secretariat explained that a number of the NGOs used the opportunity of these negotiations to secure certain allowances and contract conditions in order to form the basis for further contracts with the World

Bank. Although retroactive financing clauses had been agreed upon with those agencies where grant agreements are being finalized, a number of donor members of the mission did not agree that this was an acceptable alternative to disbursement of funding. The mission noted that for those agencies where special projects were an extension of their existing activities (i.e. SCF/UK), operations continue to be effective on the ground, especially in the east and in Bunia. However, those agencies where the special project was a new activity were experiencing delays in recruitment of staff (especially international staff) and preparation work on the ground (training, capacity building, procurement, identification of buildings for CTO's). While these delays were not adversely affecting agencies' abilities to respond to the current small caseload for DDR activities, they were inhibiting preparatory work at the field level and preparation and response to emergency contingencies.

21. **Regional Activities:** DRC and Rwanda have formally endorsed the joint communications and sensitization strategy for cross border sensitization. Although progress was made in its implementation including the preparation of materials for dissemination (brochures, leaflets, comic strip etc) and a visit to Rwanda to make a video on repatriated ex combatants, these efforts are currently on stand by while awaiting the integration of the program under the Ministry of Defence as per the September decree on mandates of various Ministries.

22. **Coordination.** The interim strategy has served as a framework for the coordination of all technical groups established for its implementation. All technical groups are fully functioning with the exception of the sensitization working group which has been constrained by a lack of participation from other agencies. UNDP regularly briefs the local donor committee on DDR that was also established. With the Government of Transition in place, coordination and technical planning for the development of the national program and response to emergency DDR issues will be incorporated under Government leadership through the CTPC.

C. Complimentary Efforts

23. In the absence of a National DDR program, the *interim strategy for the development of a national DDR program* which was developed by UNDP in consultation with MDRP partners, international and national organizations has been in full effect since the Advisory Committee meeting in Paris. The mission appreciated the efforts of UNDP and the technical groups in establishing technical guidelines and operational plans for coordinated response to emergency DDR activities during the interim period. The mission wishes to ensure that these efforts will be fully incorporated into the new established CTPC.

24. Under their *rapid response mechanism* which includes five main project areas. The mission advises UNDP and its partners to ensure that clear procedures related to eligibility, verification and documentation (database) are put in place before activities are implemented under the rapid response mechanism during the interim period.

25. The efforts of UNICEF and the child protection agencies in ensuring a coordinated response to issues pertaining to *child soldiers* has led to an improved integrated strategic approach. Questions related to viable reintegration assistance still need to be addressed in conjunction with the relevant agencies and Government Ministries. The mission is in agreement with UNICEF on the need to address the needs of girls within the fighting forces and supports UNICEF's and the child protection agencies efforts in examining further this issue. The mission highly commended the efforts of UNICEF and the child protection agencies towards assisting child soldiers and support their continued concern about reports of recruitment of children and the lack of a clear process by Government for the immediate demobilization of children. The mission has learnt that the existing system of issuing of demobilization papers can take up to six months. With numbers ranging from 10

to 30,000 children with the fighting forces, there needs to be a very clear plan of action on the process of their demobilization. The mission recommends that UNICEF supports Government in the development of this plan which should outline a clear timetable that will assist the agencies on the ground to put the appropriate mechanisms in place to receive children.

26. As part of its overall advocacy strategy in Ituri, UNICEF and the child protection agencies have requested that the fighting groups immediately release children under the age of 12 from their ranks as proof of their commitment to peace. This does not undermine the need for all children under the age of 18 years of age to be immediately released from the fighting groups, but would be seen as the first step within the process. The mission urges MONUC to address this issue with the various fighting factions in Ituri and to liaise closely with UNICEF and the Child protection agencies in Bunia in regard to negotiation, advocacy, identification, verification and subsequent release of children.

27. MONUC continues to disarm, demobilize and repatriate *foreign armed groups* from eastern DRC and has to date sent back approximately 2,700 (out of a estimated total of 50,000 – 60,000) combatants and associated civilians to Rwanda.. MONUC has informed the mission that delays in this program have been attributed to:

- Deep suspicion and mistrust of the Rwandan Government and of MONUC on the part of the leadership of the Rwandan armed groups - the *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR). The FDLR have given instructions to their combatants, forbidding them to enter DDRRR. Reports have been received that some of those who tried to enter the DDRRR have been killed for going against this order;
- A series of armed attacks carried out in early 2003 by RCD Goma forces which resulted in the scattering into the forest armed members who had assembled to enter DDRRR, this seriously disrupted operations;
- Widespread and generated lawlessness and disorder in North and South Kivu, characterized by persistent outbreaks of fighting involving multiple actors in shifting and unpredictable alliances;
- Persistent logistical difficulties arising from the generated degradation of infrastructures including roads, airstrips and communications facilities.

MONUC informed the mission that it is committed to a voluntary approach to the DDRRR of foreign armed groups and may not disarm by force and also that it is not in the position to discuss FDLRs political claims or to serve as an intermediary between FDLR and the Government of Rwanda. The mission expressed the importance of the repatriation of foreign armed groups as one of the key tasks for MONUC and a prerequisite for peace and stability in the region.

28. MONUC briefed the mission on its program to create camps for combatants in Ituri, stressing that efforts in Ituri were governed by the Dar-es-Salaam agreement and that the encampment of combatants was not primarily a DDR issue but one of security and public order. The mission highlighted their concern about the absence of an appropriate framework and exit strategy. MONUC informed the mission that a working group has been established in Ituri to address the various issues pertaining to encampment and the exit strategy. They informed the mission that this plan would be available by the end of October. Reference was also made to the integration of combatants into the army, but concern was expressed over the timeframe for combatants to remain in camps. MONUC informed the mission that they were working in close collaboration with the government on these issues. The tentative plan at the moment is to regroup all the irregular forces in Ituri within two months. MONUC explained to the mission that there is currently a positive momentum in Ituri that cannot await the establishment of a national DDR program. MDRP partners understand the need for urgent security in Ituri and commended MONUC's work since the departure of Artemis forces, but

stressed that there is a need for much closer collaboration between MONUC and the MDRP (via UNDP or the MDRP Secretariat directly) for these are Congolese combatants and potentially eligible for assistance under a National program or entry into the new army. The mission also stressed that it was important to ensure that early planning for reinsertion and reintegration activities is undertaken in a timely manner so as to accompany demobilization

D. Program Performance Indicators

29. *Percent of DDR activities undertaken in the region within the framework of the MDRP.*

Activities currently undertaken within the framework of the MDRP include: a) the interim strategy and the work of UNDP and partners towards the development and implementation of technical guidelines, operational plans, technical support to government for the creation of the CTPC, dialogue with Government on the preparation of the National plan and dialogue on the inter-linkages between SSR and DDR; b) the continued efforts of MONUC in relation to DDRRR of foreign troops and voluntary disarmament of irregular forces; c) development of strategy for child soldiers and coordination efforts by UNICEF and child protection agencies on all issues pertaining to the care, protection and reintegration of child soldiers; d) ongoing activities for child soldiers by SCF UK under the special project window; e) initial preparatory work by UNDP and IRC for implementation of special projects; and f) identification mission by the World Bank for the establishment of the PPF.

30. *Percent of DDR resources channeled through the regional MDTF.* Activities relating to cross border sensitization and material development have been funded under the MDTF. No disbursement of funding under the special projects window to date.

31. *Degree of harmonization of national program.* No national program has been developed to date.

32. *Number of ex combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through national program.* No national program has been developed to date.

33. *Number of ex combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through special project.* Information relating to numbers of child soldiers entering the program since the activation of the retro-active clause with implementing partners will be provided at the November MDRP partners' meeting.

34. *Effectiveness of technical knowledge sharing activities.* Through the technical committees, various agencies contribute to the development of strategies, guidelines, operational plans.

35. *Efficient organization of joint missions and preparation of reports.* There has been a number of joint missions within DRC, mission reports (prepared by UNDP or MDRP) have been shared before final distribution.

36. *Reduction in the number of IDPs and refugees.* The number of displaced persons has increased due to the outbreak of violence in Ituri. The total number of displaced is now estimated to be 3,413,000 (OCHA), of which 1,209,000 are in North Kivu and 127,000 are from Ituri. There are currently 171,142 refugees in the DRC (OCHA, July 03) and 379,000 (UNHCR) Congolese refugees in border countries.

37. *Restoration of free movement of goods and persons within and between countries.* With the establishment of the Government of Transition, transport networks (including by air) have opened up across the country (however, the road infrastructure is totally inadequate and even non-existent in most areas.). Although these link the major cities and larger towns of the country, access to many

areas with the Kivu's and Ituri is still restricted due to insecurity. Armed groups, including foreign combatants, continue to be the source of insecurity in many areas, harassing local populations (violence, extortion), looting goods and crops. Movement across borders is relatively good with some exceptions on the borders with CAR and Uganda.

E. Risks and Mitigation Measures

38. **Security.** The issue of security in Ituri and in many parts of the east will continue to affect the implementation of DDR activities, whether under the interim period or under the national program. The problem of circulation of small arms, payment of salaries to military personnel, recruitment of child soldiers, outbreak of armed violence continue to pose internal security problems.

39. **Politics, Good Governance and Human Rights.** The Transitional Government has only been in place a short period of time. Analysis on political trends, good governance and improvement in the overall human rights situation cannot be made at this time.

40. **DDR and SSR programming and the risk of moral hazard.** This is the corner stone to the success of the peace agreements. Overall the risks are very high as the acceptance by all (officers as well as rank and file) of the integration framework for the new army will be tested. Expectations are high on all sides with the added problems related to non signatories. The reintegration challenges under the National Program are enormous, due primarily to the lack of infrastructure (housing, health care, water and sanitation, schools, market opportunities) and the economic situation in areas where combatants will be reintegrated and to the fact that millions of IDPs will also be returning to these areas as well. The risk of recycling of actual combatants under the program as well as incentives to become a combatant are very high at the moment and must be considered very carefully in the program design and implementation.

41. **Humanitarian Situation.** As mentioned the numbers of IDPs continued to rise during 2003. Insecurity has restricted access to agricultural land, decreasing yet again the harvest yields and contributing to the food security crisis. Poverty is widespread and the health care system has been eroded across the country. Humanitarian agencies were called to respond to the crisis earlier this year in Ituri, which called for relocating of some of their programs and personnel, putting a strain on their already stretched capacity.

