



Reintegration Study Tour Report

Sierra Leone

February 2004

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Cover photo: Ex-combatant black-smith training program that converts used weapons from disarmament phase into tools and farming implements.
Taken by Christian Smida, GTZ Sierra Leone

A. Overview and Background

1. A delegation consisting of representatives from six countries involved in the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP); namely, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, and the MDRP Secretariat¹ conducted a study tour to Sierra Leone from February 9 to 16, 2004. The purpose of the trip was to draw lessons from the Sierra Leone disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program specifically regarding the design of reintegration programs and the challenges facing implementing agencies in undertaking such activities. The visit was also designed to allow participants an opportunity to directly assess the results of such interventions on the lives of ex-combatants and the communities to which they return.

2. The Government of Sierra Leone's national demobilization and reintegration program is generally considered a success, and is now coming to a close after disarming and demobilizing approximately 70,000 combatants, and providing reintegration assistance to almost 50,000. The program effectively covered three phases. The first phase ran from September to December, 1998, when it was interrupted by a deterioration in the security situation, including an attack on Freetown, that effectively suspended the program until the Government and the RUF signed the Lomé Peace Agreement in July 1999. A second phase of the program was again interrupted by a resumption of hostilities in May 2000, although some demobilization and more reintegration work continued thereafter. Finally, concerted diplomatic efforts gradually resulted in an improved political and security environment leading to an agreement between the Government and the RUF to resume a third phase of DDR efforts that started in May 2001. This final phase ran its course with disarmament and demobilization completed by January and February, 2002, respectively. The program continued to provide reintegration assistance and support to all eligible and interested ex-combatants until December 2003.

3. The study tour was organized in three phases:
 - First, a series of meetings in Freetown with Government DDR program representatives, and key partners including the UN, bilateral donors, and NGOs;
 - Second, field visits to two areas of the country (Makeni in the North and Pujehun/Bo in the South) to visit reintegration activities, meet and speak with ex-combatants, and discuss the process and outcome with implementing partners and other local-level stakeholders;² and
 - Third, a wrap-up meeting for all participants to identify as a group key lessons learned and to help organize national plans to put in action relevant lessons.

4. The remainder of this report provides a summary of each of the meetings organized, and field trips undertaken, presents the key lessons learned as identified jointly by all participants to the tour, and presents the individual national action plans as annexes.

¹ List of study tour participants can be found in annex 1.

² List of people met with during the study tour can be found in annex 2.

5. The MDRP Secretariat wishes to thank the Government of Sierra Leone and the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) for hosting and supporting this study tour and to Dr. Francis Kai-kai and the staff of NCDDR in generously sharing their thoughts and insights into the process. The MDRP Secretariat also wishes to acknowledge the valuable inputs of the Commissioner and staff of the National Commission for Social Action, the Deputy SRSG and staff of UNAMSIL, the Chief of OCHA, management and staff of GTZ, DFID and the staff of the Community Reintegration Programme, UNICEF, Caritas/Makeni, the International Rescue Committee, representatives of the local NGOs and CBOs who worked extensively with the demobilization and reintegration program, and most importantly the ex-combatants with whom the study tour meet and whose own efforts were key to the re-establishment of peace in Sierra Leone.

B. Summary of meetings

6. NCDDR. The entire team met with Dr. Francis Kai-kai, Executive Secretary, and other staff of the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR). The NCDDR was responsible for overseeing the implementation of the national DDR program, which was designed following the Lome Peace Agreement to provide social and economic reintegration support to demobilized combatants through the promotion of various measures of social adaptation, community sensitization, and short and long-term economic reintegration assistance. Between 1998 and the end of 2003, when the program closed down, the NCDDR had provided or helped to ensure reintegration assistance to more than 48,000 ex-combatants. Dr. Kai-kai and staff noted a number of issues that proved crucial to the success of the program, including:

- High level political input and support of the process (in the form of the President himself) was critical for program success;
- Clear definition of how the program would work and what it would provide was established and then communicated widely and consistently to all stakeholders;
- It was kept in mind that the overarching goal of the program was to improve security;
- Coordination was key to the success of the process—at both policy and implementation levels-- an inter-agency mechanism (including donors, NGOs and UN agencies) was established and met regularly throughout the process; a Joint Operations Center including civil and military logisticians met daily;
- The challenge of managing many – and at times conflicting-- interests and expectations of the stakeholders was overcome by listening and being flexible, while maintaining focus on the program objective;
- UNAMSIL’s short-term, stop-gap reintegration projects helped getting started in otherwise inaccessible areas;
- Challenge of depending on organizations with very low capacities was ameliorated by investing in capacity building;

- Inclusion of the militia in the DDR process (and the Lome accords) with the same benefits as the rebels;
- Clear establishment of eligibility criteria for disarmament were developed in the Joint Operations Plan, based on intelligence with estimation of the groups' strength and a man to weapons ratio;
- Involvement of a number of different institutions and strategies in preparing the communities to receive ex-combatants critical to success; information and sensitization by media and civil society was important for the understanding of the objectives behind the program, and helped contain communities' fears related to the DDR program.

7. UNICEF. The team meet with Glenis Taylor, Child Protection Officer of UNICEF, which was an early and key player in the DDR process and partner to Government in the implementation of the national program. The role of UNICEF, working in close collaboration with child protection agencies and the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs, in the process included receiving children at disarmament centers, aiding the process of registration, providing interim care, and assisting in reunification and follow-up reintegration support. UNICEF had different reintegration opportunities for the child ex-combatants, with the majority returning to their homes, other being admitted into group homes, foster care or apprenticeships with skilled artisans. For the children going back to school, UNICEF and their child protection partners negotiated with the schools to facilitate return, and provided the school with packages that would benefit all students rather than paying fees for only ex-combatants. Government and NGO capacity was low at the beginning but through a conscious effort, the government resumed the coordination responsibility and international NGOs helped to build the capacity of their national counterparts in order to receive funding from UNICEF. Ms. Taylor highlighted problems encountered at the demobilization stage, and advised against maintaining interim care centers too close to adult demobilization centers, against lengthy interim care stays (maximum 6 weeks), and stressed the need to have child protection agencies at the point of demobilization and to do everything feasible to gather and provide program information to girls and women associated with the male combatants.

8. DFID. Half of the team met with Ian Stuart of the British Department for International Development (DFID), and Sorrie Jawara of the DFID supported Community Reintegration Program (CRP). The CRP focused on expanding reintegration opportunities and restarting economic activities in the North of the country at the time when disarmament was restarted in May 2001. A pilot phase commenced in Port Loko district working closely with NCDDR, and was later extended to Bombali and Tonkali as security allowed. The program encouraged reintegration through community-based activities including infrastructure rehabilitation, agriculture production, micro-enterprise development and water/sanitation projects, with at least 30% of participants having to be ex-combatants. DFID and CRP feel that the inclusion of both groups helped to break down the command structures. Discussions centered around the use of micro-credit, including the difficulties encountered if management capacity is not present, as well as the dilemmas arising from giving grants and providing microcredit at the same time. The

other critical issues was the role of the local leadership, which through proper planning and sensitization had been receptive and ready to assist in the process of reconciliation.

9. GTZ. The other half of the team met with Ferdinand Takatsch, Christian Smida, Fabio Germano, and other members of the GTZ team. GTZ worked extensively with ex-combatants under the national program both with funding from NCDDR as well as other bilateral sources including the German Government and DFID in both the south and east of the country. They served as a strategic partner in the process, and worked through several local NGOs in the implementation of its program, which is centered around vocational training. An instructive video, "Seed of Hope", of this vocational training program was shown to the group as well as a power point presentation on GTZ's approach and organizational set-up. GTZ noted two important elements to the success of their reintegration programs, namely: use of an integrated approach whereby ex-combatants receive training together with members of the communities, preferably in a 50-50 ratio, and close linkages to appropriate skill transfer and local market opportunities.

10. NaCSA. One half of the team met with Kanja Sesay, Commissioner, and staff of the National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA), which was originally established (as the National Commission for Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction) in parallel with the NCDDR to support the populations and communities affected by the war. In the emergency phase the institution monitored resettlement and provided social services through NGOs, and was converted into a national social fund after the emergency was over to capitalize on the institutional experience and momentum. Whereas DDR targets individuals, NaCSA targets communities through three windows: community development, public works and micro-credit. One of the main issues discussed at the meeting was that of targeting ex-combatants vis-à-vis the rest of the population. NaCSA is resisting pressure to target ex-combatants after the closing of NCDDR, however they will stick to community-focused approach aiming at creating employment, attracting both ex-combatants and regular citizens. This move away from targeted assistance is further facilitated by the fact that most of the ex-combatants no longer wish to be categorized in this way.

11. OCHA. The team met with Dennis Johnson, Chief of the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which was actively involved in the Government's emergency and post-war efforts through the collection, analysis and dissemination of humanitarian information; coordination of UN, Government and NGO partners; and as a focal point for the country's annual UN Consolidated Appeal. OCHA also worked with the NCDDR and relevant partners in identifying and proposing solutions for humanitarian assistance needs related to the process of demobilization. Key observations noted were that information exchange and close coordination among the partners — weaker in earlier phases-- proved critical to the ultimate success of the program in the final phase; NGOs were initially hesitant to participate in the DDR program due to the nature of the target beneficiary group; and while there remained some concerns about the effectiveness of the reintegration assistance, no significant incidents have occurred or problems reported regarding the return of ex-combatants to their communities.

12. IRC. The team met with representatives of the International Rescue Committee, one of the partners to UNICEF under the child soldier demobilization process, running interim care centers and providing reintegration support. Several key issues were noted as important to program success including (i) reuniting child soldiers with families and communities as quickly as possible, (ii) working with community welfare committees to help in family tracing and to mediate when problems arose during the reintegration process, and (iii) use of traditional mediation and cleansing ceremonies to facilitate the return of children. It was also noted that girls associated with fighting forces were often forced to return to their partners due to the lack of economic or social alternatives.

13. UNAMSIL. The team met with Alan Doss, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General and UNDP Resident Representative, Desmond Malloy and staff of the Reintegration Unit of the UN Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). UNAMSIL, after having been involved in the Disarmament and Demobilization phases, supported the government in the delivery of reintegration activities. Using funds from the UN Human Security Fund, UNAMSIL launched the Stopgap Program, which offered short-term employment of ex-combatants through labor-intensive community infrastructure projects that included participation and close interaction with the community in the most volatile areas where very little institutional capacity existed. The Deputy SRSG highlighted a number of issues related to the program, including:

- Critical role of Government in leading process (both President and NCDDR);
- Equal treatment of all parties helped build confidence and facilitated implementation;
- Clear time-line and benchmarks for program implementation critical to success;
- Coordination at policy and implementation levels key; technical input to political process essential;
- Importance of group disarmament and discouraging cash-for-weapons image also critical to success;
- Avoid cash payments in or in close proximity (in time and location) to demobilization camps;
- Important to minimize the length of cantonment and disperse demobilized soldiers as quickly as possible in order to dissolve command structure due to volatility of combatant groups; and
- Start planning and setting up mechanisms for reintegration as soon as possible (even when political environment and access not completely conducive).

14. The Deputy SRSG concluded by noting that while reintegration support was expensive, it was essential for stability. He added, however, that this support should be kept short-term realizing that the program cannot do everything.

Fairo/Zimmi/Bo Field Trip

15. One half of the group traveled to Fairo and Zimmi (Pujehun District) and Bo town to meet with ex-combatant trainees and those engaged in economic activities, to meet with

NCDDR staff at provincial headquarters (Bo), and to discuss with implementing partners the challenges and results of their work with ex-combatants. The visit was made possible through the assistance of UNAMSIL Air Operations which arranged a special helicopter flight from Freetown.

16. In Fairo, the team met with the Paramount Chief and elders of Sorogbema Chiefdom and visited two reintegration activities being implemented by the national NGO MAPCO, overseen by GTZ and financed by DFID. The first, the Fairo Technical Education Center (TEC), is a centrally located training facility capable of handling 125 trainees, which offers several different skills options and includes a complementary cross-section of “life skills” training in literacy, civic education, HIV/AIDS, etc. The second, was a community-based traditional apprenticeship scheme in Ghon that links local artisans with approximately 10 trainees, and which provides training opportunities for ex-combatants while also enhancing the local artisan’s skills and infrastructure. The advantages of these local “training and production centers” include lower investment costs (as compared to the fixed training center), improved absorption of the dispersed ex-combatant population, and closer links to market forces. Both types of training run from 9-12 months and include 50% community members.

17. In Zimmi the team visited several sites where ex-combatants trained at the local TEC were currently employed in the informal trade or construction sectors. The team also visited an agricultural training site where trainees reported no difficulties in securing land upon returning home, nor in terms of their acceptance by the communities.

18. In Bo, the team met with NCDDR staff, training partners, a small group of trained ex-combatants and visited two ex-combatant businesses and one partner training facility. The NCDDR staff noted the importance of mobilizing the community in support of reintegration efforts through modern media and traditional channels (particularly religious leaders) and linking with community reconstruction efforts, observed that it was necessary to finance the extension of implementing partner capacity to cover the dispersed group of ex-combatants in the region, and that while reintegration is far from completed, they felt that it is now best handled as a general community assistance program and not through targeted efforts. The implementing partners felt that 6 months of training was generally too short, but that the provision of the tool kits had aided the chances that ex-combatants will find jobs. They also noted highlighted the difficulties caused by delays in payment of subsistence allowances and some behavioral problems among ex-combatants which required counseling by the partners. Certain ex-combatants indicated that they were discriminated against when seeking jobs based on their training certificates, but noted that they had not encountered any great problems in reintegrating back into the community. It should be noted, however, that these were predominantly pro-Government militia forces in Bo, as well as Pujehun district.

Makeni Field Trip

19. The other half of the group traveled to Makeni (Bombali district), which was the former stronghold of RUF and had received many ex-combatants, including former child soldiers, following the end of the war. The trip was facilitated by NCDDR, DFID, and

Caritas Makeni. The trip started with a combined briefing from staff of the three organizations, as well as a demobilized RUF soldier who had worked as a liaison officer between the government and RUF, and been instrumental in convincing others to disarm.

20. The team visited a mechanics shop, a bike renters association, a carpentry shop, a tailor shop and a vocational training facility, and spoke with owners/trainers and ex-combatants. Observations arising from these visits included: insufficient length of training period; the fact that the final certificate was given based on attendance and completion, not actual skills of the trainee; the importance of ex-combatants and regular civilians training together; and that the later groups of ex-combatant trainees seemed easier to deal with than the first ones.

21. The team also visited a primary school that had received a number of child ex-combatants, and talked to the head master, teachers and five students between the age of 13 and 17 who had participated in the war from two to four years. The staff noted that the children who used to be in the bush acted differently than their classmates, and could be more violent at times. However, the children with whom the team spoke did not admit to having many problems fitting in, though some were teased in the beginning. For the most part, other children were not aware of their status until the packages to the school or their uniform and backpack revealed it.

22. The team ended the trip with a meeting with representatives from NCDDR, Ministry of Youth and Sports, NaCSA, the Paramount Chief, the police, the military, Caritas, the local radio station and the NGOs/CBOs Civil Society Movement, Citizen Rights, Women's Association, and National Social Security Trust. Each group highlighted the following key lessons learned:

- *NaCSA* noted that the reintegration process had failed to deal with foreigners (e.g. Liberians and Guineans) and stressed the importance of involving the host communities in reintegration.
- The *police* pointed to the importance of the line ministries' involvement, so they can continue with the relevant follow-up such as aiding with employment and possibly further training.
- *Caritas* did not consider six months of training to be enough and suggested that more money should be allocated for this activity. They furthermore advocated for a system capable of monitoring the ex-combatants after the termination of the DDR program.
- *NCDDR* supported the idea of a system to monitor the welfare of the ex-combatants, including those that were reintegrated into the army and police as they had indications that these ex-combatants were not doing well. It was also noted that the timing of the special court had discouraged some ex-combatants from claiming reintegration benefits, and that it is important to secure funding for reintegration in spite of the donors' declining attention after demobilization. Finally, community sensitization was stressed along with social reintegration and the preaching of forgiveness through traditional structures.

- The representative of the *military* confirmed that ex-combatants who had entered the military were having difficulties, noting that illiteracy had hindered the creation of a professional army. He therefore stressed the importance of literacy and numeracy training.
- *The Women's Association* noted that many ex-combatants only participated in the training in order to receive cash allowances. Their observation was that not only did they create trouble during training, they were also likely to end in crime and prostitution after the training ended.

C. Joint Observations of the Study Tour

23. The study tour ended with a half day wrap-up meeting held outside of Freetown. The purpose of the meeting was to brainstorm on key observations resulting from the study tour, refine these observations in small working groups, and to provide input to the individual country programs to identify and determine how best to implement those observations most relevant to the national programs. The conclusions of these discussions are summarized below, organized by Program Design/Policy Issues, and Implementation Issues.

24. Program Design/Policy Issues

- High level political involvement/commitment to DDR is critical to program success;
- Strategic regional/sub-regional approach to DDR is needed in some contexts;
- Coherent partnership is necessary among all the stakeholders under the coordination of the relevant government agency;
- To ensure national ownership and continuity even after the DDR, the line ministries should be involved throughout program implementation;
- Reintegration programs need to be flexible in design and implementation to respond to the dynamic environment and to take advantage of market opportunities;
- While flexible, reintegration strategies should be clear and focused in design on short-term measures;
- Links to non-targeted community support by other partners is key to success and sustainability of program objectives;
- Parallel efforts in support of IDPs and refugees improves success of DDR activities;
- All stakeholders should have a common vision of what the program will, and will not include, and this vision should be widely disseminated;
- Comprehensive sensitization is critical in all stages of the DDR program-- civil society and the media need to be involved and support the process;
- Technical level coordination committees proved critical to success of program;
- Reintegration assistance should be demand driven;
- Disarmament and payment of (cash) reinsertion benefits must be de-linked through information campaign as well as time and space between two actions;
- Where they are part of the program, decentralized payments to ex-combatants help support local economy and, in turn, economic reintegration;

- Reintegration support should be optional as mandatory support can discourage self-reintegration;
- The private sector should be invited to participate in program design;
- Vocational training in general, and a diversified selection of training options, proved effective in Sierra Leone;
- A clear strategy needs to be in place for receiving and handling female ex-combatants, and relevant protection agencies should be involved;
- Establishing a strong network of partners involved in child protection is important;
- Security sector reform should be done in parallel with DDR;
- Root causes of conflict, e.g. corruption, mismanagement of natural resources, bad governance, marginalization, etc. should be considered and dealt with where feasible within program.

25. Implementation Issues

- Avoid delays between demobilization and reintegration;
- Timely financing is essential for successful implementation of all aspects of the reintegration process;
- Parallel efforts to assist the community at the same time as ex-combatants improves reintegration;
- Linkage of (reintegration) sub-projects to socio-economic needs of community (i.e., link training and strategies such as traditional apprenticeships to local market needs) improves success;
- Technical certificates should not make reference to the program, but rather refer exclusively to the training provider;
- Measuring the quality of training after completion proved difficult;
- Transformation of weapons into tools is good use of available resources and has a positive psychological effect;
- Utilization of light/simple equipment and technologies in training activities increased use of labor and improved market entry by trainees;
- Training subsistence allowances facilitated participation in training opportunities but caused a distortion in the selection of reintegration activities that could have a negative impact on employability;
- Toolkits tied to training improved employability of ex-combatants;
- Information system for the identification, registration and verification of ex-combatants must be robust;
- Neutral and independent financial management unit to oversee program funds strengthens credibility and facilitates fund raising;
- Support for social reintegration, which is best facilitated through local culture and traditional practices, should be closely linked to economic reintegration.
- Given the limited availability of psycho-social support, counseling and life skills training as part of technical training proved helpful in improving the impact of training;
- Group home concept for older child soldiers was seen as creative solution;

- Clear communication of what will be included in reintegration packages is important in managing expectations.

D. Next steps

26. Finally, as part of the wrap-up meeting, the participants agreed on a structure for individual country reports that would be used to inform other national program staff in their respective countries upon their return. It was also agreed that these individual country reports would be submitted to the MDRP Secretariat for inclusion in this study tour report. These national reports, including specific action plans to implement key recommendations, can be found in Annexes 4 to 9.

Annex 1 : Study tour participants

Angola:

Mr. Amilcar Chieva José Mateus Candeias

Director Geral Adjunto, Instituto de Reintegração Sócio-Profissional dos Ex-Militares

Mr. João de Jesus Ventura

Instituto de Reintegração Sócio-Profissional dos Ex-Militares

Mr. José Pinotes

UNDP/CTA

Burundi:

Mr. Isaie Nibizi

Directeur des opérations

Central African Republic :

Mr. Côme Zoumara

Conseiller en Matière de Défense Globale, Présidence de la République

Republic of Congo

Ms. Madeleine Yila

High Commission for Reintegration of Ex-combatants

Rwanda

Mr. John Zigira

Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission

Mr. Alphonse Nkusi

Chief Operations Officer, Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission

Uganda:

Mr. Francis Apiku

Program Manager, Uganda Veterans Assistance Board Reintegration

Mr. Moses Draku

Amnesty Commission

MDRP/World Bank:

Ms. Ellen van der Laan

Adviser to the Country Director for South-Central Africa and the Great Lakes

Mr. Sean Bradley

Senior Operations Officer/Trust Fund Administrator

Ms. Roisin De Burca

Senior Demobilization and Reintegration Officer

Ms. Caroline Bahnson

Operations Analyst

Annex 2 : People met

National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR)

Dr. Francis Kai-Kai, Executive Secretary, and staff, including in Bo and Makeni
Abu Bakar Bah, Regional Reintegration Officer

United Nation's Children Fund (UNICEF)

Glenis Taylor, Child Protection Officer

Department for International Development UK (DFID)

Ian Stuart, DFID Representative

Sorrie Jawara, Coordinator of the Community Reintegration Programme (CRP)

Annette Isatu Kamara, CRP Project Officer Makeni

National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA)

Kanja Sesay, Commissioner, and staff

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)

Ferdinand Takatsch, Country Manager

Fabio Germano, Reintegration Program Coordinator

Christian Smida

UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

Dennis Johnson, Chief

International Rescue Committee (IRC)

Christof Kurz, Deputy Country Director, and staff

UN Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)