G. Recommendations and/or Agreed-upon Next Steps

Agreed Upon Next Steps	Responsibility	By When
1. Establish Forum on international support to the transition with particular reference to DDR and security sector reform	Belgium in coordination with the World Bank and UNDP	TBD
2. Draft discussion paper on resettlement and reintegration of IDP's and reintegration under DDR.	Reintegration Technical working group with technical advice from regional advisor DFID and regional advisor UNICEF	December 03
3. Contribute to the national registration of the fighting forces. This is to include particular reference to female combatants and child soldiers. (identification process to be accompanied by child and gender experts)	UNDP under the rapid response mechanism in conjunction with the Military Support team.	To start in November 03

4. Technical discussions at the Presidency level on DDR and security sector reform.	UNDP, World Bank, MDRP, Military support program	October 03
5. Preparation of National DDR policy paper to be presented at the next MDRP Advisory Committee Meeting which will be held in Kinshasa mid November.	Government with technical support from UNDP.	November 03
6. To make progress in the development of a comprehensive national demobilization and reintegration program for DRC.	Government with appropriate assistance from the international community	Oct 03 – Dec 03
7. Assist the Government with the preparation of the letter of demobilization policy	Government, UNDP and MDRP	November 03
8. That those involved in the military support program and MDRP members meet in Kinshasa prior to the November AC meeting to discuss security sector reform and DDR.	Belgium MDRP focal Point in coordination with the MDRP Secretariat and UNDP	Oct/Nov 03
9. Identification of technical and international policy experts to support the PNDDR process.	MDRP	Nov/Dec 03
10. Formal endorsement of the Ituri Operational Plan	Government (CTPC)	November 03
11. Capacity Building of CTPC	UNDP and partners	Oct – Dec 03
12 Development of preliminary action plan for the establishment of an appropriate institutional structure for the implementation of DDR	Government	Oct-Nov 03

Monitoring of Recommendations from Joint Supervision Mission – February 2003

*** Note: Some of the recommendations have been grouped together.**

	Recommendation	Action To date	Comments/Recommendations from Oct Mission.	Responsibility (where applicable)
1.	UNDP to develop Rapid Response Mechanism	The rapid response mechanism has been an ongoing development process for UNDP. The overall mechanism includes five main project areas 1) Assist with the preparation of a national program 2) Operational Contingencies 3) Community emergency programs 4) Disarmament and the reduction in small arms 5) DDRRR	Special Project ⁵ for sub projects 1 and 2 submitted to ad hoc committee in June 03, and following incorporation of committees comments final submission in July/August 03. Funding for sub project 3 has been received from the French.	MDRP Secretariat
2.	UNDP and specialized agencies to lead and support efforts in drafting related policies and strategies in preparation for a national DDR program.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National Workshop on children associated with the armed groups and development of program framework for children (UNICEF/UNDP) - Interim Operational plan for spontaneous disarmament and community reinsertion - Ituri specific disarmament and community reinsertion program for children and adults - Identification of technical and policy issues for discussion with Government of DRC. - Establishment of CTPC for finalization of PNDDR - Development of schedule and a draft work plan for finalization of PNDDR. - National Workshop (promoted by GTZ) for reflection on the creation of a national DDR institution. 	All plans are currently operational while awaiting final endorsement by the newly established CTPC. These plans have formed the basis for inter agency cooperation and program implementation at the field level.	UNDP, UNICEF and partners (ongoing)
3	Monthly reports to be shared by UNDP with MDRP focal points to improve coordination with MDRP partners at HQ level.	Although the DDR newsletter and the briefing notes were distributed widely at the national level to partners and the donor community, they were not systematically distributed to the MDRP focal points by UNDP.	[®] It was recommended that UNDP will design a new reporting format for monthly reports and at the same time include all the MDRP focal points to the advisory committee on their email distribution list for all issues pertaining to DDR. All information that is shared locally to the local donor committee will be also sent to the advisory committee. UNDP will continue to forward finalized documents to MDRP web site.	UNDP
4	Interim Strategy	An interim national strategy was developed under the coordination of UNDP and presented at the Advisory	[®] It is recommended that the work plan within the interim strategy will be revised to incorporate recommendations from	UNDP in collaboration with the

⁵ Issues pertaining to special projects have been addressed separately within the main text of the Aide Memoire

[®] Recommendations.

	Recommendation	Action To date	Comments/Recommendations from Oct Mission.	Responsibility (where applicable)
		Committee meeting in Paris. The strategy was been implemented since the Paris meeting and all activities outlined in the strategy are on course.	the mission and also taking into consideration the current involvement of the New Transitional Government in the planning of the national program.	CTPC
5.	Draft a strategy and protocol for dealing with non signatory groups	The issue of non signatory groups was incorporated into the 'strategic framework and operational guidelines for voluntary disarmament and community based reintegration'. Technical document developed by the technical groups which were established under the interim strategy.	With the establishment of the national technical and planning group (4 th October) for the development of a National DDR Program, all technical guidelines previously developed by the technical groups will now be incorporated into the National Committee on Planning and Coordination.	UNDP and CPTC
6.	Government and MDRP partners should closely coordinate on Security Sector Reform and DDR at the Kinshasa level and at the HQ level.	July 17 th – Installation of Transitional Government September 4 th – Installation of integrated military high command. A representative from the Military Support Program (Belgium) has been a member of the core technical group on DDR. Discussions at the Kinshasa level with those currently involved in Security Sector Reform and DDR are ongoing. A meeting/workshop between Government and those will to participate in the Military Support Program (Belgium, France, UK, USA) was to be held in October to discuss issues pertaining to the reconstruction of the national army – this meeting has been postponed four times.	<p>*It is recommended that</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ❑ That those involved in the military support program and MDRP members meet in Kinshasa prior to the November AC meeting to discuss security sector reform and DDR. ❑ That the MDRP Secretariat distributes to MDRP members within the next two weeks, the discussion paper on DDR and security sector reform that was to be presented at the November meeting. This will form the basis for discussion at the proposed meeting. ❑ That MDRP members are invited to the SSR workshop in Kinshasa. 	<p>MDRP secretariat in coordination with UNDP & Belgium Military advisory team.</p> <p>MDRP Secretariat</p> <p>UNDP in coordination with the MDRP secretariat.</p>
7.	Inventory of existing technical expertise in Kinshasa	UNDP, UNICEF, ILO, GTZ have developed lists of various organizations and their capacities to assist in the implementation of programs in the area of reintegration. MONUC and UNDP produced a map of current and future possible economic activities in the four Eastern Provinces in preparation of the reintegration of demobilized persons in civil economic community activities. A separate list of individuals from these agencies or from the donor community has not been developed.	*It was recommended that UNDP in collaboration with ILO will update existing information to include 'individual technical experts' available in DRC among UN agencies, Non Governmental organizations, Government institutions etc.	UNDP in coordination with ILO
8.	European Governments involved in MDRP take action to mitigate interference from outside the	A number of MDRP donor countries have taken steps or are in the process of, to address this issue which is of serious concern to all.	*It is recommended that MDRP will systematically try to follow up on this issue and that during the upcoming Advisory Committee meeting in November, members will provide an update on where their countries are in relation to this.	MDRP Members

® Recommendations

® Recommendations.

	Recommendation	Action To date	Comments/Recommendations from Oct Mission.	Responsibility (where applicable)
	country in DDRRR			
9.	Joint sensitization strategy to be implemented on the repatriations of Rwandan combatants from DRC	The MDRP secretariat has provided technical support both in the DRC and Rwanda for the development of this strategy. Support has also been provided to the Government in DRC (prior to the installation of the New Transitional Government) for the finalization of their communication strategy, development of leaflets and brochures and a field visit to Rwanda to prepare a small video on returning combatants.	With the new decree (30 September) outlining the various mandates of the different Ministries, the role of various commissions has changed. [®] It is recommended that the work, done to date on the sensitization strategy, communications strategy, material development etc., be incorporated into the new government structure to ensure that the work already done in relation to sensitization within the DDRRR program is continued and the expertise and lessons learnt be used for the development of a national sensitization program for DDR of Congolese forces (including children)	MDRP Secretariat in collaboration with the technical committee on sensitization and MONUC
10	MDRP Regional Representative to participate in DDR Thematic groups	MDRP representative participated in the Core technical group and the DD technical group.	With the establishment of the government led CTPC, the MDRP representative will participate in meetings in an observer capacity.	MDRP Secretariat
11	Mass sensitization campaign on reconciliation, good governance and potential benefits of disarmament	Work done for the preparation of this campaign with support from the MDRP secretariat but no campaign took place.	As with the overall sensitization strategy, this will be incorporated under the new government structure.	MDRP secretariat
12	UNDP coordination in relation to DDR process, establishment of thematic groups etc.	UNDP ⁶ uses the framework of the interim strategy for ongoing work within the DRC. All technical groups have been created and are fully functioning with the exception of the sensitization working group which lack response and participation from other agencies. The local donor committee on DDR was also established and UNDP briefs them regularly on progress to date.	Coordination to continue	UNDP
13	Provide comments to draft National DDR plan submitted by Government	Through Bunader a draft DDR plan was submitted to MDRP for comments. This was circulated and comments incorporated from partners and response sent to Bunader.	Bunader has now been incorporated under the Ministry of Defence following the installation of the new Transitional Government and the issuing of the decree on the various attributions of the new Ministries.	
14	UNDP to plan meetings with RCD Goma and MLC	Both meetings were held and MDRP partners participated in these meetings.	No further action as transitional government is now in place.	

⁶ Information relating to overview of the implementation of the interim strategy and achievements to date can be found in the main text of the Aide Memoire.