Alan Doss, Deputy SRSG/Resident Representative UNDP

Desmond Malloy, Officer in Charge, DDR coordination section, and staff

Caritas Makeni

Abu

Memunatu Bangura, Project Officer for Women

Bo, Pujehun, Zimmi and Makeni

Paramount Chief and elders of Sorogbema Chiefdom

CBO's, military, police and local media of Makeni

Representatives of GTZ, MAPCO, Technical Education Centers and Ex-combatants

Annex 3 : Program

| Day | Group/Individuals to Meet | Issues for Consideration |
|---|--|--|
| Sunday Feb 8/ Monday, Feb 9 | Arrive Lungi airport, Freetown | |
| | | |
| Tuesday, Feb 10 (in Freetown) | 8:30 Team meeting at Lacs Guest house | All participants to meet at Lacs at 8:30 am to discuss program and organization |
| | 10:00 NCDDR (F. Kai-Kai, P.K. Lansana) | Overview of program, key policy issues, program design and management structure |
| | 13:00 UNICEF (G. Taylor) | Overview of child program, key policy issues, program design and management structure |
| | 16:00 DFID (Ian Stuart, Sorrie Jawara) | Perception of reintegration efforts (half of the group) |
| | Dinner at Mamba Point Hotel with NCDDR M&E and reintegration consultants | Reintegration, monitoring and evaluation |
| | | |
| Wednesday, Feb 11 (in Freetown) | 9:00 National Social Action Commission (K. Sesay and staff) | Discuss national community reintegration and recovery program, assistance to IDPs/refugees, links to DDR efforts (half of the group) |
| | 9:00 GTZ (F. Germano and staff) | Overview of GTZ reintegration efforts, lessons learned, possible field visit contacts (other half of the group) |
| | 11:00 OCHA (Dennis Johnson and staff) | Role of NGOs in community reintegration, DDR, links to larger recovery efforts |
| | 15:00 Key NGO partner - IRC | Program activities, implementation challenges, program results, relations with Government in implementation |
| | 16:00 UNAMSIL (A. Doss) | Perception of reintegration efforts, short-term stop-gap efforts, field visit sites/contacts |
| | | |
| Thursday, Feb 12- Friday, Feb 13 | Field trips (two groups) to North/West, and South/East: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Group 1 to Makeni ▪ Group 2 to Bo, Pujehun and Kenema | Meet with and explore in depth with ex-combatants, implementing agencies, and community members their assessment of reintegration process and results. Group 1: Apiko, Candeias, Nkusi, Yila, Zoumara, De Burca, Bahnson. Group 2: Draku, Nibizi, Pinotes, Ventura, Zigira, Van der Laan, Bradley. |
| | | |
| Saturday, Feb 14 | Cotton Club beach hotel | Team discussion of observations, conclusions and recommendations for application to MDRP national programs |
| | | |
| Sunday, Feb 15 | Cotton Club | Day off |
| | | |
| Monday, Feb 16 | 12:00 NCDDR (F. Kai-Kai) | Wrap-up and thanks |
| | Depart Lungi | |

Annex 4 : Angola Country Report



REPUBLICA DE ANGOLA
MINISTÉRIO DA ASSISTENCIA E REINserÇÃO SOCIAL
INSTITUTO DE REINTEGRAÇÃO SOCIO PROFISSIONAL DOS EX-MILITARES
= IRSEM =

Relatório de missão à Serra Leoa



Composição da missão :

Amílcar Candeias, Director Geral adjunto do IRSEM

João Ventura, Chefe de Departamento do IRSEM
Central

José Manuel Pinotes, Conselheiro Técnico Principal do
Projecto Especial BM/PNUD

Datas: de 6 a 17/02/04

1. Introdução

1.1. Objectivos da missão

A missão realizada à Serra Leoa visava os seguintes objectivos:

- Conhecer o Programa de Desmobilização e Reintegração (PDR) executado neste País com o apoio de um Fundo Multi Doadores gerido pelo Banco Mundial;
- Identificar os aspectos chave mais salientes das suas diferentes fases;
- Verificar da possível aplicabilidade de algumas das opções retidas neste País no quadro do PGDR em Angola;
- Seleccionar as mais importantes lições aprendidas.

Participaram na Serra Leoa representantes de 6 Países do MDRP e quadros responsáveis do Banco Mundial (ver lista de participantes em anexo 1). A missão cumpriu o programa incluído no anexo 2.

1.2. Situação da Serra Leoa e contexto do programa

O Programa de Desarmamento, Desmobilização e Reintegração (DDR) da Serra Leoa foi lançado em 1998 como um esforço para consolidar a paz e a estabilidade no País após o regresso ao poder de S. E. o Presidente Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. O Comité Nacional para o Desarmamento, Desmobilização e Reintegração (NCDDR) e o seu Secretariado Executivo foram estabelecidos para guiar a implementação do programa DDR, que visava originalmente cerca de 45,000 combatentes das forças da Frente Revolucionária Unida (RUF), do Concelho das Forças Armadas (AFRC), do antigo Exército da Serra Leoa (SLA) e da Força de Defesa Civil (CDF).³ O Programa foi concebido para financiar cinco grandes tipos de actividades: (i) identificação, registo e fornecimento de abastecimento essencial aos Ex-Combatentes durante o breve período de acantonamento; (ii) orientação pré-desmobilização, desmobilização e transporte de Ex-Combatentes para as suas comunidades; (iii) um conjunto de donativos sociais para apoio à transição; (iv) apoio à reintegração económica e social; e (v) custos gerais de operação, gestão e assistência técnica.

A primeira fase do programa DDR decorreu de Setembro a Dezembro de 1998, durante a qual forma desmobilizados cerca de 3,200 combatentes. Nesta fase, o programa foi interrompido pela deterioração das condições de segurança e o subsequente ataque a Freetown, em Janeiro de 1999, o qual conduziu à suspensão efectiva do programa até Julho de 1999, data em que o Governo e a RUF assinaram o Acordo de Paz de Lomé. Na sequência da assinatura do Acordo de Paz, as forças de manutenção da paz desarmaram com sucesso quase 19,000 combatentes (incluindo crianças) e o Governo desmobilizou cerca de 17,500 e procedeu à descarga de 16,600 Ex-Combatentes, no que agora é considerada como a Fase II do programa. Contudo, em Maio de 2000, o programa foi de novo interrompido pelo reacender das hostilidades e a tomada como reféns, pela RUF, de 500 capacetes azuis da ONU.

Esta interrupção do processo originou um significativo atraso no programa. Não obstante, foi ainda mantida alguma dinâmica entre Maio de 2000 e Maio de 2001, traduzida no desarmamento de mais 2,600 combatentes, na sua desmobilização e acção psicossocial, na integração de mais

³ No momento em que o desarmamento foi concluído (no início de 2002), verificou-se que a previsão inicial de Ex-Combatentes foi excedida em mais de 60%.

11,000 Ex-Combatentes nos programas de reintegração e no reforço da Comissão Nacional (NCDDR) no período de transição, através da análise, correcção e melhoria dos sistemas e procedimentos e um melhor planeamento para uma futura expansão do programa.

Em Maio de 2001, os esforços diplomáticos realizados no final de 2000 e início de 2001 produziram efeitos e, como consequência, verificou-se uma melhoria gradual da situação política e de segurança, conduzindo a um acordo entre o Governo e a RUF para recomeçar a terceira fase do programa DDR. O programa foi oficialmente relançado em Maio de 2003, tendo o desarmamento sido formalmente concluído em 11 de Janeiro de 2002 e a desmobilização completada, no essencial, em Fevereiro de 2002. O programa funcionou até Dezembro de 2003 para fornecer assistência de reintegração e apoio a todos os Ex-Combatentes elegíveis e interessados. Presentemente, o programa está a encerrar para o público em geral, embora decorram as auditorias e avaliações finais.

2. Observações chave relevantes

Todos os membros dos vários países participantes na missão efectuaram uma reflexão conjunta que identificou os pontos chave do processo de desmobilização e reintegração na Serra Leoa.

Em termos de *concepção* do programa, os aspectos chave retidos foram os seguintes:

- Deve existir um desenho claro e focalizado do programa desde as primeiras etapas;
- O programa deve ser flexível, mas com uma implementação bem dirigida;
- Deve existir uma visão comum entre todos os actores relativamente à concepção;
- A descentralização dos pagamentos aos Ex-Combatentes contribui para reactivar a economia local;
- Todas as partes devem ser envolvidas, a todos os níveis;
- A reintegração social é decisiva para a reintegração económica;
- A integração dos diferentes pacotes de reintegração deve ser tida em conta no desenho do programa;
- As opções de reintegração não devem ser obrigatórias, mas facultativas;
- As comissões responsáveis pelo programa desempenham um papel chave a todos os níveis;
- O sector privado deve ser convidado a participar, logo na fase de desenho do programa;
- Deve existir uma boa articulação entre a reintegração dos Ex-Combatentes e os membros das comunidades;
- Deve ser evitado o perigo de se estabelecer uma ligação entre desarmamento e pagamentos;
- Deve haver uma boa identificação, registo e verificação dos Ex-Combatentes;
- Há necessidade de uma estratégia clara focalizada nos Ex-Combatentes;
- É desejável o desenvolvimento de esforços paralelos de reintegração de deslocados e refugiados;
- Devem ser evitados atrasos na desmobilização e reintegração;
- A reforma do sector da segurança deve caminhar em paralelo com o programa DDR;
- É necessária uma gestão financeira neutra e independente para monitorar os fundos do programa;
- As causas profundas do conflito devem ser atacadas para evitar o retorno de situações de instabilidade.

Em termos de *política, estratégia, sensibilização e informação*, foram anotados os seguintes pontos:

- Um Programa de sensibilização global é fundamental durante todo o processo;
- A sociedade civil e os meios de comunicação social devem estar plenamente mobilizados para apoiar o processo;
- É fundamental uma coordenação perfeita entre os parceiros aos diferentes níveis;
- É necessário que os Ministérios sectoriais estejam envolvidos para assegurarem a continuidade do processo uma vez concluído o PGDR;
- É de todo desejável um comprometimento político ao mais alto nível (na Serra Leoa, a Comissão Nacional de Desarmamento, Desmobilização e Reintegração foi presidida pelo próprio Presidente da República);
- É importante haver uma articulação entre o Programa Nacional e os Programas implementados pelos Países vizinhos, num quadro regional e subregional;
- Necessidade de estabelecer uma rede dos vários parceiros de implementação, no sentido de melhorar a eficácia dos serviços de reintegração;
- Uma ágil disponibilização dos fundos do Programa é essencial para o êxito de todas as suas etapas;

Especificamente, as actividades de *reintegração* foram guiadas pelo seguinte:

- Uma constante articulação dos diferentes Sub Projectos de Reintegração às necessidades sócio-económicas das comunidades;
- A perspectiva de curto prazo do programa ligada à continuação das actividades por outros parceiros é fundamental para o seu êxito e sustentabilidade;
- A planificação da assistência de reintegração deve ser dirigida à procura;
- A transformação das armas em ferramentas (utensílios de trabalho) constituiu uma boa fonte de matéria prima e um factor de efeito psicológico positivo;
- Os conjuntos de ferramentas ligados à formação melhoram a empregabilidade dos beneficiários;
- A diversidade de opções de formação eleva o impacto do programa;
- A necessidade de estabelecer melhores ligações entre a formação e as necessidades e oportunidades do mercado local;
- Os esforços para beneficiar, em paralelo, os membros da comunidade de acolhimento, melhoram a própria reintegração dos Ex-Militares;
- A utilização de equipamento ligeiro e simples conduz a uma maior intensidade de mão-de-obra e sua aplicação posterior no trabalho;
- A reintegração social é facilitada quando respeitadas a cultura e tradição locais;
- Constitui um desafio medir a qualidade da formação após a sua realização;
- A formação técnica deve ser completada com educação cívica, alfabetização, sensibilização sobre DST, etc.
- A certificação da formação deve ser feita pelo próprio fornecedor deste serviço;
- Os subsídios de formação facilitam a participação dos beneficiários nestes serviços de reintegração.