Further recommendations from the October 2003 supervision meeting

	Topic	Recommendation	Responsibility
1.	Special Projects	To be defined at the Nairobi Meeting	MDRP/World Bank
2.	MONUC	MDRP mission support full enforcement of the chapter 7 and is looking forward to seeing MONUC's integrated strategic approach on their support.	MONUC
3.	MONUC	That MONUC carries out a dissemination program with each of different sectors within MONUC and especially with those at the field level on implementation of chapter 7 with particular reference to the role of MONUC in the DDR process	MONUC
4.	Child soldiers	MDRP mission recommends that UNICEF in collaboration with government and child protection agencies develop clear policies related to identification and verification of child soldiers. It also recommends that UNICEF with its government counterpart on reintegration of child soldiers, develops strategies and policies on the reintegration of child soldiers under a National Program.	UNICEF
5.	Regional effort	That a delegation from MDRP participate in the Great Lakes Regional Peace Conference scheduled for next year.	MDRP Secretariat
6.	UN system	The mission recommends that as with resolution 1493 which authorises MONUC to work within the MDRP framework, further decisions in New York taken vis a vis the UN coordination system in DRC, should also take into consideration this framework and the key (and lead) roles of the various UN agencies.	
7.	MDRP members	It is recommended to initiate immediately a capacity building action in favour of the CTPC	UNDP (Rapid Response) World Bank
8.	MONUC	1 That MONUC continues to work closely with the DRC transitional Government and the Government of Rwanda DRRR of foreign armed groups. MONUC's effort in this regard should take into account and build upon " <i>Principes de Relations de bon voisinage et de coopération entre la RDC, le Burundi, le Rwanda et l'Ouganda</i> " adoptés à New York le 25 septembre dernier	MONUC
9.	MONUC	On the situation in Ituri, MDRP recommends that MONUC pursue its efforts to improve the security of the local population, in the context of the Dar es Salaam agreement and on the basis of its chapter seven mandated under resolution 1493. These efforts should include	

Attachment 1

Mission Members and Key Interlocutors

Mission Members

Donors

Joris Beerda, Holland,
Sophie da Camara, Belgium
Bernard Harborne, DFID
Pierre Le Brun, Belgium
Nicholas Jenks, USAID
David Rhody, Canada
Rob Wilkinson, DFID
Richard Wyatt, European Union
Marc Mertillo, France

UN Agencies

Stephanie Kuttner, UNDP New York,
Praveen Rardeshi Sing, UNDP Geneva
Andy Brooks, UNICEF Regional Office
Aboudou Toure Cheaka, ILO

UN Agencies In-Country

Bintou Djibo, UNDP Rep ai
Gustavo Gonzales, UNDP
Judith Suminwa, UNDP
Raja Jandhyala, DDR Specialist
Trish Hiddleston, UNICEF
Stephane Pichette, UNICEF
Kambale Kavunga, ILO
Enrique Muñoz, UNDP
OCHA

MONUC

Peter Swarbrick

World Bank

Juana Brachet

MDRP Secretariat

Roisin De Burca
Philippe Maughan

International Agencies

Evelyne Mbata Kalongi, UAP, Canada

Government

Mande Kabasele (Min of Social Welfare),
Pilipili Tolowo (Min of Solidarity and Humanitarian Affairs),
Dr. Luboyo Kasongo (Min of Defense),
Sebastien Kirongonzi (Min of Defence),

Key Interlocutors

Government

S.E. M Azaria Ruberwa, Vice President
S.E. M Jean- Pierre Ondekane, Ministre de la Defense
S.E.M. Ingele Ifoto, Ministre des Affaires Sociales

S.E.M Sylvain Delma Mbo, Vice Ministre de la Démobilisation et des anciens Combattants
S.E.M Philemon Mukendi, Vice Ministre de l'intégration de l'Armée

MONUC

SRSG, Ambassador William Swing
MONUC head of office, Goma and Bunia
Col. Banal
Col. Sangué Ndao
Col. Lawrence Smith

UN Agencies

UNDP Goma
UNDP Bunia
OCHA Goma
UNICEF Goma
UNICEF Bunia
FAO Goma
HCDH Goma

NGOs

SCF UK
IFESH
IRC
Oxfam
COOPI
Agro Action Allemande
CARE
Merlin

International Organisations

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
Red Cross Belgium

Attachment 2
MISSION SCHEDULE

Octobre 6-11, 2003

Date/Heure	Activités	Thèmes	Lieu
LUNDI 6 OCT			
08:20	Arrivée de la Mission dans la salle de Conférence		Conference Room UN
08:30- 09:30	Accueil par le Représentant Résident a.i		Conference Room UN
10:00-11: 00	Rencontre avec le Vice-Président en charge de la Défense et Sécurité	- Visite de Courtoise	Bureau du Vice-Président
11:00-11:30	Rencontre avec le Ministre de la Défense	- Visite de Courtoise	Bureau du Ministre
11:30-12:00	Rencontre avec le Ministre des Affaires Sociales	- Visite de Courtoise	
12:00-13:50	Lunch		Cafétéria Nations Unies
14:00-15:00	Séance de travail avec le Vice-ministre en charge de l'Intégration	<u>Thème</u> : * <i>Reforme du secteur de la sécurité et le DDR</i> * <i>Situation actuelle et prochaines étapes</i>	Conference Room UN
15:00-16:00	Séance de travail avec le Vice-ministre en charge de la Démobilisation et Ministre des Affaires Sociales	<u>Thème</u> : * <i>Dimensions institutionnelles du DDR</i> * <i>Plan de Travail – situation actuelle, prochains étapes</i> * <i>Apport Gouvernement/Coopération internationale</i>	Conference Room UN
16 :00-16 :30	Pause-café		
16:30-17:30	Séance de travail avec le Groupe de travail Technique DDR	<u>Thème</u> : « <i>Résultats obtenus au cours du plan intérimaire et les prochaines étapes</i> »	Conference Room UN
MARDI 07 OCT	Activités	Thèmes	Lieu
08:30-10:00	Séance de travail avec le Groupe Technique "Enfants soldats" (UNICEF, SCF, IRC, CARE, IFESH, MONUC, CRB)	<u>Thème</u> : * <i>Problématique du DDR des enfants soldats</i> * <i>Prochaines étapes</i>	Conférence Room UN
10:00-10:30	Pause-café		Conférence Room UN

10:30-11:00	Séance de travail avec la Commission DDRRR	<u>Thème</u> : * <i>Rapatriement des forces étrangères</i> * <i>Situation Actuelle</i> * <i>Contraintes – Forces - Faiblesses</i>	MONUC/HQ
11:00-13:00	Réunion avec le SRSR / Séance de travail avec la MONUC	<u>Thème</u> : « <i>Rôle de la MONUC dans le cadre de la résolution 1493</i> »	Conference Room UN
13:00-14:20	Lunch		-
14:30-16:30	Séance de Travail avec le Sous-groupe Technique Réintégration (UNDP, USAID, GTZ, BIT, FAO ...)	<u>Thème</u> : « <i>Réintégration</i> » <i>Analyse de la situation actuelle</i> <i>Contraintes et évolution des activités</i>	Conference Room UN
16:30-17:30	Présentation PNUD	<i>Mécanisme de Réponse Rapide et désarmement spontané</i>	Conference Room UN
17: 30	Fin de la journée		
MECREDI 8 OCT	Activités	Thèmes	Lieu
08:30-10:30	Séance d'information avec le « Groupe Humanitaire »	<u>Thème</u> : « <i>Situation Humanitaire en RDC</i> »	Conference Room UN
10:30-11:00	Pause-café		Conférence Room UN
11:00-12:30	Séance de travail avec le Vice-Ministre chargé de la Démobilisation et le Comité Technique de Planification et Coordination DDR.	<u>Thème</u> : * <i>Préparation du PN-DDR</i> * <i>Priorités et stratégies</i>	Conference Room
12:30-13:30	Lunch		
15:00-16:00	Séance de travail avec le Comité local des bailleurs de fonds DDR	<u>Thème</u> : Briefing avec la Mission	Conference Room UN
16:00-16:30	Mot du Représentant Résident a.i		Conference Room UN
20 : 00	Cocktail DFID		DFID
Départ vers l'Est (Goma/Bunia)			
JEUDI 9 OCT	Activités	Thèmes	Lieu
17.00	Accueil à l'aéroport		Aéroport de Goma
18 : 00	Briefing de réception PNUD, MONUC, UNICEF, FSO		A déterminer (PNUD)
VENDREDI 10 OCT	Activités	Thèmes	Lieu
09:00-10:00	Séance de travail avec les autorités locales	<u>Thème</u> : « <i>Situation actuelle du DDR</i> »	Bureau du Gouverneur
10:30-11:30	Séance de travail avec la MONUC	<u>Thème</u> : « <i>Capacités de réalisation du DDRRR</i> »	Goma

11:30-13:00	Séance de travail avec l'équipe Inter agence (PNUD, UNICEF, PAM, OCHA, HCDH, MSF, OXFAM, SCF, CARE, MERLIN, SAVE THE CHILDREN...)	<u>Thème</u> : « La problématique humanitaire et sécuritaire de l'Ituri et des Kivu »	Goma
13 :00-1400	Lunch		
14:30-16:00	Visite du Centre de Transit et d'Orientation des enfants soldats (CTO), SCF UK		Programme à déterminer avec le point focal PNUD
16:00-17:00	Condensé de principaux points de la mission en RDC		Goma
17 : 00	Fin de la journée		-
SAMEDI 11 OCT	Activités	Thèmes	Lieu
08 : 00	Départ pour Bunia		-
10 : 00	- Réunion avec l'Administration Intérimaire de l'Ituri	<u>Thème</u> : Situation actuelle en Ituri	-
-	- Séance de travail avec le groupe Humanitaire (SNU et ONG)	<u>Thème</u> : Situation actuelle en Ituri	-
-	- Visite de Bunia		-
15.30	Départ de Bunia pour Goma		
DIMANCHE 12 OCT			
08 : 00	Départ pour Nairobi/ Bujumbura via Kigali		-

Annex V

Republic of Congo Country Report

October 1-4, 2003

1. The Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) Joint Supervision Mission visited the Republic of Congo (RoC) on October 1-4, 2003. The objectives of the mission were to :

- (iii) familiarize themselves with the major developments in the political and security situation that have occurred since the previous joint mission of June 2003 and;
- (iv) to assess the eligibility of the RoC for support for a DDR process within the MDRP framework in light of recent proposals from the Government.

2. The members of the mission¹ wish to thank the Minister of Transport and Coordination of Humanitarian Action, the Minister of Social Affairs and Solidarity , the Minister of Security and Policy, the High Commissioner for Reintegration, the Minister of Defence as well as heads of mission of UNDP, UNHCR, the World Bank, and IOM for receiving them and making their time available to the mission.

A. Country /political context.

3. The major event that had marked the previous MDRP mission was the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities agreement in the Pool district on March 17, 2003. It was hoped that this agreement would lead to a rapid disarmament and demobilisation of the militia forces under the Rev. Ntoumi. Indeed the EU had made an emergency fund available to UNDP to deal with this contingency under the guidance of the High Commission for the Re-insertion of Ex-combatants (HCREC). Unfortunately this has not yet occurred.

4. Although the cease fire remains firmly in place, the forces of Rev. Ntoumi have not come forward for disarmament and demobilisation. It would appear that problems persist over the conditions of the Rev. Ntoumi's own personal future and status. However, a reaffirmation of the previous agreement has been signed on two separate documents by the government and the Rev. Ntoumi.

5. The inability to fully resolve the Pool problem has created both political tensions and economic uncertainty. Firstly, the Pool conflict had left a number of national and local assembly seats unfilled due to the inability to hold elections in the conflict zone. These seats are apparently fairly critical in establishing the final balance of the national assembly and thus its impact on government. Thus the elections and the fate of these seats have become enmeshed in the issue of the resolution of the Pool problem. Secondly, although the fighting has stopped, the climate is still not conducive to full economic recovery. Indeed, the initial free flow of goods that the original peace had permitted in March is now threatened by the imposition of ad-hoc levies by uncontrolled elements of Ntoumi's forces.

6. There have also been rumors that certain militia fighters who were demobilized some time ago and who had not benefited from re-insertion support, were increasingly jealous of the attention that potential new demobilees were being offered and may react to this perceived injustice

¹ The mission members were: M. de Souza, Ambassade France; Richard Wyatt, EU; M. Aurelien Agbenonci, PNUD; Mme Roisin de Burca and Philippe Maughan, MDRP Secretariat.

7. Despite the above, Brazzaville gave the appearance of being relatively calmer. Fuel had returned to the pumps and less soldiers seemed to be in evidence in the city. Nonetheless, disgruntled public sector workers (mainly teachers) were demonstrating outside the Finance Ministry complaining of the non-payment of salaries. However the international community hopes that a recent windfall resulting from higher than expected oil revenues will help the Government fund some of its arrears in the social sectors.

8. On the political front there is an increasingly vocal parliamentary opposition but even more significant has been the exponential rise in civil society activity particularly in demanding increased transparency in public finance management.

B. Eligibility Criteria and Implementation of MDRP principles.

9. The major development since the last JSM, in terms of DDR, has been the confection of a “*Plan National de Démobilisation, de Désarmement et de Réinsertion des Ex-combattants*” with an attached “*Lettre de Politique Générale de Désarmement, de Démobilisation et de Réinsertion*” which was shared with MDRP and its local partners in August 2003.

10. In the Letter of Policy, the Chef de Cabinet of the Presidency outlines:

- The previous achievements of the government and its partners (including UNDP, IOM and IDA) in the field of ex-combatant DDR and small arms reduction, claiming :
 - The re-insertion of 14,150 ex-combatants (with 2,850 still pending under the current HC/IDA programme).
 - The collection of 19,142 sundry weapons and pieces of ammunition.
- The governments intentions to continue these activities under the auspices of and respecting the rules of the MDRP, notably in order to:
 - Re-insert a further 41,277 ex-combatants (between 2004 and 2006).
 - Collect some 30,000 weapons and items of ammunition through a voluntary process.
 - To provide special services for child soldiers, war wounded.
 - To provide substantial community based rehabilitation and reconstruction for the receiving communities, returning IDPs and refugees.
 - To establish an institutional framework for the programme based on the existing Comité Nationale de Démobilisation et de Re-insertion (CONADER), a PNDDR programme management unit run by the High Commissioner for the Re-insertion of Ex-combatants and a Comité de Pilotage (Steering Committee) consisting of all concerned stakeholders (such as ministries, civil society, NGOs and donors).

11. The draft document program, which was prepared by the High Commission (HC) estimates the total cost for the three year program to be Euro 41,640,551. It mentions a parallel and apparently ongoing exercise in Security Sector Reform and in particular a restructuring of the army. However, other than mentioning the probability of this producing some 6,000 soldiers that would be superfluous to requirements and therefore candidates for demobilization and reintegration, it does not describe the process in any other details. Indeed it was apparent to local partners and MDRP that programme document and Letter of Policy had only enjoyed limited circulation amongst the various government departments and ministries, including the Ministry of Defence.

12. The CONADER and Comité de Pilotage despite being created by decree in January 2003 had not met until last month. At its first meeting the international institutions (including the WB and UNDP) that were supposedly to be part of it asked to be excluded on the grounds that it was inappropriate for the non-national institutions to be decreed part of a national policy making body. The request was accepted and a decision was apparently taken to redraft CONADER's terms of reference. No further information was available.

C. Complimentary Efforts.

13. The existing National Programme program ,managed by HC with a \$5,000,000 IDA credit has re-inserted some 6,150 ex-combatants from a planned caseload of 9,000. This programme has just been subject to an external financial audit which was deemed satisfactory. A thorough qualitative audit has yet to take place.

14. In order to meet the challenge presented by the Pool peace process, the EU had made an emergency grant of Euro 700,000 available to UNDP and pledged a further Euro 2,000,000 to community small arms recovery initiatives also through UNDP. Unfortunately, the current refusal of Rev. Ntoumi's combatants to come forward for DDR has left the EU/UNDP DR initiative pending. The fact that the programme has certain fixed costs creates obvious difficulties.

15. The Tripartite agreement between DRC, RoC (Ministry of the Interior) and UNDP that was to assist with the repatriation of foreign combatants has made little progress. Although concrete lists of individuals (mainly ex-FAZ and Ex-FAC) are apparently available, they do not concur with the figures proposed by the proposed PNDDR. The status and numbers of ex-FAR also remains uncertain. Some have supposedly settled permanently in North but locals dispute and resent this. There are also reports that a number of foreign combatants from Rwanda and DRC participated in the conflict in the Pool.

16. The present blockage to the repatriation of certain Ex-DRC combatants is that on return they would automatically be included into the planned new combined DRC army. This is an issue that would need to be resolved in Kinshasa rather than Brazzaville and discussions are on-going.

17. France is committed to assisting the RoC with its process of restructuring the army and gendarmerie. An initial exercise of a census of the existing forces is almost complete (some units in the north still need to be covered). Once the figures are known a second exercise defining the needs of nation in terms of security will allow the re-definition of the type and size of the forces required and thus, logically, the number of soldiers and gendarmes that can be discharged. The figure of 6,000 put forward by the HC is only a tentative estimate on their part as the Ministry of Defence will not be in an official position to confirm it for several months. At present no formal programme for the restructuring of the security sector has been made available, which is why it does not feature in the current Letter of Policy.

18. The RoC has made significant strides in securing donor support for development activities. The World Bank is pushing forward with a number of initiatives that will impact positively on the provision of opportunities for employment for both ex-combatants and young people in general. Substantial infrastructure rehabilitation programmes will provide jobs and improve the general economy indirectly. More decentralised programmes targeting communities should do the same. Other donors, including the EU have similar initiatives and negotiations with the IMF for balance of payment support are looking extremely positive. All this, combined with better than expected oil prices (despite the drop in value of the dollar) and an increasing degree of transparency in government finances bode relatively well for the future of the economy. Nonetheless, the country is still emerging from what was a very destructive civil war.

19. The mission was pleased to note that following the recommendations of the last MDRP meeting in Paris, UNDP has been very active in its lead role for DDR in RoC. It has kept partners informed and encouraged a co-ordinated approach amongst the partners. It is to be noted that most of the observations and recommendations by the mission to the Government had already been made by MDRP and its partners in UNDP-led discussions with government.

D. Programme Indicators.

20. Estimates from the humanitarian community indicate that the number of *IDPs* in the Pool region has fallen since March, 2003, to around 114,500 due to the holding of the cease-fire agreements, and that access to these groups has also improved. However, official estimates of the number of *refugees* within the borders of the Congo has remained stable at around 113,200. Also since March, the country has experienced an improvement in the *movement of goods and services* due to the reopening of the railway link between Pointe Noire and Brazzaville. However, passenger traffic is still on hold and cargo traffic remains at a low level due to infrastructure constraints.

21. As of the time of the joint supervision mission, Government estimated that a total of 14,169 ex-combatants had received *reintegration support* (8,019 under the UNDP/IOM program, and 6,150 under the IDA-supported HCREC program). However, none of these activities are currently being carried out within the MDRP framework.

E. Risks and Mitigation Factors.

22. **Security.** The fact that the problem in the Pool has not been entirely resolved is disconcerting but despite this a total reversal of the peace process is considered unlikely. The efforts to re-insert ex-combatants over past years, the gradual improvement in the economy and the improved governance all represent substantial stabilising factors. On the other hand weapons are abundant and despite DDR efforts to date the command and control structures of the main militias still appear to be in place.

23. **Politics, Good Governance and Human Rights.** A relative improvement in governance and political freedom has been noted. However the major opposition figures still remain outside the country and outside the process; political reconciliation represents a source of potential instability.

24. **DDR and SSR programming and the risk of moral hazard.** This represents a very serious problem in the RoC. The figures put forward by the planned PNDDR both in terms of numbers remaining to be demobilised and the budget for DDR are not considered to be justifiable by local MDRP partners. This has already been highlighted in previous MDRP aide mémoires, JSM reports and a consultant study commissioned by the EU. For example, the government's original figures for militia immediately following the conflict were 25,000. The HC accepts that 18,000 will have been re-inserted by the UNDP/IOM and IDA funded programmes. Unfortunately, the IDA-funded programme has not documented beneficiaries with secure picture identification cards, which makes control of current and future program benefits difficult and increases the likelihood of leakages. The army admits that at least 6,000 former militia were incorporated into the army. This would already account for 24,000. The figures proposed for the Rev Ntoumi's forces have not been verified but are considered to be overestimated at 8,500, including an estimated 1,700 child combatants.⁷ One indication that the Government's new numbers of likely combatants to be demobilized under a national program may be excessive is found in their estimate of 5,000 ex-militia men amongst refugees in Gabon, whereas UNHCR has only registered 105.

⁷ Other sources indicated that the adult combatant force strength was more likely in the 2,000 to 3,000 range.

25. **The lack of co-ordination between government departments on DDR and SSR issues.** Local MDRP partners have become increasingly aware that these issues are closely linked and discussions thereon need to be broadened. DDR and SSR require input from Defence, Interior, Social Affairs/Health, Plan, Employment, Finance the HC and in terms of overall policy the Presidency itself. The mission noted with satisfaction that these areas were well represented during its discussions.

26. **The Lack of focus and prioritisation.** Partners are concerned that the proposed DDR programme goes beyond the targeted and short-term initiatives that prioritise groups that threaten peace and security outlined in the MDRP strategy. The proposed programme appears to more in keeping with a general youth employment scheme. Indeed the programme as proposed risks sustaining and even re-creating militias when, four years after the main conflict, it should be time to put this issue aside and to move on to other forms of employment creation.