3. Lições aprendidas

Em termos globais, a missão retirou ainda algumas conclusões chave para o processo de desmobilização e reintegração de Ex-Militares em Angola:

1. ***Oportunidade e efectividade de um programa DDR.*** Durante a missão constatou-se que 2 a 3 anos após a desmobilização, um programa especificamente dirigido a Ex-Militares deixa de ter sentido, assim como ficou clara a esta visão, sobretudo, na comunidade

- doadora,. Sendo fundamental que a efectividade de um programa deste tipo ocorra no mais breve espaço de tempo após o desarmamento e a desmobilização dos Ex-Militares. No caso de Angola, não fará sentido que o PGDR atrase por mais tempo o seu arranque, sob pena de mais dias menos dias a comunidade internacional começar a questionar a oportunidade de um tal programa especificamente dirigido aos Ex-Militares.
2. As **transferências de fundos** para o Programa e deste para os diferentes parceiros de implementação deve ser feita nas datas acordadas, evitando atrasos que afectam a credibilidade do processo e causam insatisfação junto do grupo alvo. Em particular é desejável que os kits de ferramentas, quando previstos, sejam distribuídos imediatamente após a formação.
 3. Uma **estratégia adequada** para a execução prática de um Programa como o PGDR, deverá ter em conta o papel dos parceiros estratégicos e institucionais. Verificou-se que uma das condições base para o sucesso do PGDR na Serra Leoa foi o estabelecimento de um conjunto alargado de parcerias que apresentou, no essencial, três grandes vantagens:
 - Um ambiente de grande compreensão de todas as partes, incluindo a comunidade internacional para as naturais matérias de execução de um programa que este tipo comporta;
 - Uma mobilização adicional de fundos das cooperações bilaterais da ordem de 40% do valor do programa, o que permitiu aumentar a sustentabilidade das acções (perspectivas de maior prazo), envolver outros grupos afectados pela guerra ao nível da comunidade e concretizar iniciativas mais amplas em matéria de desenvolvimento que o PGDR não poderia financiar;
 - Envolver bons parceiros estratégicos, como GTZ/Serra Leoa, UNICEF e o PAM que reforçaram as capacidades da Comissão Nacional e dinamizaram excelentes iniciativas de reintegração ao nível local, enquadrando e reforçando os parceiros de implementação (ONGs, Autoridades Locais, Organizações Comunitárias de Base, Igrejas, etc.);
 - Recursos humanos para implementar o PGDR. Apercebemo-nos que desde o director executivo do Programa até ao técnico de base foram todos recrutados e remunerados pelo próprio Programa o que permitiu níveis de profissionalismo e desempenho muita acima da média da Serra Leoa.

4. Potenciais aplicações ao PGDR / Angola

Por indicação dos Técnicos do Banco Mundial, foi recomendado a cada país participante que, a partir dos pontos chave identificados, se estabelecesse uma proposta para sua implementação efectiva nos programas DDR nacionais. No caso de Angola, a missão considera que as seguintes experiências poderiam ser potencialmente consideradas:

| Ponto chave | Prazos | Responsável | Observação |
|----------------------|---------------|----------------|---|
| Efectividade do PGDR | Março 2004 | BM/DG do IRSEM | Dependente da aceitação do BM de que Angola preenche os critérios de elegibilidade. |
| Reforço do IRSEM | Mar.- Jun. 04 | DG/BM | Para reforçar o IRSEM são necessárias três acções complementares: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Melhorar a estrutura de incentivos dos actuais quadros; – Reforçar os seus quadros com Consultores |

| | | | |
|------------------------------|------------|-------------------------|---|
| | | | <p>Nacionais e Internacionais;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reforçar os meios materiais. |
| Sensibilização e informação | Permanente | IRSEM / DIAR | <p>O plano de trabalho para 2004 já prevê a realização desta actividade. Em concreto, prevêem-se:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Criação de um Boletim regular de informação; - Realização de inquéritos e sondagens ao grupo alvo; - Campanhas de divulgação e de sensibilização da opinião pública através dos media; - Implementar a segunda etapa do PRONASAR (Programa Nacional de Aconselhamento, Informação e referência) junto das comunidades, autoridades locais e tradicionais e grupo alvo. |
| Estabelecimento de parcerias | Permanente | IRSEM / DG e Dir. Prov. | <p>O IRSEM, com base no Manual de Implementação do PGDR, tem previstos um conjunto de acções com parceiros institucionais, estratégicos e de implementação que permitirão materializar efectivas parcerias na execução do programa.</p> |
| Mobilização de recursos | Permanente | IRSEM / DG | <p>Já desenvolvidos contactos com a Cooperação Espanhola, Italiana e Canadá.</p> <p>Novas oportunidades de financiamentos adicionais serão exploradas para alargar a abrangência e a sustentabilidade das acções do PGDR.</p> |

Annex 5 : Burundi Country Report

CNDRR / SE
DEPARTEMENT OPERATIONS

Bujumbura, le 08/03/2004

N°.... / DOps/2004

A Monsieur le Secrétaire Exécutif

Objet : Rapport de Mission
en Sierra Leone

Monsieur le Secrétaire Exécutif,

J'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre en annexe le rapport de mission que j'ai effectuée en Sierra Leone du 10 au 16 février 2004. Après une brève introduction retraçant le contexte de la mission, les trois parties du rapport se suivent dans l'ordre suivant :

- I. Présentation et discussion du programme sierra leonnaise
- II. Visites de terrain
- III. Mise en commun des enseignements tirés du voyage d'étude

Vous en souhaitant bonne réception, veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Secrétaire Exécutif, l'assurance de ma considération très distinguée.

Col NIBIZI Isaïe

Directeur des Opérations

CPI à :

- Col SINARINZI Mamert, Conseiller Opérations,
- Mlle BAHNSON Caroline, Banque Mondiale.

RAPPORT DE MISSION EN SIERRA LEONE

Organisée par la Banque Mondiale, la mission à laquelle j'ai pris part en Sierra Leone était conçue comme un voyage d'étude et d'informations sur les aspects réinsertion et réintégration socio-économique d'un programme national DDR arrivant à son terme.

Y participaient des délégués provenant de la région des Grands-Lacs (Angola, Burundi, Congo Brazzaville, Ouganda, République Centrafricaine et Rwanda), presque tous en charge des opérations au sein de leur structure nationale. Le programme, conçu par une équipe de la Banque Mondiale composée de personnes ayant joué des rôles-clé dans le processus DDR Sierra leonais, s'articulait autour de 3 axes complémentaires :

- a) Présentation et discussion des programmes par le Secrétaire Exécutif de la commission DDR sierra leonaise, le Représentant de l'UNICEF à Freetown, le Directeur de GTZ's Freetown, le Président de la Commission Nationale de l'Action Sociale, le Représentant de l'OCHA, un Représentant de l'UNAMSIL (la Mission Onusienne en Sierra Leone) et du PNUD.
- b) Visite de terrain et discussions avec les agences partenaires d'exécution des projets de réintégration, les ex-combattants en cours de réintégration , le personnel décentralisé e la CNDDR ainsi que les communautés d'accueil.
- c) Mise en commun des expériences et des leçons apprises par les différentes délégations avec la facilitation de l'équipe de la Banque Mondiale.

I. Présentation et Discussion du Programme

▪ Réunion à la CNDDR avec le Dr Francis KAI-KAI

Après une brève introduction par le team leader Banque Mondiale, le Dr KAI-KAI, Secrétaire Exécutif de la CNDDR a fait un brillant exposé sur le programme national de Sierra Leone. Il a commencé par rappeler le contexte historique et politique dans lequel ce programme s'est inscrit. Il a continué en présentant les stratégies adoptées pour les différentes composantes du programme, les problèmes rencontrés et les solutions mises en place pour les résoudre :

a) Concernant le désarmement :

Pour cet aspect des programmes DDR et je pense que la leçon est valable partout, la volonté politique des parties au conflit est certes un élément indispensable mais elle doit être solidement soutenue par une force coercitive conséquente ayant un mandat et des moyens adéquats. Ainsi, en Sierra Leone, la première tentative de désarmement a connu de nombreux ratés malgré les différents accords de cessez-le-feu signés par les parties belligérantes. Il a fallu l'intervention massive de l'ONU (17 000 hommes) et surtout l'appui décisif du contingent britannique pour mener à bien cette délicate opération.

b) Sur la démobilisation

- La sensibilisation s'est révélée un élément primordial du programme. Une sensibilisation orientée vers les combattants des différentes factions mais aussi vers la société civile et les acteurs politiques.
- Le séjour des combattants dans des zones ou des camps de cantonnement doit être le plus court possible afin de limiter les tricheries sur le statut de combattant qui doit être défini de la manière la plus précise possible.

c) Concernant la réintégration

Elle doit d'abord être une réintégration dans la société et dans la communauté. Pour ce faire, les programmes DDR doivent créer des liens étroits avec la société par l'intermédiaire des agences gouvernementales, des agences internationales, du secteur privé formel ou informel, etc...

Prétendre fournir un emploi à des milliers d'ex-combattants dans des pays à peine sortie de profondes crises est une utopie. Par contre, il faut tout faire pour qu'une majorité d'ex-combattants ne se sentent pas exclus et marginalisés. Un important travail de sensibilisation est également nécessaire de ce point de vue.

Le programme de réintégration de Sierra Leone a fait appel à un grand panel de partenaires. Outre la Banque Mondiale dans le rôle principal, la coopération bilatérale et multilatérale, les ONG, le secteur privé (dans une moindre mesure) ont été sollicités. Ceci implique évidemment un immense travail de coordination et le Secrétariat Exécutif a fort bien relevé ce défi.

▪ **Rencontre avec le Représentant de l'UNICEF**

6 845 enfants soldats dont 8% de filles ont bénéficié du programme de réintégration en Sierra Leone.

Une bonne partie de ces enfants avaient subi des traumatismes psychologiques sévères et leur prise en charge dans un pays sans structure de soins appropriés n'a pas toujours été facile. Des centres de soins ont été organisés où les enfants traumatisés passaient jusqu'à 6 mois avant leur réunification avec les familles.

Pour les enfants réintégrant le système scolaire normal, le programme a associé dans son assistance, des enfants de la communauté ne faisant pas partie du groupe cible.

▪ **Rencontre avec la Commission Nationale de l'Action Sociale**

La Commission Nationale de l'Action Sociale est en quelque sorte la structure qui est en train de prendre le relais de la CNDDR. Ses interventions concernent le développement des communautés à la base et elle est présente sur tout le territoire national. Son groupe cible, c'est la jeunesse sierra leonaise y compris, bien entendu, les jeunes ex-combattants.

Elle reçoit les financements de la Banque Mondiale, de la Banque Islamique, du PNUD, de la Coopération Britannique(DFID), de la Coopération Française, etc...

Dans les projets de développement qu'elle initie(construction d'écoles, de centres de santé, de pistes rurales, d'adduction d'eau, etc...), la communauté bénéficiaire apporte une contribution de 10% du montant du projet dont 1% en cash et 9% en nature.

Elle a mis en place également un fonds de micro-crédit qui a l'air de bien fonctionner.

▪ **Rencontre avec le Représentant de l'OCHA**

Cette rencontre avait pour but de mettre en lumière l'indispensable coordination des différentes agences travaillant dans un pays en crise ou en sortie de crise.

▪ **Rencontre avec le Représentant du PNUD**

Cette rencontre a été très bénéfique, surtout pour nos délégations dont les programmes nationaux ne font que commencer. Le Représentant du PNUD, qui est aussi le N° 2 de l'UNAMSIL, a mis en évidence un certain nombre de principes qu'il convient d'avoir toujours à l'esprit dans l'élaboration et l'exécution des programmes DDR :

- Le désarmement et la démobilisation sont des processus techniques mais aussi politiques. Un dialogue permanent doit s'établir entre les acteurs sur le terrain (le Secrétariat

Exécutif) et les instances politiques sinon, le risque est grand de voir les processus techniques pris en otage par les politiques et leurs ambitions.

- Il faut autant que faire se peut éviter les décisions unilatérales qui risquent de saper la fragile confiance entre les parties.
- Eviter que le désarmement soit perçu comme un achat d'armes détenues par les combattants.
- Eviter des cantonnements prolongés (risque d'émeute dans les camps)
- Les allocations, dans la mesure du possible, doivent être payées après le retour dans les communautés de réinstallation.
- Ne pas attendre la démobilisation pour planifier la réintégration.
- Ne jamais négliger l'aspect réconciliation dans les programmes DDR (les 2-3 premières années de l'après conflit est une période très vulnérable. Le retour au conflit a une très forte probabilité.)
- Le désarmement et la démobilisation exigent, en plus du consensus politique, des forces neutres suffisantes et un mandat approprié. Comme contre exemples, il a cité les cas de la somalie (Restore Hope) et du Rwanda (MINUAR).