G. Recommendations .

27. The mission agreed with the government representatives that:

- DDR policy be reviewed by the government as whole, in the light of the need to address the main priorities that threaten instability in RoC, namely:
 - The full and final resolution of the problem in the Pool region;
 - The restructuring and reduction in numbers of the armed forces and security services;
 - The repatriation of foreign forces in RoC territory;
 - The funds likely to be made available for DDR activities; and
 - The increasing availability of resources for employment creation initiatives for young people and those ex-militiamen that might still be neglected.
- That DDR policy discussion would be broadened to include other key Congolese government stake-holders and be supported at the highest echelons of the nation; the revised letter of policy should be signed by the Head of State.
- That the Letter of Demobilization Policy (LDP) would contain explicit details of the governments security sector reform policy and its impact on DDR needs.
- That the activation of CONADER was a welcome development and that it should be active in the co-ordination of DDR policy and the oversight of the HCREC.
- That once the LDP between government and MDRP partners is agreed upon that CONADER encourage a participative approach to the elaboration of the revised DR programme.
- That the LDP would also clarify the current status, situation and planned repatriation of foreign ex-combatants on RoC soil.
- That the process of MDRP supported DDR needed to move ahead as soon as possible.

29. In separate meetings, the mission:

- Strongly encouraged IDA and HC try to introduce picture identifications for the remainder of its caseload.
- Shared its impatience with partners at the lack of progress with respect to the DDR in the Pool but encouraged them to remain prepared to assist when the situation improved.

- Noted the desirability of providing equal benefits in real terms between participants in any new DDR programs and those of past schemes in the country.

H. Proposed next steps :

5. Provision of revised **LDP and SSR** Policy and agreement thereon between Government and MDRP partners.
6. Reformulation of PNDDR by Government in consultation with major stakeholders and available expertise **in the light of the agreed LDP.**

Annex VI

Rwanda Country Report

October 9 –11, 2003

1. Within the framework of the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), a joint supervision mission visited Rwanda from October 9-11, 2003. The overall goal of the mission was to review the performance of the MDRP partnership in Rwanda and to assess progress made in the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program (RDRP).⁸ Specific objectives included:

- Review progress made in the implementation of reintegration activities under the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program;
- Assess the effectiveness of the RDRP in facilitating the demobilization and reintegration of members of Rwandese armed groups from the DRC; and
- Review the program's overall framework for monitoring and evaluation.

2. The mission wishes to thank the Government of Rwanda, the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC), as well as donor, UN and NGO partners for the generous time and assistance provided during its visit.

A. Country context

3. The overall political and security situation in Rwanda continues to be stable. Presidential and parliamentary elections were completed peacefully in the two-month period immediately preceding the mission. There have been no significant hostile incursions by Rwandese armed groups from the DRC into Rwanda since May 2001.

4. Implementation of the Pretoria Agreement of 30 July 2002 between the governments of the DRC and Rwanda, which called for a withdrawal of the Rwanda Defense Forces (RDF) from the DRC in exchange for a dismantling and repatriation of Rwandese armed groups by the government of the DRC with the support of the international community, continues to complicate relations between the two governments. While the RDF has formally withdrawn from the DRC, large scale efforts to disarm and repatriate the Rwandese armed groups have yet to commence, especially in the eastern DRC. Mutual accusations of violations and bad faith are not uncommon. On a positive note, both governments committed themselves to a common set of principles of good neighborliness during the recent UN General Assembly meetings.⁹

5. Relations between the Government of Rwanda and the Government of Uganda were strained by mutual accusations of support for groups hostile to the respective governments in early 2003. However, a shared desire to resolve differences through diplomatic processes with the support of the Government of the UK has resulted in a recent easing of those tensions.

⁸ Mission composition is attached as attachment 1. Mission program is in attachment 2.

⁹ The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Rwanda visited the DRC shortly after the completion of the Joint Supervision Mission, and both governments agreed to enhance efforts to facilitate the disarmament, demobilization and repatriation of members of Rwandan armed groups to Rwanda.

B. Meeting Program Eligibility Criteria and Application of MDRP Guiding Principles

Country Eligibility Criteria

6. **Participation in the regional peace processes:** the Government of Rwanda is a signatory of the Lusaka Agreement. In this context, it has consistently participated in the regional peace process and associated mechanisms such as the Joint Military Commission (JMC). In accordance with the Pretoria Agreement, the withdrawal of the Rwanda Defense Forces from DRC territory was formally completed in October 2002.

National Program

7. Stage II of the **Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program (RDRP)** has been up and running since December 2001. Government established the **Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC)** to oversee implementation of RDRP II. **National ownership** of the Program has been very strong to date. Government submitted a **letter of demobilization policy** to the World Bank in March 2002, and subsequently made this letter available to interested MDRP partners. Furthermore, **appropriate safeguards and fiduciary measures** were put in place by Government in the course of program preparation, and in accordance with World Bank requirements. The RDRC also completed a thorough social and environmental assessment since the last supervision mission in October 2002.

8. Demobilization and reintegration activities over the course of the preceding twelve months were modest, largely owing to the low numbers of return of members of Rwandan armed groups (estimated to number up to 25,000) from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The following numbers of ex-combatants have received assistance in stage II of the Program to date:

Description	# Assisted in Stage II (since Dec. 2001)	Target #	% Complete
Rwandan Armed Groups	3,187	22,500	13
Child soldiers	454	2,500	18
Ex-Forces Armées Rwandaïses	9,841	15,000	65
Rwandan Defense Force*	10,713	20,000	54
Total	24,195	60,000	40

**stage II demobilized only

9. The mission expressed concern about the slow rate of repatriation from the DRC to date. While the mission recognizes that the situation in Eastern DRC remains logistically challenging and volatile, it hopes that the consolidation of new transitional government in the DRC and the deployment of MONUC Task Force 1 to the Kivus under an expanded mandate will provide opportunities for an accelerated disarmament and repatriation of Rwandese armed groups. The mission encourages MONUC to identify and pursue disarmament and repatriation opportunities in a proactive and flexible manner. Furthermore, the mission calls on both governments of the DRC and Rwanda to exert their influence to advance this process. The Government of Rwanda reiterated its request to MDRP partners to increase their efforts to encourage the return of Rwandan armed group members still present in the DRC.

10. Given the slow pace of repatriation of members of Rwandese armed groups and the limited RDF demobilization to date, the RDRC has been able to focus on the challenges of reinsertion and reintegration. During a field visit, the mission observed examples of reintegration efforts, and gained insights into the constraints posed by an economy that has not yet fully recovered from the consequences

of the 1994 genocide. The harmonization of efforts of the RDRP with the decentralization process has seen some success, although it has placed heavy demands upon the limited capacities of Community Development Committees (CDCs) through which demobilized soldiers, and associations in which they are members, channel their respective reintegration project proposals. It appears that in some cases this community-based reintegration strategy may have had some unintended benefits, such as the reinvigoration of traditional communal social assistance mechanisms.

11. The mission noted that Provincial Program Offices (PPOs) of the RDRC may not be adequately staffed to provide necessary support to ex-combatants and CDCs. The mission thus encourages the RDRC to review its reintegration capacity requirements at PPO level as soon as possible.

12. The RDRC is engaged in technical discussions with the Ministry of Local Affairs (MINALOC) for the establishment of procedures for the reception, registration, demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers *special target group*. The mission calls upon the RDRC to operationalize this component as soon as possible, to pay particular attention to the situation of girl child soldiers when considering appropriate assistance modalities, and to adhere to the principles of the Cape Town Agreement and its definition and screening of child soldiers.

13. Valuable reintegration information has been collected but has yet to be analyzed by the RDRC and shared with MDRP partners. The mission stressed to the RDRC the importance of timely processing, analysis and dissemination the information available as part of the monitoring and evaluation of the RDRP. The World Bank informed the mission that the first annual independent evaluation of the RDRP would be undertaken shortly. Furthermore, the World Bank informed the mission that it had recruited a consultant to review the RDRC's monitoring and evaluation systems, and pledged to share the findings of this consultant's ongoing mission with the TCC.

14. *Transparent* use of RDRP resources is assured by the utilization of financial management and procurement procedures required by the World Bank.

Coordination

15. Systems for the handover of combatants from MONUC to the RDRC are clearly in place, and there have been several examples of cooperation (e.g., cross-border exchanges that have allowed Rwandan armed group members to visit demobilization centers and communities where other ex-combatants have reintegrated in Rwanda, MONUC collection of testimonies and video material at Mutobo Demobilization Center, etc.). However, the mission noted signs of discord and low levels of trust between MONUC's Kigali Liaison Office and the RDRC despite the fact that both recognize that they share critical objectives and interests. In this regard, the mission welcomes MONUC's offer to enhance collaboration with the RDRC (e.g., joint screening, information and sensitization), and to establish a tripartite working group (MONUC/RDRC/MDRP) to better accomplish shared repatriation objectives. The mission encourages the Government of and World Bank / MDRP Secretariat to follow up. Furthermore, the mission encourages the MDRP Secretariat to strengthen its support of the governments of the DRC and Rwanda to cooperate in efforts to disarm and repatriate members of Rwandese armed groups from the DRC to Rwanda, in collaboration with MONUC.

16. The Technical Secretariat of the RDRC (TS/RDRC) has led implementation of demobilization activities and is *coordinating* the inputs of all governmental and external partners of the RDRP through a Technical Coordination Committee (TCC). Local MDRP partners informed the mission that the TCC serves as a useful forum for information exchange and discussion. The mission commends local partners for their contributions to the social and economic working groups of the TCC. The mission encourages the TS/RDRC to ensure that this committee meets regularly and serves as an effective instrument for

consultation, monitoring and evaluation. In addition, the mission encourages the MDRP Secretariat to participate in this forum regularly and to support the Commission's coordination efforts more proactively.

17. RDRP reintegration activities are closely coordinated with the Government's decentralization program. In particular, elected Community Development Committees (CDCs), which form a cornerstone of the Government's decentralization and community empowerment strategy, play a central role in the approval and monitoring of reintegration benefits for ex-combatants. The RDRP continues to call upon ex-combatant to participate in more general poverty reduction and employment activities supported by Government and external partners.

Financing

18. IDA has disbursed approximately \$9 million of its US\$25 million IDA credit in support of the RDRP to date. In addition, US\$1.4 million have been disbursed from the MDRP Multi-Donor Trust Fund since the finalization of the grant agreement in July 2003.

Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program Financing Plan (Stage II)

Source	Million US\$	Percent
Government of Rwanda	2.7	5
IDA	25.0	47
MDTF	14.5	27
Bilaterals (parallel)	11.1	21
Total	53.3	100

19. The mission welcomed confirmation by a simultaneous GTZ and KFW mission of the German government that they are finalizing the terms for the provision of bilateral support of Euro 6.2 - 8.7 million in support of the RDRP. German bilateral assistance in the amount of US\$6.2 million was envisaged in the original financing plan (see table above) for the RDRP. However, the mission noted that only Euro 2.5 million of the German government's contribution will be fully consistent with the current design of the RDRP. The mission noted that this might require an increase of the MDTF Trust Fund contribution at a later stage.