II Visites de Terrain

Le Bureau Régional de Bo est l'une des structures décentralisées du programme DDR de Sierra Leone située dans le Sud du pays.

Dans cette région, le groupe cible pour la réintégration comptait dix mille ex-combattants dont un faible pourcentage de femmes. Nous n'avons pas pu avoir de chiffre concernant les enfants. 90% du groupe cible ont bénéficié des divers programmes de réintégration organisés par des organisations partenaires ; La GTZ , le DFID sont particulièrement actifs dans cette région. La réintégration a porté sur l'assistance dans les domaines suivants :

* L'éducation formelle

Organisée pour des ex-enfants soldats associés à des jeunes issus des communautés d'accueil. L'assistance consistait en la fourniture de matériels scolaires et pédagogiques.

* La formation professionnelle

Deux formules ont été retenues :

- a. L'apprentissage dans des centres de formation type école des métiers,
- b. L'apprentissage par compagnonnage dans des petits ateliers tenus par des civils ou des ex-combattants anciens artisans.

Quelques difficultés ont été évoquées par les ex-combattants concernant leur réintégration :

- Le temps de formation (6mois) leur semble trop court pour les rendre compétitifs sur le marché du travail.
- Les kit d'outils que le programme leur fournit après la formation arrivent parfois avec d'importants retards. Ceci est dû au fait que ce sont des matériels importés et les délais de livraison peuvent se révéler assez longs.
- La difficulté pour certains ex-combattants de trouver un emploi même lorsqu'ils sont performants (mais ce problème est structurel à la Sierra Leone comme dans la plupart de nos pays sous-développés et sortant de crises souvent prolongées).

Malgré ces quelques problèmes, toutes les délégations ont noté un aspect très important pour le programme de réintégration de Sierra Leone : les ex-combattants sont socialement intégrés dans leur communauté. Malgré toutes les exactions qui peuvent leur être imputées pendant la guerre ,

la société civile ne semble pas les marginaliser et eux même se considèrent désormais comme des civils faisant face aux difficultés quotidiennes de la vie à l'instar de leurs concitoyens.

III. Séances de Mise en Commun des Enseignements Tirés du Voyage D'étude

Pour le programme DRR du Burundi, l'expérience sierra leonaise m'a permis de dégager les leçons suivantes :

- Sur le processus de démobilisation :

Le voyage d'étude ne se focalisait pas sur cet aspect mais suite à une bonne introduction du « Country manager » de la Banque Mondiale et de son équipe qui ont souvent orienté les discussions sur cet aspect, nous avons pu retirer un certain nombre d'enseignements utile pour le programme national, l'essentiel vient des entretiens que nous avons eu avec le Secrétaire Exécutif du programme sierra leonais et du Représentant du PNUD :

- pour réussir un tel programme, il est indispensable d'avoir l'engagement de toutes les parties concernées : les parties aux négociations mais aussi celui de la communauté internationale.
- L'information et la sensibilisation avant et pendant l'exécution du programme sont des éléments très importants qu'il convient de concevoir et d'exécuter de la manière la plus professionnelle possible.
- Le cantonnement, s'il est parfois incontournable, doit durer le minimum de temps possible ; ce qui signifie que les phases ultérieures doivent être préparées suffisamment à temps :
- Les aspects politiques ne doivent jamais être négligés dans l'appréciation des situations : il est donc indispensable pour les gestionnaires du programme de garder un contact permanent avec les décideurs dans ce domaine pour bâtir la confiance.
- Les plans d'opérations conjointes doivent être clairs, compréhensibles pour tous les acteurs et les bénéficiaires tout en étant simple dans leur exécution.
- Les campagnes de sensibilisation doivent viser à prévenir des attentes irréalistes de la part des bénéficiaires.
- La gestion des centres de démobilisation doit obéir à des normes très rigoureuses sinon les coûts deviennent rapidement insupportables comme par exemple ceux relatifs à la prise en charge médicale.

- Sur la Réinsertion- Réintégration

- Il ne faut surtout pas attendre le début de la démobilisation pour réfléchir aux stratégies de réinsertion-réintégration.
- Importance, là aussi, de l'information et de la sensibilisation faites à temps.
- Il y a nécessité d'impliquer la communauté nationale entière qui doit accepter et appuyer le programme.
- Dès le démarrage du processus et même au cours de sa préparation, sensibiliser et impliquer la communauté internationale présente dans le pays.
- Dans les projets de réintégration pour les ex-combattants, inclure des associés civils chaque fois que cela est possible.
- Ne pas inculquer aux ex-combattants des réflexes d'éternel assisté.

Annex 6 : Central African Republic Country Report

NOTE

A LA TRES HAUTE ATTENTION DE SON EXCELLENCE MONSIEUR LE
PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE,
CHEF DE L'ETAT

Objet : Rapport du voyage d'Etude en Sierra Léone
dans le cadre du programme multi-pays de
Démobilisation et de Réinsertion.
- **BANQUE MONDIALE** -

Excellence, Monsieur le Président de la République,

1^{ère} Partie : CONTEXTE DU VOYAGE

La Banque Mondiale a organisée à Freetown en Sierra Léone, un voyage d'étude dans le cadre du programme multi-pays de Démobilisation et de Réinsertion, du 09 au 16 Février 2004.

Ce voyage avait pour objectif, de permettre aux différents participants venus de 07 pays d'Afrique à savoir :

L'Angola
Le Burundi
La République du Congo (Brazzaville)
La République Démocratique du Congo
Le Rwanda
L'Ouganda et
La République Centrafricaine,

De s'imprégner, s'inspirer et surtout de tirer les leçons positives du modèle de la Sierra Léone en vue d'une adaptation, et en tenant compte du contexte spécifique de chaque état dans la mise en œuvre du processus de Démobilisation et de Réinsertion.

- Le programme de désarmement, démobilisation et réinsertion en Sierra Léone, visait à la consolidation de la paix et de la stabilisation du pays, suite à l'accession à la magistrature suprême du Président Ahmed TEJEAN KABBAH. Ce programme avait été mis en place en 1998;
- Afin de superviser la mise en œuvre dudit programme qui devait initialement couvrir quelque 45.000 combattants des forces du front révolutionnaire Uni (LE RUF), le Conseil de Direction des Forces Armées (AFRC) de l'ancienne armée de la Sierra Léone et de la Force de Défense Civile (CDF);
- Un Conseil National pour le Désarmement, la Démobilisation et la Réinsertion (CNDDR) et un Secrétariat Exécutif ont été institués;
- Quatre grandes catégories d'activités ont constituées l'ossature du programme à savoir :

- 1- l'examen, l'enregistrement et la prise en charge des anciens combattants pendant une brève période de cantonnement ;
- 2- l'orientation avant la libération, et le transport des anciens combattants dans les communautés d'accueils ou d'origine ;
- 3- La formation et la mise à disposition d'une indemnité à titre de couverture sociale transitoire;
- 4- enfin un appui à la réinsertion économique et sociale, sans oublier la mise en œuvre et la gestion générale du programme en adéquation avec une assistance technique conséquente.

Les Temps forts :

Septembre à Décembre 1998 ⇨ 3200 combattants ont été démobilisés

Juillet 1999 ⇨ interruption du processus par une attaque contre Freetown ⇨
Suspension du processus

Juillet 1999 ⇨ signature des accords de paix de Lomé entre le gouvernement et le RUF

⇨ 19.000 combattants (y compris des enfants) auront été démobilisés par le gouvernement ;

⇨ dont 17500 réellement démobilisés et 16600 libérés dans le cadre de l'opération connue sous le nom de phase II du programme.

Mai 2000 : Nouvelle interruption du programme suite à la reprise des hostilités et la prise en otage par le RUF de plus de 500 soldats de maintien de la paix des Nations-Unies.

Mai 2000 à Mai 2001 : plus de 2600 combattants ont été désarmés, démobilisés et libérés.

Plus de 11.000 anciens combattants ont été placés dans des programmes de réinsertion.

Enfin, toutes ces péripéties auront permis au Comité National de désarmement, démobilisation et réinsertion, d'évaluer, de modifier et d'améliorer les systèmes et les procédures, et de prendre les meilleures dispositions en vue de la réussite aujourd'hui du processus. C'est en Décembre 2003 que le programme s'est terminé, avec en plus un travail d'évaluation et de vérification.

Un peu plus de 70.000 ex-combattants ont été démobilisés et réinsérés, dont 7000 enfants soldats sur une période de cinq (5) ans.

2^{ème} Partie : LES OBSERVATIONS ESSENTIELLES

Deux groupes de travail se sont constitués pour faciliter les déplacements à l'intérieur du pays.

Le 1^{er} groupe était composé de :

Monsieur Francis APIKO de l'Ouganda
Monsieur Amilcar CANDEIAS de l'Angola
Monsieur Alphonse NKUSI du Rwanda
Madame Madeleine YILA du Congo (Brazzaville)

Mademoiselle BAHNSON Caroline de la Banque Mondiale
Madame de BOURCA Roisin de la Banque Mondiale
Et de Monsieur Côme ZOUMARA de la République Centrafricaine.

Le 2^{ème} groupe était composé :

Monsieur MOSES DRAKU de l'Ouganda
Monsieur ISAIC NIBIZI du Burundi
Monsieur José PINOTES de l'Angola
Monsieur JOÃO VENTURA de l'Angola
Monsieur John ZIGIRA du Rwanda
Madame Ellen VAN Der Laan de la Banque Mondiale
Monsieur Sean BRADLEY de la Banque Mondiale.

A l'issue des différentes rencontres de travail à l'intérieur pour la partie Nord précisément à MAKENI par le premier groupe et à BO pour la partie Sud par le deuxième groupe, les observations principales suivantes ont été formulées :

1. la sensibilisation des communautés est essentielle dans le processus ;
2. la transformation des armes en matériels agricoles, hautement symbolique ;
3. le rôle essentiel des différents départements Ministériels sectoriels impliqués dans le processus ;
4. la flexibilité dans l'évaluation des programmes ;
5. l'absolue nécessité des programmes de formation afin de permettre aux ex-combattants de devenir autonome ;
6. le soutien politique au plus haut sommet de l'Etat dans le processus ;
7. l'implication des autres pays de la sous-région sous forme d'accord de paix pour aider et faciliter le processus ;
8. la nécessité d'impliquer tous les chefs rebelles dans le processus ;
9. la réintégration sur demande volontaire et sans forcer ;
10. la totale implication des différentes communautés locales dans le processus
11. le rôle capital des ONG dans les programmes de protection des enfants ;
12. l'implication des artisans locaux dans le processus ;
13. l'utilisation et l'implication des US et coutumes, de la tradition culturelle locale dans la résolution du processus DDR ;
14. implication du secteur privé ainsi que de toute la société civile ;
15. nécessité d'alphabétisation, de réconcilier par la formation civique, et morale ;
16. nécessité d'intégrer un programme sur le VIH/SIDA
17. nécessité d'avoir un programme sur les notions de citoyenneté et des droits de l'homme ;
18. rôle des médias - public - privé - la radio - au début du processus, au milieu et à la fin, mais surtout après la fin du processus ;
19. l'importance de la solidarité au sein des différentes communautés ;
20. la fixation et la planification des calendriers de toutes les étapes du processus ;
21. que les certificats délivrés aux ex-combattants ne portent pas la mention des ex-combattants ;
22. que la gestion financière du processus et des programmes soit attribué exclusivement aux partenaires au développement ;
23. pendant le processus DDR, que la restructuration des Forces de Défense et de Sécurité se fasse simultanément ;
24. d'analyser au fur et à mesure les causes profondes des crises tant sociologique que politique, que sur le plan économique, social, le chômage, et la mauvaise gestion etc...

25. création des unités familiales ;
26. comment mesure la qualité des programmes
27. éviter la relation une arme, de l'argent ;
28. que les paiements se fassent localement pour décentraliser la gestion financière dans le processus ;
29. adéquation entre le kit proposé et le programme de formation ;
30. l'assistance de réintégration formulée à la demande spécifique ;
31. a bonne coordination entre les partenaires impliqués dans l'ensemble des programmes.