20. The mission expressed some concerns about the equity and institutional capacity implications as well as the needs justification for the additional components envisaged by KFW and GTZ (e.g., community reintegration, labor intensive public works, etc.). The mission welcomes KFW and GTZ's willingness to take these concerns into account in the finalization of program planning, and welcomes the offer to share draft program documents, terms of reference for technical assistance and MoUs with the TCC for comment. The mission further welcomes GTZ's assurance that additional RDRC capacity requirements for implementing these activities will be addressed with a view to ensuring that ongoing activities are not compromised in any manner. Finally, the mission encourages GTZ to ensure that any technical assistance envisaged under the German contribution be geared to providing program-wide support.

21. The mission was informed that the European Commission is in the process of finalizing a labor-intensive public works project targeting ex-combatants in Kigali ville (approximately Euro 3 million). As it is not clear that this proposal has been elaborated in sufficiently close cooperation with the RDRC, the mission encourages the EC to undertake additional consultation with the Technical Secretariat of the RDRC as well as the TCC before finalizing this proposal.

22. In accordance with MDRP guiding principles, the mission would like to recall that all activities explicitly targeting ex-combatants in Rwanda should be provided within the framework of the RDRP. As such, they should be elaborated in close cooperation with the Technical Secretariat of the RDRC as well as the TCC. The mission would like to note that there are significant risks in providing “complementary” assistance to ex-combatants who are not socio-economically vulnerable beyond that already foreseen under the RDRP. First, there is a *moral hazard risk*, as there is no clear justification for continuing to discriminate in favor of this group after they have received reintegration assistance through the RDRP. Indeed, this may cause resentment among other poor social groups in Rwanda, potentially compromising the Program’s social reintegration objectives. Second, geographically limited initiatives risk creating perverse urban or regional migration incentives and/or inequalities among ex-combatants. Finally, over time such actions may contribute to the persistence of a distinct ex-combatant interest group and dependency behavior patterns, which the Program seeks to discourage by limiting its assistance over time.

23 The mission reminds the RDRC and the Ministry of Finance of their obligations to ensure consistency in assistance strategies and implementation structures for ex-combatant reintegration, as stated in the decree establishing the RDRC and as agreed in the letter of demobilization policy.

Regional Issues

24. The RDRC confirmed that the regional mechanisms established under the MDRP, especially the Technical Coordination Group (TCG), have helped to facilitate common understandings among participating countries. DDR staff members from Burundi and the DRC (as well as personnel from the African Mission in Burundi) have visited Rwanda to observe and learn from demobilization and reintegration efforts of the RDRP. The RDRC has also supported the recent TCG monitoring and evaluation workshop in Kibuye, which was facilitated by GTZ. The mission would like to thank the RDRC for its willingness to support such regional *knowledge-sharing* and *confidence-building* activities.

25. The mission welcomes the RDRC’s desire to reinvigorate the implementation of a joint information and sensitization strategy with the Government of the DRC, in collaboration with MDRP Secretariat and MONUC. The mission encourages the RDRC to identify concrete next steps in this regard during the forthcoming MDRP TCG/AC/TFC meeting in Kinshasa. The mission encourages the MDRP Secretariat to support this important cross-border initiative as required.

C. Efforts complementary to the MDRP

26. The mission was informed of several activities deemed by the RDRC and bilateral partners as complementary to the MDRP. Given the mention of ex-combatants as potential beneficiaries within a broader category of vulnerable persons eligible for participation in these programs (high intensity labor and training opportunities), the need for broader partner collaboration in the planning process was stressed, so as to assure equity in the delivery of assistance to ex-combatants country-wide and to ensure harmonization with the decentralization process and broader development programs of the Government. The mission also drew attention to the fact that the MDRP was designed as a facilitation mechanism for coordination and that it should thus be capitalized upon by partners.

27. The large-scale community-based post-conflict justice initiative (*gacaca*) continues to address the judicial legacy of those accused of participation in the 1994 genocide and all ex-combatants demobilized under the RDRP are subject to the *gacaca* system.

28. Issues related to the *security sector* were addressed by Government in the Letter of Demobilization Policy.

D. Risks and mitigation measures

29. The *security* situation within Rwanda is stable. However, the risk of further incursions into Rwanda persists. The Government is mitigating this risk by maintaining a robust defense force and by participating in regional peace efforts. This risk could be further limited by a robust deployment of MONUC in the Kivus and proactive measures by the Transitional Government of the DRC to re-establish security in the eastern DRC and to facilitate the disarmament and repatriation of Rwandese armed groups to Rwanda.

30. With the Government having legally mandated the RDRC to coordinate all DDR activities in Rwanda, the risk of *non-coordination* is limited. However, recent developments suggests that more proactive coordination by the Government of Rwanda and the MDRP Secretariat is required. There is a risk of a proliferation of “complementary” activities that seek to link other programs with those of the RDRP, rather than use the RDRP as a model for other broader development activities for which fully reintegrated ex-combatants (when is he or she no longer categorized as an ex-combatant but rather as a Rwanda citizen like everyone else) are eligible. The mission encourages the Government of Rwanda to proactively ensure partner coordination in this respect.

31. With an IDA credit and the MDTF in place, the *funding outlook* for the RDRP remains encouraging.

E. Summary of key recommendations and proposed next steps

32. The mission’s key recommendations and proposed next steps include the following:

Recommendation	Responsible Party
16. Strengthen joint activities in support of disarmament and repatriation of Rwandese armed groups from the DRC. Establish tripartite forum to this end.	RDRC, Government of the DRC, MONUC and MDRP Secretariat
17. Fully deploy Task Force 1 in the Kivus as soon as possible and prioritize disarmament and repatriation of Rwandese armed groups from the DRC	MONUC
18. Reinvigorate cross-border joint information and sensitization strategy	Governments of DRC and Rwanda with support of MDRP Secretariat and MONUC
19. Ensure strong coordination of external partners to ensure integrity of RDRP	Ministry of Finance and RDRC
20. Adhere to MDRP principles and framework of RDRP	MDRP partners and TCC
21. Ensure regular and well-planned TCC meetings	RDRC, MDRP Secretariat and Embassy of the Netherlands
22. Finalize child soldier component and ensure adherence to Cape Town Principles in screening process	RDRC and MINALOC
23. Share project documents, terms of reference of TA and MoUs with TCC for comment	GTZ and KFW

TCC for comment	
24. Share project document with TCC for comment before finalization and approval	European Commission
25. Reinforce RDRP monitoring and evaluation systems	RDRP with support of World Bank

33. Below is an update on progress made against the recommendations of the **September 2002 MDRP JSM**.

Recommendation of September 2002	Current Status
1. The RDRP should further strengthen its national coordination role at both technical and political levels. The World Bank should enhance its support of the Government's coordination role.	TCC has been strengthened with reintegration working groups. However, Government and WB performance requires further strengthening
2. The MDRP should continue to support cross-border initiatives of the Governments of Rwanda and the DRC aimed at facilitating the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement	Joint Information and sensitization strategy finalized. However, implementation challenging to date, largely due to political volatility and institutional vacuum on DRC side. Further work required to operationalize.
3. The mission recommends that Government continue to encourage MONUC participation at technical and policy levels, encourages MDRP partners on the ground to facilitate MONUC-RDRP collaboration, and recommends that the MDRP Secretariat strengthen coordination with UNDPKO in New York and with MONUC in Kinshasa. In general, MDRP partners should encourage MONUC to work more closely within the MDRP framework.	MDRP Secretariat has followed up with UNDPKO in New York and with MONUC in Kinshasa. MONUC/RDRP relationship in Rwanda still not satisfactory. Tripartite forum to be established with a view to remedying.
4. The World Bank should make credit and MDTF financing for the RDRP available as soon as possible in view of the possibility of a rapid increase in demobilization and reintegration demands for Rwandese armed groups.	Done.
5. MDTF financing in support of the RDRP should flow through Government in the first instance. Partners should seek to overcome possible internal administrative obstacles to contracting with Government. The RDRP, with the support of the World Bank, should ensure that adequate contracting capacity is in place in the RDRP, and that procurement procedures are efficient and timely.	Done.

Attachment 1

Team Composition

Mr. Gregory Alex, Senior Demobilization and Reintegration Specialist, MDRP Secretariat, Kigali
Mr. Sean Bradley, Trust Fund Coordinator, MDRP Secretariat, Washington
Mr. Kees Kingma, Senior Demobilization and Reintegration Specialist, MDRP Secretariat, Washington
Mr. Dietmar Krissler, Rwanda Desk Officer, European Commission, Brussels
Mr. Matthew Maguire, DFID, Kigali
Ms. Ellen van der Laan, Senior Advisor, World Bank, Washington
Mr. Hans Poley, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kigali
Mr. Hugues-Antoine Suin, First Secretary, Embassy of France, Kigali
Mr. Cheaka Touré, Reintegration Specialist, ILO, Yaoundé
Mr. Tharcisse Urayenzeza, Senior Advisor, CIDA, Kigali
Mr. Ingo Wiederhofer, Senior Operations Officer, World Bank, Washington

The following persons participated in several mission meetings:

Mr. Kurt Hildebrand, KFW, Frankfurt
Petra Windisch, Country Manager, GTZ, Kigali

Attachment 2

Mission Program

October 9, 2003

- 09.00 Team Kickoff Meeting
- 10.30 Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission
- 11.00 Lunch with Mr. Mohamed Alhousseyni Touré, Country Representative, World Bank
- 14.00 Technical Coordination Committee
- 16.00 MONUC
- 19.00 Dinner with the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission

October 10, 2003

- 08.30 Field trip to visit ex-combatant reintegration activities
- 11.00 Col. Pierre Pinchard, Belgian Defense Attaché
- 14.30 UNICEF and Save the Children Fund (UK)
- 17.00 GTZ and KFW
- 19.00 Dinner at the invitation of GTZ and KFW

October 11, 2003

- 9.00 Team wrap-up meeting
- 11:15 Wrap-up meeting with RDRC
- 13.00 Meeting with Ambassador Richard Sezibera, Special Envoy, Government of Rwanda
- 15.15 Wrap-up meeting with Government DDR planning team

Annex VII

Uganda Country Report

OCTOBER 5-8, 2003

1. The Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) Joint Supervision Mission (JSM) visited Uganda from October 5-8 2003, in order to assess the overall progress made in preparing for a national demobilization and reintegration program in Uganda. The overall objectives of the JSM were agreed among the MDRP partners and are shown in Attachment I of the JSM Aide Mémoire. The specific objectives for the Uganda mission, as confirmed by MDRP partners in Kampala, were to:

- i. review progress made in the government's DDR policy and discuss planning for possible MDRP support, and how this relates to security sector reform based on the forthcoming Defense Review; and
- ii. assess arrangements for and progress with the special project including its relation to a possible national program.