Au delà des recommandations retenues dans le cadre de ce travail, le constat retenu c'est que l'impact de l'ensemble des programmes est positif. Plus de 80 % des anciens combattants ont apprécié les formations. Les disciplines qui ont retenues plus l'intérêt des anciens combattants sont :

la conduite (auto - moto)
le bâtiment
la mécanique.

Toutes les évaluations ont montré que les formations ont clairement améliorées les possibilités d'emploi des anciens combattants et leurs avaient fourni non seulement des compétences utiles au delà des 75 % et aussi d'obtenir des emplois qu'ils occupent aujourd'hui.

Enfin, rien n'indique que les anciens combattants se rassemblent en tant qu'unités à la suite de la démobilisation. A juste titre, l'on peut penser qu'ils sont réintégrés dans leurs communautés d'accueil ou d'origine dans les villages. En tous les cas, les visites à l'intérieur, et les discussions avec les anciens combattants l'attestent.

3^{ème} Partie : RECOMMANDATIONS DES SOUS GROUPES

Trois sous-groupes avaient été constitués dans le but de dégager des recommandations spécifiques. Le sous-groupe (3) était composé de :

Madame Madeleine YILA du Congo (Brazzaville)
Mademoiselle Caroline BAHNSON de la Banque Mondiale
Madame ROISIN DE BURCA, de la Banque Mondiale
Monsieur John ZIGIRA, du Rwanda et de
Monsieur Côme ZOUMARA, de la République Centrafricaine.

La particularité du groupe (3), c'est de relever les recommandations par rapport à la politique, aux partenaires au développement etc... Ainsi donc les points souvent ont été retenus :

1. l'engagement politique doit être au plus haut sommet de l'Etat afin de garantir la réussite du processus DDR ;
2. un programme de sensibilisation globale est très important pendant tout le processus du DDR ;
3. le rôle des médias est nécessaire sur tout le processus ;
4. la nécessité d'une parfaite coordination entre l'ensemble des départements Ministériels impliqués dans le processus ;
5. la nécessité pour les départements techniques de s'approprier totalement le projet, afin de pérenniser les acquis du processus après la fin du programme contractuel ;
6. la nécessité de laisser la gestion financière du programme aux partenaires au développement ;

7. la nécessité du fonctionnement en réseaux des organisations non-gouvernementales (ONG) notamment dans le programme des enfants ;
8. l'urgente nécessité de la mise à disposition des moyens financiers sans interruption pour garantir dans tous ses aspects la réussite du ou des programmes ;
9. l'absolue nécessité d'impliquer les pays sous régionaux dans le cadre d'un accord de paix, ou d'un pacte de non agression afin de garantir une réussite certaine au processus.

Pour la République Centrafricaine, il faut savoir que la réinsertion des ex-combattants sans emploi et armé, à travers des activités économiques et en effectuant simultanément le ramassage et la destruction de leurs armes, restent et demeurent une absolue priorité pour le maintien de la paix et la sécurité des populations.

La stabilité du pays ne sera possible que si les jeunes développent des moyens d'existence autonome, à travers des activités génératrices de revenus.

A l'exemple de la Sierra Léone la République Centrafricaine peut avoir le schéma suivant :

Une structure placée sous la présidence du Président de la République, Chef de l'Etat, dénommé :

la Commission Nationale de Démobilisation et de Réinsertion ;
Avec comme Départements techniques ;
Ministère du Plan, de l'Economie et du Budget
Ministère de la Réconciliation Nationale et de la Culture Démocratique et Civique ;
Ministère de la Famille des Affaires Sociales et de la Solidarité Nationale ;
Ministère de l'Intérieur Chargé de l'Administration du Territoire ;
Ministère de la Modernisation et du Développement de l'Agriculture ;
Ministère de la jeunesse des Sports, des Arts et de la Culture ;
Ministère de la Sécurité Publique et du Désarmement ;
Haut Commissariat au Droit de l'Homme à la Présidence de la République.

Autre Partenaires

La Société Civile
Les Organisations des Droits de l'Homme
Les Confessions Religieuses
Les Organisations de Promotion de la Jeune l'ensemble des partenaires au Développement
La CEMAC
L'Union Européenne
Le FUNUAP
Le BONUCA
La France, la Chine etc...

Tels sont globalement les éléments que je soumetts, à la Très Haute Attention de Son Excellence, Monsieur le Président de la République, Chef de l'Etat.

Côme ZOOMARA
Conseiller en Défense Globale
Point Focal du DDR

Annex 7 : Republic of Congo Country Report

RAPPORT SUR LE VOYAGE D'ETUDES ORGANISE PAR LE MDRP EN SIERRA LEONE

Du 9 au 16 février 2004, s'est déroulé un voyage d'études organisé par la Banque mondiale et le Secrétariat du MDRP en Sierra Leone. Portant sur les stratégies visant à appuyer la réinsertion des anciens combattants démobilisés et sur les fruits de ces efforts, cette mission avait pour objectif de permettre à différents pays de la sous-région Afrique centrale élargie aux Grands Lacs concernés par le programme de démobilisation, désarmement et réinsertion de s'informer sur l'expérience sierra leonaise de démobilisation, désarmement et réinsertion des anciens combattants afin d'en tirer des leçons utiles pour la mise en œuvre de leur propre programme. Six pays étaient représentés à savoir : l'Angola, le Burundi, le Centrafrique, la République du Congo (Brazzaville), le Rwanda, et l'Ouganda.

Le choix de la Sierra Leone s'explique par deux choses essentielles : le fait que la Sierra Leone est arrivée au terme de son programme de DDR dont la première phase avait démarré en 1998 et surtout la qualité des résultats atteints au regard des objectifs fixés, en dépit des interruptions du programme dues à la reprise des combats en juillet 1999 et mai 2000.

Méthodologie

Le programme d'études comprenait :

- Des rencontres avec les différents acteurs concernés par le programme (cf. liste jointe en annexe) à Freetown. Le groupe s'est ensuite divisé en deux sous-groupes pour aller voir ce qui se faisait sur le terrain. Le premier dont nous avons fait partie est allé à Makeni à 184 km de Freetown dans le nord et le second à Pujehun dans le sud du pays. Au programme pour Makéni :
- Des visites des sites de formation professionnelle des ex-combattants
- Une école où sont inscrits des enfants-soldats qui suivent l'enseignement formel dont certains ont été admis à l'école alors qu'ils n'avaient jamais été inscrits avant de devenir enfants-soldats.
- Des échanges avec des anciens combattants dans leurs ateliers de travail
- Des échanges avec ex-combattants regroupés au sein d'associations créées par eux mais qui comptent également des membres qui ne sont pas des anciens soldats
- Une réunion consultative avec différentes personnalités (représentants d'associations de défense de droits humains, d'associations de femmes, des religieux (musulmans et chrétiens), des officiers dont le commissaire de police pour la région nord, un représentant du gouvernement, un représentant des ex-combattants et Caritas .
- Une mise en commun au cours de laquelle tous les participants au voyage d'études ont dégagé des observations qui constituent le cadre à partir duquel chaque structure chargée du programme de DDR pourra, en fonction de ses propres réalités proposer les stratégies les mieux adaptées.

La structure de coordination du programme

Le programme de réinsertion des anciens combattants a été coordonné et supervisé par le Comité National pour le Désarmement, la Démobilisation et la Réinsertion (NCDDR) dont le président de

la République est lui-même le président du secrétariat exécutif et réalisé en partenariat avec les Agences gouvernementales, les Ministères et les Commissions, les bailleurs de fonds, les donateurs, les ONG nationales et internationales, la Mission des Nations Unies pour la Sécurité (UNAMSIL), les Organismes des Nations Unies (UNICEF, PAM, PNUD), les Agences d'aide gouvernementales (GTZ pour l'Allemagne, DFID pour la Grande Bretagne, USAID-OTI, les EU, le gouvernement français), les églises, les chefs traditionnels et les rebelles.

Les objectifs du programme :

- La réconciliation nationale
- La prévention des conflits
- L'appui au développement

Les composantes du programme :

- Désarmement et démobilisation
- Réintégration sociale
- Réintégration économique

Les résultats du programme

- L'immatriculation se faisait dans les centres de démobilisation et une carte avec photo et numéro était établie et remise à l'ex-combattant avant son retour dans sa communauté. Quatre trous sont prévus et un ou deux sont déjà percés avant que l'ex-combattant ne quitte le centre de démobilisation indiquant que l'ex-combattant a bénéficié d'une prestation comme par exemple l'indemnité de réinstallation dans la localité habituelle de l'ex-combattant.
- Le désarmement a été fait en groupe sous la responsabilité des chefs rebelles. 29.000 armes ont été ramassées par UNAMSIL mais il en resterait encore 300.000 à ramasser.
- L'enregistrement au programme de réinsertion se fait dans les bureaux de région ou de district uniquement pour l'ex-combattant qui le désire. Ainsi :
- Sur une estimation initiale de 33. 000 anciens combattants revue à 45 000 à l'issue de l'accord de Lomé, 62. 618 anciens combattants en dehors des 6 845 enfants anciens combattants ont été considérés comme population éligible au programme de réinsertion et finalement, 56. 751 se sont effectivement fait enregistrer pour bénéficier du programme tandis que 2. 385 ont choisi de participer au programme de réinsertion militaire.
- Sur le programme de réinsertion économique visant à transformer les anciens combattants en citoyens, 48. 218 avaient terminé une formation professionnelle, un apprentissage ou s'étaient engagés dans l'éducation formelle. Parmi ceux qui avaient appris un métier, beaucoup l'exercent.
- Sur le plan de la réinsertion sociale qui comprenait la réconciliation c'est-à-dire l'acceptation des ex-combattants par les communautés, la grande majorité des ex-combattants ont réintégré leur communauté. Dans l'exercice de leur nouveau métier, ils sont plusieurs à travailler avec des personnes qui n'ont pas combattu et ce, dans toutes les catégories de métiers (ateliers mixtes de menuiserie, couture, mécanique, etc.). Certains ex-combattants ont créé des associations mixtes également. Il en reste quelques uns qui ont rejoint les zones d'exploitation de diamant contrôlées par d'anciens rebelles.
- La majorité des enfants ont été réunis à leurs familles, pour certains après une médiation entre les parents et les enfants, médiation organisée par l'UNICEF. De nombreux enfants ont été reversés dans le système scolaire formel et semblent aujourd'hui intégrés même si

au départ, certains d'entre eux ont dû faire face à quelques réactions de rejet de certains de leurs camarades quand ces derniers se sont rendus compte de leur statut d'anciens soldats. La communauté a accepté les enfants-soldats en leur ouvrant les écoles moyennant une aide apportée à toute l'école et non seulement aux enfants soldats.

- La majorité des anciens soldats qui ont suivi une formation ont reçu un kit d'outils pour leur permettre d'exercer en indépendant. Ce programme profite à toute la communauté qui jouit des services offerts par les anciens combattants. Quoique certains aient vendu leur kit, leurs acheteurs étant des membres de la communauté qui prêtent eux-mêmes leurs services à la communauté, celle-ci reste gagnante.
- La présence des ex-combattants a aussi un impact sur l'économie des communautés à travers l'argent injecté dans des activités comme les travaux publics et les routes.

A l'issue des différentes rencontres et visites sur le terrain, le groupe des participants au voyage d'études a procédé à une mise en commun et dégagé les observations suivantes :

Observations principales

Elles ont été regroupées en trois modules à savoir «réintégration», «cadre d'élaboration» et «politique, information et sensibilisation».