2. The members of the mission (see Attachment 1) wish to thank the representatives of the Government of Uganda (GoU), the donor and UN partners, diplomatic missions and NGOs and other stakeholders who all generously assisted the mission to better understand the current situation and challenges of the demobilization process in Uganda.(see Attachment 2 – mission schedule). The remainder of this document contains the main findings and recommendations of the JSM team in Uganda.

A. Country Context

3. The regional and national environment in which the preparation for demobilization and reintegration support takes place remains dynamic. While some positive developments have occurred over the past half a year or so, the situation has stagnated or even deteriorated in other areas.

4. Since the previous MDRP country update (April 2003), which referred to “further strained relations” between the GoU and the Government of Rwanda and “escalating tensions”, relations between the two countries have significantly improved, particularly in the past few months when, for instance, President Museveni attended of the inauguration of President Kagame in Kigali.

5. However, the security situation in Eastern DRC remains very unstable. Although a transitional government has been installed in Kinshasa (July 2003), it is expected that it will take some time before it can effectively maintain law and order in the eastern part of the country. In addition, MONUC is yet to establish greater control over certain armed groups in border areas that pose potential threat to Uganda.

6. The recent progress in the peace process in Sudan promises to be an important factor in resolving the conflict in northern Uganda. However, the mission notes that the situation remains bleak in the north from a security and humanitarian standpoint, and is likely to have deteriorated since the previous MDRP country update. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has been heading toward the east, which has caused the spread of violent conflict to that region (e.g. Teso). Government's position is that the LRA will have to be defeated militarily. Most of the military personnel that withdrew from Eastern DRC are believed to now be deployed in the campaign against the LRA. However, the effectiveness of military actions in the

north has been questioned by some observers and Government's efforts to enter into a credible dialogue with the LRA leadership have thus far failed.

7. Groups of local militias are currently being established and armed in parts of the country to defend communities against the threats posed by the LRA. The "Arrow Group" has reportedly been relatively successful in fending off the LRA in certain parts of Teso,¹⁰ and other militia groups are active in Lira and Apach. Some of the members are drawn from previous rebel groups, such as the Uganda's Peoples Army in Eastern Uganda. The mission is not aware of any "exit strategy" for the militia that are currently mobilized.

8. The Defense Review process, which started in June 2002, is well advanced. Official decisions on what the defense forces should look like in the medium- and long-term future are to be taken by Cabinet in a matter of weeks. Subsequently, a draft White Paper is expected to be presented to Parliament in November. It will probably take at least until the end of the year before the process is completed and results in an established policy that would indicate the numbers of soldiers required in the future.

B. Eligibility Criteria and Implementation of MDRP Principles

9. Despite some positive regional developments, a number of factors make it hard to predict the size and timing of a possible demobilization of regular forces. On the one hand, the army is still fully engaged in fighting the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in the North, and on the other it is not clear whether – even in peacetime – there would be a significant reduction in the number of forces in the Ugandan Peoples' Defense Forces (UPDF).

10. Nevertheless, Government reconfirmed its commitment to develop a National Demobilization and Reintegration Program (NDRP). Some progress has been made to strengthen the institutional arrangements for the preparation and implementation of the program, including the establishment of a Steering Committee to oversee and provide policy guidance for a program that would target both regular and irregular forces, as outlined in the letter from the Office of the Prime Minister to the MDRP Secretariat of 25 September 2003. The proposed institutional set-up appears generally appropriate to the needs of a national program. The Steering Committee has met several times and also established a Technical Working Group.

11. The mission noted that such commitment to an eventual NDRP should also be considered and reflected in the Government's Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) revision process and the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). The Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development is already reflecting on the requirements.

12. A key pre-condition for the NDRP is the finalization of the Defense Review and adoption of the White Paper. In the absence of this detailed statement of national defense policy, it is premature to consider the possibility and details of the NDRP. Due to the fact that the Defense Review had reached a critical stage, the Minister of Defense was not able to meet with the mission as planned. It was thus agreed that a meeting between MDRP partners and the Minister of Defence would be requested in the near future so as to obtain further clarifications on issues related to the future developments in the UPDF.

13. The mission did not learn of any concrete planning for significant downsizing of the UPDF. In the absence of significant downsizing of the armed forces, the exact role of the MDRP vis-à-vis the national armed forces is in question, particularly in relation to retirement of soldiers or to assist in paying gratuities to ex-combatants who have been demobilized in the past.

¹⁰ Recent estimates of force strength of the "Arrow Group" vary widely from 1,000 to 4,000 members.

14. Main steps still to be taken for the GoU to be eligible for MDRP support are:

- Resolution of the conflict with the LRA
- Adoption a White Paper on Defense that would indicate that there is currently a significant surplus of soldiers in the UPDF.
- Drafting of a Letter of Demobilization Policy.
- Development of a national demobilization and reintegration program.
- Further development of suitable implementation arrangements.

15. Activities by the Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB) – partially in preparation for a NDRP – are currently at a low level. Without a clear perspective on a future NDRP, the World Bank and the MDRP would not be a position to provide support to UVAB. Even if significant downsizing of the UPDF would only take place in a matter of years, it might be worth considering for the GoU to maintain UVAB’s structure and core staff in order to be better prepared once demobilization would be decided upon.

16. Since a national program is not foreseen in the near future, the GoU – in consultation with the MDRP Secretariat – decided to prepare a proposal for a *special project* in order to be able to appropriately support the resettlement and reintegration of irregular forces. It is considered important that the Amnesty Commission is able to provide support to those that have already presented themselves as soon as possible, and that its capacity to respond to new “reporters” is enhanced. On September 24, 2003, the GoU submitted a revised proposal to the MDRP Secretariat for the Repatriation, Rehabilitation, Resettlement and Reintegration of Reporters. On October 3, 2003, an initial MDRP Local Ad-Hoc Committee (LAC) meeting was held to plan the approval process. A full LAC meeting will be held on October 20, 2003 to formally assess the proposal.

17. The existing systems and practices of *donor coordination* appear to be appropriate and beneficial for supporting the development and implementation of a NDRP.¹¹ Efforts are being made to make sure that incentives provided within the support of the Amnesty Commission are not creating unnecessary disparities. In addition to strengthening the capacity of the Amnesty Commission, this requires continued coordination among those external agencies that are (considering) supporting the Commission.

C. Complimentary Efforts

18. As indicated above, a *Defence Review* undertaken by Government with the support of the United Kingdom is currently in its final stages. Once the review is completed, a Defense Reform Program is expected to follow. The review process has already produced a security policy framework for Uganda. The policy formulated in the White Paper will explain the role of the armed forces and the vision of the Government for professionalizing them. It would also provide a foundation for the establishment of a sustainable system for recruitment and retirement.

19. The issue of *small arms and light weapons control* is increasingly on the national agenda. Government established a National Focal Point on the issue in October 2001, under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This commission became operational in March 2002. NGOs are actively involved in its central structure, the purpose of which is to assist Government in the coordination of action and policy on small arms and light weapons.

¹¹ These include the Donor Technical Group for the North, Amnesty and Recovery from Conflict, and the Donor Working Group for the Amnesty Commission.

20. The combination of both a comprehensive Defense Review and the definition of a broad socio-economic policy through the PEAP would allow for a demobilization program that would lead to a sustainable reduction of men and women in arms and facilitate their reintegration into civilian life without much disruption of the receiving community. Effective control of small arms would also be an important complementary effort for successful demobilization and reintegration.

D. Program Performance Indicators

21. In the absence of a national program, output performance indicators can not be measured at present.

22. The MDRP framework is widely accepted as the mechanism to support Government with the preparation of the proposed special project and the possible NDRP.

23. Uganda plays an active and constructive role in regional cooperation within the MDRP framework.

24. It is important to note that , as a result of recent increased levels of insecurity, estimates show that the number of *IDPs* would have doubled in the past six months, particularly in the east.. The World Food Programme (WFP) currently estimates the total of IDPs in Uganda to be about 1.2 million. In addition, Uganda houses about 219,000 *refugees* from neighboring countries.

E. Risks and Mitigation Measures

25. The MDRP regional strategy already identified the potential risk that the availability of financial resources for the support of demobilization and reintegration could in certain instances provide the wrong incentive for peace settlements and disarmament. The so-called ‘moral hazard’ would be that the program would in fact encourage armament and mobilization in order to be able to obtain benefits in the future.

26. The JSM in Uganda noted such risk of ‘*moral hazard*’, in the sense that the potential or perceived availability of financing through the MDRP might reduce the normal restraint on the mobilization of military forces, or similarly affect individual decisions to take up arms. It is therefore particularly important to monitor the mobilization of (Government-backed) militia and the inclination of people to form or join rebel movements. It also points to the importance of clear and targeted information dissemination on Government policies, the MDRP and its support to the country.

27. Potential risks of an *imbalance between support for ex-combatants with assistance to other vulnerable groups*, or lack of coordination, appear to be limited. The donor community in Uganda is quite likely to address the need for support to DD&R jointly, given its coordination structures and practices.

G. Other Matters Related to MDRP

28. As indicated above, the GoU has submitted a proposal for a Special Project supporting the Amnesty Commission in its assistance to ex-rebel fighters to the MDRP Secretariat. While the structure, commitment and general approaches of the Amnesty Commission were found to be appropriate to challenges of demobilizing reporters, certain concern was expressed with regard to the specific capacity of the Amnesty Commission to manage the activities as outlined in its proposal. This will be one of the issues taken into account by the LAC in its elaborations.

29. Another concern is the legal status of the Amnesty Commission, which is renewed semi-annually along with the Amnesty Act, and the implications this has on the implementation of the two-year special project. While Government indicated an unwillingness to extend the Amnesty Act by more than six months at a time, they provided assurances that the Amnesty Commission will be renewed for the duration of the special project. The MDRP Secretariat is investigating the possible legal concerns this may raise with the World Bank legal department.

30. The proposed Special Project will be part of the broader NDRP policy framework once a national program is in place. Several areas of technical collaboration between the Amnesty Commission and UVAB have been suggested, such as in the development of appropriate management information systems. The two bodies are also considering a process to jointly learn lessons regarding their past experiences in reintegration support. One of the components of such an exercise could be a study on actual reintegration experiences of ex-combatants demobilized with UVAB's support in the 1990s or of those resettled after being granted amnesty by the Amnesty Commission.