Réintégration:

- Flexibilité dans l'élaboration et la mise en oeuvre des sous-projets
- Efforts parallèles d'assistance aux ex-combattants et à la communauté dans le même temps
- Lien entre les sous-projets de réintégration et les besoins économiques de la communauté
- Harmonie entre la réintégration et la demande
- Réalisation du programme en relation avec les autres partenaires est un processus clé de réussite et de pérennité du programme
- Importance de la formation professionnelle
- Amélioration de l'impact du programme à travers la diversification des options de formation
- Nécessité de lier la formation et les besoins du marché local pour garantir les chances de l'emploi (analyse du marché, apprentissage en commerce)
- Allouer une prime de formation facilite la participation aux opportunités de formation offertes mais cause en revanche un biais dans la sélection des opportunités qui peut avoir un impact négatif, certains ne venant que pour obtenir cette allocation
- Délivrance d'un certificat de fin formation mentionnant uniquement la formation acquise (ne pas mettre la mention ancien soldat)
- Difficulté d'évaluer la qualité de la formation à la fin de celle-ci
- Transformer des armes en instruments est une bonne utilisation des ressources et a en plus un effet psychologique positif
- Le kit d'instruments offert à l'issue de la formation accroît les chances d'emploi
- Offrir un équipement technique simple pour la réintégration par la formation accroît l'utilisation de celui-ci et la qualité de l'application dans le travail
- Nécessité d'utiliser la culture et les pratiques traditionnelles pour faciliter la réinsertion sociale

- Importance d'inclure l'éducation à la vie dans la transmission des compétences techniques
- Nécessité d'améliorer le soutien psychosocial
- Créer des familles d'accueil est une solution originale

Elaboration du projet:

- Importance d'avoir une bonne planification
- Souplesse et attention dans la mise en œuvre du projet
- Vision commune dans la conception du programme
- Décentraliser le paiement des ex-combattants pour apporter une impulsion à l'économie locale
- Inclure toutes les parties à tous les niveaux
- Réinsertion sociale : processus clé de la réinsertion économique
- Communiquer sur les composantes du programme est important dans la conception du programme
- Réinsertion optionnelle à la demande et non pas imposée
- Rôle clé joué par les comités compétents à tous les niveaux
- Inviter le secteur privé à participer à la conception du programme
- Approche intégrée de réinsertion des ex-combattants et des membres de la communauté
- Danger de lier le désarmement avec une prime – doit être évité
- L'identification, l'enregistrement et la vérification des ex-combattants doivent être rigoureux
- Nécessité d'avoir une stratégie claire pour la prise en charge des ex-combattantes
- Efforts parallèles de soutien aux personnes déplacées et aux réfugiés
- Eviter les délais (le temps mort) entre la démobilisation et la réintégration
- Mettre en œuvre la réforme du système de sécurité en même temps que le DDR
- Nécessité d'avoir une unité de gestion neutre et indépendante pour superviser les fonds du programme
- Importance de traiter les causes du conflit c'est-à-dire la corruption, la mauvaise gestion des ressources naturelles, la mauvaise gouvernance, la marginalisation

Politique, information et sensibilisation:

- Importance de l'engagement politique au haut niveau pour la réussite du DDR
- Importance de l'approche stratégique régionale ou sous-régionale du DDR
- Nécessité d'un partenariat cohérent entre tous les acteurs sous la coordination de l'agence gouvernementale spécialisée. Pour assurer le succès et la continuité du DDR même après, les ministères concernés doivent être impliqués dans sa mise en œuvre
- La disponibilité financière est essentielle pour la réussite de la mise en œuvre de tous les aspects du processus de réinsertion
- Une large sensibilisation est indispensable à toutes les étapes du programme de DDR. Il est nécessaire que la société civile et les médias soient impliqués et soutiennent le processus

Recommandations pour la République du Congo

Le Haut Commissariat à la Réinsertion des Ex-combattants qui est en train de terminer son premier programme, le Programme de Démobilisation et de Réinsertion (PDR) et qui se propose de démarrer avec l'appui du MDRP son Plan National de Démobilisation, Désarmement et Réinsertion (PNDDR) courant 2004 a retenu les recommandations ci-après :

| Recommandations | Actions | Activités | Responsable | Période |
|--|---|--|---|-------------------------|
| Promouvoir et renforcer le partenariat entre les différents acteurs clés de la réinsertion | Sensibilisation des acteurs clés sur la nécessité d'avoir un partenariat solide | Séminaire d'information à l'attention des membres de la CONADER | Haut Commissariat à la Réinsertion des Ex-Combattants | Mars 2004 |
| Opérationnaliser les Comités de Pilotage et de Département | Mobilisation du Comité de Pilotage et des Comités de Département | - Régularité des réunions du Comité de Pilotage et des Comités de Département - Campagne d'explication à l'endroit des Comités de Département | -Haut Commissariat à la Réinsertion des Ex-Combattants -Comités de Département | Permanent Avril 2004 |
| Concevoir l'approche modulaire dans la mise en oeuvre du PNDDR Soumettre l'approche modulaire du PNDDR à l'approbation de la CONADER pour approbation | Elaboration des différents modules du PNDDR | Rédaction des différents modules : -Désarmement -Réinsertion des Ex-Combattants -Réintégration des déflattés de la Force Publique -Rapatriement des réfugiés -Réinsertion des enfants-soldats | Haut Commissariat à la Réinsertion des Ex-Combattants | Mars-Mai 2004 |
| Préserver et sécuriser les acquis actuels du Programme de Démobilisation et de Réinsertion en cours de finalisation | Sensibilisation des Ministères concernés par les activités menées par les Ex-Combattants dans le cadre du PDR | -Collecte de données sur l'objet de la sensibilisation -Détermination des formes de la sensibilisation -organisation de la sensibilisation | -CONADER -Haut Commissariat à la Réinsertion des Ex-Combattants | Avril-Décembre 2004 |
| Obtenir le lancement du PNDDR | Plaidoirie auprès des bailleurs et des donateurs bilatéraux et multilatéraux | -Campagne d'information sur le PNDDR -Recherche de soutien et de conseil -Recherche de fonds | -CONADER -Haut Commissariat à la Réinsertion des Ex-Combattants | Avril-Juin 2004 |

En conclusion, le voyage d'études organisé par le MDRP en Sierra Leone nous aura permis de tirer des leçons particulièrement enrichissantes pour l'élaboration et la mise en œuvre d'un programme de Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réinsertion des ex-Combattants. De plus, en réunissant les différents pays de notre sous-région engagés dans la réalisation des programmes de réinsertion, ce voyage d'études nous aura donné l'occasion d'établir des relations qui peuvent constituer le socle d'une approche sous-régionale du DDR.

Fait à Brazzaville, le 29 février 2004

Madeleine YILA-BOUMPOTO
Conseillère Socio-Culturelle

Annex 8 : Rwanda Country Report

RWANDA DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION COMMISSION (RDRC)

Mission Report of the Study tour to Sierra Leone: *February 9-16, 2004*

I INTRODUCTION

In 1998 the Sierra Leone (SL) Government established the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration Programme NCDDR with the aim of supporting the national strategy for peace that includes the consolidation of the political process and security which form the basis for a viable post-war national recovery programme.

Phase I of the DDR Programme was initiated in June 1998. By December 1998, 1,603 ex-combatants from the ex-Sierra Leone Army were disarmed, demobilised and discharged. However, the security situation deteriorated during January 1999, which interrupted the provision of reintegration assistance until March 1999 when activities were re-initiated. Phase II of the DDR programme was initiated in July 1999 following the signing of the Lome Peace Accord. During this phase, 17,451 ex-combatants from RUF, CDF, AFRC and other paramilitary groups were disarmed, demobilised and discharged. The initial reintegration assistance in form of reinsertion benefits were provided but later suspended due to security setbacks, including taking hostage of 500 UN Peacekeepers. This was followed by an Interim Phase beginning May 2000 up to April 2001 during which 2,628 ex-combatants were disarmed, demobilised and discharged. During this phase, NCDDR focused on initiating reintegration programme opportunities for ex-combatants discharged in phases I and II, although services were limited to Government-held areas.

Following improvements in the political and security situation in the rest of the country, Phase III of the DDR programme was put on track in May 2001. During this phase, a total of 47,781 ex-combatants of mainly CDF and RUF, and a few from other paramilitary groups, were disarmed, demobilised and discharged by February 2002. The Programme continued until December 2003 in order to assist eligible and interested ex-combatants in social and economic reintegration by providing reinsertion benefits; short-term reintegration opportunities; and referral and counselling services.

After successfully disarming and demobilising about 70,000 combatants, and providing reintegration assistance to nearly 60,000, both the Government and the key stakeholders consider this Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme a success. The Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) of the Great Lakes Region organised a study tour to SL, to explore the lessons learned with regard to reintegration programme design, the challenges implementing agencies may have faced, and the impact of such interventions on the lives of ex-combatants and the communities to which they return.

The study tour took place from February 9-16, 2004. Altogether, 14 people attended, including 10 from MDRP National Partners and 4 from the MDRP Secretariat in Washington D.C. The tour involved meetings with the NCDDR and key partners including, GTZ; UNICEF; DFID; IRC; National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA); United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL); and United Nations Office for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Two field trips were

undertaken between February 12-13, 2004 with one group of participants going to Makeni in the North and the other to Fairo, Zimmi, and Bo in the South. In the field, the participants were able to meet and hold discussions with some implementing agencies, ex-combatants, and community leaders.

II. GROUP OBSERVATIONS

After the field visits, a wrap-up meeting was organised for all the participants to discuss and put together key observations. The key observations put forward, include:

Policy, Information and Sensitisation:

- Importance of high-level political involvement and commitment to DDR.
- Important to have a strategic regional/sub-regional approach to DDR.
- Coherent partnership is necessary among all the stakeholders under the coordination of the relevant government agency. To ensure national ownership and continuity even after the DDR, the line ministries should be involved throughout the implementation.
- Importance of establishing a strong network of partners involved in child protection.
- Timely financing is essential for successful implementation of all aspects of the reintegration process.
- Comprehensive sensitisation is critical in all stages of the DDR program. Civil society and the media need to be involved to support the process.

Design:

- There should be a clear and focused design from day one.
- The programme should be flexible but focused in implementation.
- Common vision among key actors about programme objectives is essential.
- Decentralization of payments to ex-combatants helps to support the local economy.
- Inclusion of all parties to the conflict at all levels of planning through implementation is recommended.
- Social reintegration is key to economic reintegration.
- Communication about reintegration packages is important in program design.
- Key role played by competent committees at all levels, should be emphasised
- The private sector should be invited to participate in program design and implementation
- Need for Integrated approach of reintegration of ex-combatants and members of the community.
- Parallelefforts to assist the community and the ex-combatants at the same time, improves reintegration.
- There should be linkage between (reintegration) sub-projects and socio-economic needs of community.
- Linking disarmament with payments should be avoided.
- Identification, registration and verification of ex-combatants should be robust.
- Need for clear strategy for handling female ex-combatants.
- Parallel efforts in support of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees are important in DDR process.
- Delays between demobilization and reintegration should be avoided.
- Security sector reform should be parallel with DDR.

- Need for neutral and independent financial management unit to oversee program funds.
- Root causes of conflict should be dealt with e.g. corruption, mismanagement of natural resources, bad governance, marginalization.

Reintegration:

There should be flexibility in design and implementation of sub-projects.

- Program linked to continuation by other partners after DDR is key to success and sustainability.
- Diversification of training options improves program impact.
- There needs to be better links between training and local market needs to best guarantee employment (market analysis, trade apprenticeships).
- Training subsistence allowance facilitated participation in training opportunities but caused a distortion in the selection of reintegration opportunities that could negatively impact employability.
- Technical certificates should refer exclusively to the training provided.
- Challenge of measuring quality of training after being completed.
- Reintegration assistance should be demand driven.
- Transformation of weapons into tools is good use of available resources and has a positive psychological effect.
- Toolkits tied to training improves employability of ex-combatants.
- Utilization of light/simple equipment/technology increases use of labour and application to work.
- Social reintegration is best facilitated through local culture and traditional practices.
- Including life skills training with technical skills is important.
- Psychosocial support needs to be improved.
- Group home concept is a creative solution to the problem of ex-child combatants who fail to reunite with parents or foster families.
- Community Education Investment Project (CEIP) concept benefits not only the ex-child combatants but also the entire school communities that receive them.