H. Recommendations and/or Agreed-upon Next Steps

31. In spite of on-going conflict in the north of the country, the mission was encouraged by the positive climate and support of Government and partners to pursue the work within the MDRP framework towards demobilization and reintegration in Uganda.

Agreed Upon Next Steps	Responsibility	By When
1. Meeting of the Local Ad-Hoc Committee (LAC) to review the government's proposal for assistance to the Amnesty Commission	All 5 LAC members, chaired and convened by MDRP Secretariat	20 October
2. Request for MDRP partners to meet Minister of Defense	MDRP/World Bank Kampala to write	October
3. Assess validity of legal basis for the proposed Special Project	GoU and MDRP Secretariat	early November
4. Publication of the draft White Paper on Defense	GoU	November

Attachment 1

Team Composition

Gromo Alex (MDRP Secretariat)

Michèle Baherle (France)

Sean Bradley (MDRP Secretariat)

Graham Carrington (UK-DfID)

Gerald Duda (Germany-GTZ)

John J. Oloya (World Bank)

Kees Kingma (MDRP Secretariat)

Janne Knudrud (Norway)

Ellen van der Laan (World Bank)

Francesco Mancini (Netherlands)

Enid Nambuya (UNDP).

Uganda MDRP Focal Point, Gen. Emilio Mondo (ret.), participated in most of the mission's meetings.

Attachment 2**UGANDA MISSION PROGRAM**

October 5 – 8, 2003

Appointment and Venue	Date And Time	1.1.1 Issues for Consideration
1.2 SUNDAY, OCTOBER 5, 2003		
Major Gen. Emilio Mondo, World Bank office	1.2.1 3:00 p.m.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ General program update
Monday, October 6, 2003		
Initial Meeting with Mission Team, World Bank office	1.2.2 8:30 a.m.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Organization of mission ▪ Additional meetings ▪ Participation
Mr. Oode Obella, Assistant Commissioner, Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) and J.O. Anyala, MFPED Desk Officer Ministry of Defense	11:45 a.m.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ General program information ▪ PRSP and links to other Bank activities ▪ Econ recovery for north
Team Meeting and DFID Officials for Defense Review	2:00 p.m.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Defense review
Hon. Mondo Kagonyera, Minister for General Duties, Office of the Prime Minister (OPM)	1.2.3 3:00 p.m.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Defense review ▪ Plans for demobilization ▪ New military recruitments/ militia ▪ Situation in north and west
Dinner for MDRP donors & partners	7:30 p.m.	
Tuesday, October 7, 2003		
Donor Meeting (DTG); EU offices	10:00 a.m.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ MDRP role in peace process ▪ Complementary activities
Justice Peter Onega, Chairperson Amnesty Commission	1.2.4 11:45 a.m.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Amnesty Com. Mandate ▪ Special project ▪ ADF

Appointment and Venue	Date And Time	1.1.1 Issues for Consideration
Ministry of Defence	2:30 p.m. <i>(meeting cancelled)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Defense review ▪ Recruitment and demobilization plans ▪ Militia ▪ Status in north, east and west ▪ Role of UVAB
Amb. Jean-Bernard Thiant, Ambassador, French Embassy	5:00 p.m.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Regional security assessment
Wednesday, October 8, 2003		
Ms. Grace Yabrudy, W. Bank Country Manager, W. Bank office	1.2.5 7:00 a.m.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Overview of mission findings
Wrap-up Meeting; all partners, W. Bank office	9:00 a.m.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Discuss observations, agree on key mission recommendations
Debriefing with Hon. Mondo Kagonyera	1.2.6 11:30 a.m.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Overview of mission findings
Briefing of NGO Representatives	2:30 p.m.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Overview of MDRP program
Hon. Ruhakana Rugunda, Minister of Internal Affairs and Justice Peter Onega, Chairperson Amnesty Commission	4:15 p.m.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Status of Amnesty Act ▪ Security issues ▪ Civilian disarmament

Annex VIII

Statement of Mission Objectives

I. Joint Mission Dates and MDRP Team Members

The mission will visit the seven countries in which the MDRP is currently active, as per the following schedule. The lead MDRP secretariat staff member for each country is indicated in parentheses.

CAR:	Sept 27-Oct 1	(Phil Maughan)
Angola:	October 1-4	(Sean Bradley)
Congo:	October 2-4	(Phil Maughan)
Uganda:	October 5-8	(Kees Kingma)
DRC (Kin):	October 5-8	(Roisin de Burca)
DRC (East):	October 9-12	(Roisin de Burca)
Rwanda:	October 9-12	(Ingo Wiederhofer)
Burundi:	October 12-15	(Ingo Wiederhofer)

II. Overall Mission Objective

To jointly assess, with major partners, progress made in implementing the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP), including national program and/or special project efforts.

III. Specific Mission Objectives

All missions will:

- For each country as appropriate, assess and update status of MDRP criteria and indicators regarding program (i) benefits, (ii) risks and mitigation measures, (iii) eligibility criteria, (iv) guiding principles, (v) performance, and (vi) complementary efforts as outlined in the MDRP Strategy document and detailed in the attachment to these SMOs; and
- Prepare country-specific reports summarizing status of program and identifying key issues and recommendations for consideration by the Government and MDRP partners.

Furthermore, the missions will have the following country-specific responsibilities:

In Angola:

- Review progress made in launching the Angola Demobilization and Reintegration Program, in particular related to: (i) establishment of suitable institutional structure, (ii) participation of UNITA in program process, (iii) plans and activities for reintegrating ex-combatants; and
- Assess arrangements for and progress with the special project.

In Burundi:

- Review effectiveness of national coordination mechanisms, especially with respect to: (i) political negotiations, and (ii) JCC and AMIB on cantonment;
- Assess progress made in preparing the national program, Government capacity to carry out the program, and links to restructuring of the armed forces; and

- Assess arrangements for and progress with the special project.

In the Central African Republic:

- Assess and discuss with Government the progress made in preparation of a revised version of the national DDR policy and review appropriate MDRP response as well as links with the reform of the security sector;
- Review the progress on the security, political, and economic front in relation to MDRP criteria.

In Congo-Brazzaville:

- Review the progress on the security, political and economic front in relation to MDRP criteria;
- Assess the scope for further DDR activities in the country and their relation to development assistance; and
- Review links of DDR activities/programs with the reform of the security sector.

In the Democratic Republic of Congo:

- Review overall political and economic progress during the transitional phase, including national reunification and the security situation in Ituri and other areas;
- Review the implementation of the interim strategy and current partner coordination mechanisms;
- Discuss with the Government and partners the progress in preparing for a national DDR program, including how this is linked with reform of the armed forces; and
- Assess arrangements for and progress in the approval and implementation of special projects.

In Rwanda:

- Review progress made in the implementation of reintegration activities under the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program, in particular related to the management of the process at the provincial/district level and the role and effectiveness of Community Development Committees in project appraisal;
- Assess the impact of RDRP on facilitating demobilization of ex-FAR and Interahamwe forces; and
- Review the program's plans and framework for monitoring and evaluation.

In Uganda:

- Review progress made in the government's DDR policy and discuss planning for possible MDRP support, and how this relates to security sector reform based on the forthcoming Defense Review; and
- Assess arrangements for and progress with the special project including its relation to a possible national program.

IV. *Mission Wrap-up and Report*

A wrap-up workshop will be held in Nairobi, Kenya, on October 16 to review findings and recommendations from each country and prepare a consolidated mission report. This report will be submitted to the MDRP Advisory Committee and Trust Fund Committee at their next meeting in November, 2003.

MDRP Criteria and Indicators

- 1. Reviewing benefits of the MDRP approach (paragraph 98 of the MDRP document):**
 - (i) enhanced effectiveness of the international response;
 - (ii) greater coherence among DDR activities;
 - (iii) the facilitation of positive feedback relationships among DDR activities in the region;
 - (iv) the provision of similar incentives for all parties to the conflict to pursue peaceful strategies;
 - (v) the ability to address the regional externalities associated with some individual programs;
 - (vi) enhanced transparency of closely related DDR activities; and
 - (vii) the facilitation of knowledge-sharing and training across DDR implementers.

- 2. Evaluating risks and mitigation measures (paragraphs 101ff.):**
 - (i) reversal of the peace processes;
 - (ii) moral hazard;
 - (iii) balance between support for ex-combatants with assistance to other vulnerable groups;
 - (iv) funding gaps;
 - (v) lack of coordination; and
 - (vi) risks of non-engagement.

- 3. Reviewing general and country-level eligibility criteria for MDRP assistance (paragraph 113):**
 - (i) being affected by conflict;
 - (ii) participation in the regional peace process;
 - (iii) preparation of a national DRP as a result of the conflict(s);
 - (iv) establishment of a suitable institutional structure;
 - (v) a letter of demobilization policy outlining government commitment; and
 - (vi) establishment of appropriate safeguards and fiduciary measures.

- 4. Examining relevance and implementation of MDRP guiding principles (paragraph 119):**
 - (i) national ownership;
 - (ii) confidence-building;
 - (iii) harmonization of DDR activities;
 - (iv) knowledge sharing;
 - (v) optimization of external assistance;
 - (vi) special target groups;
 - (vii) special projects;
 - (viii) coordination with reconstruction efforts;
 - (ix) transparency; and
 - (x) flexibility.

- 5. Establishing a baseline for key MDRP monitoring indicators, including (paragraph 148):**
 - A. Strategy Indicators*
 1. Reduction in the number of internally displaced and refugees.
 2. Restoration of free movement of goods and persons within and between countries.

3. Evolution of social expenditures in participating countries, including in relation to security spending.

B. Program Indicators

4. Percent of DDR activities undertaken in the region within the framework of the MDRP.
5. Percent of DDR resources channeled through the regional MDTF.
6. Degree of harmonization of national programs.

C. Output Indicators

7. Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through national programs.
 8. Number of ex-combatants demobilized and receiving assistance through special projects.
 9. Effectiveness of technical knowledge sharing activities.
 10. Efficient organization of joint missions and preparation of reports.
6. **Assessing efforts complementary to DDR in the following areas (paras. 50ff.) and discussing the potential roles of different partners (paras. 91ff.):**
- (i) local security;
 - (ii) security sector reform;
 - (iii) civilian disarmament; and involuntary disarmament

Annex IX

Wrap up meeting participants Nairobi, October 16-17, 2003

Name	Title	Organization	E-mail
Kurt Hildebrand	Division Chief	KfW	Kurt.Hildebrand@kfw.de
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