From the group observations, each country was to identify recommendations that have direct and immediate implications for its specific programme

III . RECOMMENDATIONS

The second stage of the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (RDRP) was initiated in October 2001 to demobilise and provide socio-economic reintegration support to sixty thousand (60,000) ex-combatants from the Rwanda Defence Forces (current national army), Ex-FAR (former National Army), and members of Ex-Armed Groups (former rebels operating from mainly DR Congo). The programme reintegration support would be extended to vulnerable ex-combatants of stage I (1997 – 2001) who would be identified from a total of 18692 ex-combatants. To date, slightly over 50% of the target beneficiaries have been demobilised and/are receiving reintegration support in the communities of return.

From the above group observations, the participants from Rwanda propose the following as the key recommendations for the RDRP:

1. Community reintegration:

The overall aim of community reintegration initiatives would be to help both the ex-combatants and the community members to establish viable and stable communities. Community reintegration projects would facilitate social reintegration in a society formerly polarised by war, genocide and armed rebellion, while at the same time drawing on the diverse human resources for community transformation. Social reintegration would help to enhance economic reintegration, thereby creating sustainable livelihoods for community members. To realise this objective, RDRP would need to identify pertinent partners, and working with stakeholders, ensure that mechanisms for coordination and taking advantage of existing and future programmes, are put in place. This would ensure sustainability after the DDR programme.

2. Entrepreneurial skills:

Ex-combatants need to acquire entrepreneurial or business skills in order to be competitive in the private sector where more reintegration opportunities are likely to present themselves. The focus of entrepreneurial skills would, be self-employment and proper management of income-generating activities. The RDRP would identify relevant partners to provide the training.

3. Vocational training/Tool kits:

The majority of ex-combatants have low levels of education and lack marketable skills. To offset this, well-planned specialised demand-driven vocational courses coupled with provision of essential tools/equipment after completion would be emphasized for those interested in order to increase their competitiveness in both the formal and informal sectors. The RDRP would, identify potential trainers and work with them implementation modalities.

4. Apprenticeship:

With educational deficiencies mentioned above, ex-combatants cannot easily find jobs in the workplace. As a training strategy, apprenticeship would, help to prepare the ex-combatants for skilled employment by conducting the training in documented employment settings, where supervised structured on-the-job training is combined with related theoretical instruction. Training before and during labour-intensive public works would also be conducted in collaboration with implementing partners.

5. Functional Adult Literacy (FAL):

FAL incorporates training for livelihood skills into literacy instruction. In this approach an attempt is made to integrate livelihood training, income generating activities and literacy. The aim of FAL programme would be to help ex-combatants establish the usefulness of literacy and their new knowledge through combining instruction with actual applications to a range of activities. The RDRP would liaise with the relevant Ministries and other public and private institutions to design and implement the programme.

6. Education support:

Formal education is universally considered one of the most reliable assets that would ensure successful reintegration of ex-combatants. It would help them to diversify their reintegration options after completion and make them more competitive in the labour market. The RDRP would work with relevant partners to support the ex-combatants to start or return to formal education. The Programme would initially sensitise the ex-combatants to utilise their reinsertion

and reintegration benefits for this purpose. In addition, the RDRP would liaise with educational institutions to facilitate admission as well as contributing to the cost of their education through Vulnerability Support Window (VSW) grants.

7. Extension services:

The majority of ex-combatants are based in rural areas and indicate agriculture as their main reintegration option, yet they lack the required skills and experience. It makes sense, therefore, to emphasise extension services in this field. Agricultural extension services are important in promoting sustainable agricultural practices and help ex-combatants to learn various means of education and guidance. The extension services would include other off-farm activities. The RDRP would liaise with relevant Ministries, public or private institutions, NGOs and individuals to offer the extension services.

8. Group Homes:

For the child ex-combatants who fail to reunite with their parents or find suitable foster families, the RDRP would liaise with relevant institutions and NGOs to establish group homes, from which the reintegration process would start after initial rehabilitation of the children.

9. Establishing standing committees:

To accelerate the reintegration process, the Technical Coordinating Committee (TCC) would establish standing sub-committees to support it under four main categories, thus:

- TCC sub-committee – child ex-combatants;
- TCC sub-committee – Economic reintegration;
- TCC sub-committee – Social reintegration; and
- TCC sub-committee – Sensitisation.

These would work under the guidance and coordination of the TCC.

IV . ACTION PLAN

| S/N | Recommendation | Action required | Time frame |
|-----|---------------------------|---|-------------------|
| 1. | Community Reintegration | Identification of relevant partners | March-May 2004 |
| | | Establishing coordination mechanisms | March-August 2004 |
| 2. | Entrepreneurial skills | Identification of relevant partners | March-May 2004 |
| | | Establish cooperating mechanisms | March-August 2004 |
| 3. | Vocational training | Identification of relevant partners | March-May 2004 |
| | | Establish implementation modalities | March-August 2004 |
| 4. | Apprenticeship | Identification of relevant partners | March-August 2004 |
| | | Establish cooperating mechanisms | March-August 2004 |
| 5. | Functional Adult Literacy | Identification of relevant partners | March-May 2004 |
| | | Establish cooperating mechanisms | March-August 2004 |
| 6. | Education support | Sensitisation of educational institutions | March-August 2004 |
| | | Sensitisation of ex-combatants | March-August 2004 |
| | | Establish implementation modalities | March-August 2004 |
| 7. | Extension services | Identification of relevant partners | March-August 2004 |

| | | | |
|----|--|-------------------------------------|-------------------|
| | | Sensitisation of ex-combatants | March-August 2004 |
| | | Establish implementation modalities | March-August 2004 |
| 8. | Group homes | Identification of beneficiaries | March-August 2004 |
| | | Identification of relevant partners | March-August 2004 |
| | | Establish cooperating mechanisms | March-August 2004 |
| 9. | Establishing standing TCC sub-committees | Discussing the idea in the TCC | March 2004 |

Annex 9 : Uganda Country Report

THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA MDRP REINTEGRATION STUDY TOUR TO SIERRA LEONE FEBRUARY 9TH – 16TH 2004

DATE: March 1st 2004

1. BACKGROUND:

Uganda was one of the six countries in the Great Lakes region that participated in a one week study tour to Sierra Leone which took place from February, 9th to 16th, 2004. The tour was organized by the MDRP Secretariat Washington. Moses Draku of the Amnesty Commission and Francis Apiko of Uganda Veterans Assistance Board represented the country. The other delegates were from Rwanda, Angola, Central African Republic, Burundi and the Republic of Congo.

The study tour focused on the strategies for and outcome of reintegration efforts targeting demobilized ex-combatants.

It should be noted that the Sierra Leone Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme was set up in 1998 in an effort to consolidate peace and stability in the country following the return to power of H.E. President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. The National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR) and its Executive Secretariat were established to oversee the implementation of the DDR Programme.

- i) Screening, registration and basic living provisions for ex-combatants during a brief encampment period.
- ii) Pre-discharge orientation, discharge and transportation of ex-combatants into communities.
- iii) A transitional social safety net allowances.
- iv) Economic and social reintegration support.
- v) All general programme operations, management and technical assistance.

Since 1998, over the three phases of DDR, the total eligible population came to 69,463 ex-combatants of which 62,618 are adults and 6,845 are children.

2. THE STUDY TOUR PROCESS

On the first day of the tour the participants met at Lacs Guest house in Freetown to discuss programme and organisation. The meeting was led by the World Bank team headed by Trust Fund Manager, Mr. Sean Bradley, and include Ms. Ellen Van der Laan, Ms. Roisin De Burca and Ms. Caroline Bahson.

After this meeting the MDRP/World Bank team proceeded to NCDDR headquarters in Freetown where we met the Executive Secretary, Dr. Francis Kai-Kai and his team.

The discussions centred on the overview of the NCDDR programme, key policy issues, programme design and management structure. We learnt that the programme faced a number of interruptions due to deteriorations in security situations but gained some positive momentum in late 2000 and 2001 leading to conclusion of RUF disarmament and demobilization by February, 2002.

The programme continued to run until December, 2003 to provide reintegration assistance and support to all eligible and interested ex-combatants. At the present time, the programme is closing down and carrying out final evaluations and audits. We proceeded to UNICEF where we were briefed and had an overview of child child programme, key policy issue, programme design and management structure.

In the afternoon the team was divided into two groups where one group visited DFID to see the perception of reintegration efforts. The meeting of the second group with GTZ that was planned for that afternoon did not take place and was postponed for the following day. However, reintegration, monitoring and evaluation meeting was held during Dinner at Mamba Point hotel with NCDDR and reintegration consultants.

On day two of the tour, the first group had discussions on national community reintegration and recovery programme, assistance to IDPs/refugees, links to DDR efforts with National Social Action Commission staff. The second group met officials of GTZ and had an over view of GTZ reintegration efforts, and lessons learned through video clips.

Thereafter, the two teams merged at the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) on the role of NGOs in community reintegration, DDR, links to larger recovery efforts. Thereafter, we had discussions with officials of International Rescue Committee (IRC) at Lacs Guest House on their programme activities, implementation challenges, programme results, relations with Government in implementation.

In the afternoon we had discussions with the Head of United Nations Peace Keeping Force (UNAMSIL) on perception of reintegration efforts and short-term stop gap efforts. These include the presence of UNAMSIL for confidence building and establishment of joint discussions every month between UNAMSIL, the government and rebel leaders.

On Thursday February, 12th to Friday February, 13th MDRP/World Bank team broke into two groups again for field trips to explore in depth with ex-combatants, implementing agencies and community members on their assessment of reintegration process and results. Group 1 went to Port Loko, Makeni and Bombali while group 2 proceeded to Bo, Pujehun and Kenema.

On Saturday February 14, the two teams converged for discussions, observations, conclusions and recommendations for application to MDRP national programmes at Cotton Club beach hotel, where the meeting continued up to Sunday February 15. Analysis of these observations, conclusions and recommendation is appended to this report as paragraph 3 and 4.

3. ANALYSIS OF THE OBSERVATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS AT THE END OF STUDY TOUR TO SIERRA LEONE: Suitable for consideration in Uganda

| Observation | Activities | Proposed Implementation |
|--|--|--|
| <i>Reintegration Issues:</i> | | |
| 1. Parallel efforts of assistance to the community at the same time as ex-combatants improves reintegration. | For example in vocational training of ex-combatants and youths together. | Amnesty Commission (AC) and Uganda Veterans Assistance Board (UVAB) through implementation partners. |
| 2. Linkage of (reint) sub-projects to socio economic needs of the community. | For example in public works and infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction to involve both ex-combatants and the community members as the labour force. | AC, UVAB through NGOs, the Line Ministries and Private Sector. |
| 3. Reintegration should be demand driven. | As in micro-enterprises, in-come generating activities (IGAs) as selected by the ex-combatants. | AC, UVAB, NGOs, Private Sector, Micro Finance Institutions. |
| 4. Program linked to continuation by other partners is key to success and sustainability. | For example Micro-enterprises infrastructure i.e. Training Institutions or Centres, started in DDR by or for ex-combatants. | NGOs Private Sector, Line Ministries, Local Governments. |
| 5. Emphasis on Vocational Training | For improved marketable skills eg Carpentry, Auto Mechanics, Tailoring, Brick Making etc.. | NGOs Training Institutions, Private Sector. |
| 6. There needs to be better links between training and local market needs to best guarantee employment. | Market analysis, trade apprenticeship, job availability, Business management. | Private Sector, NGOs, Line Ministries. |
| 7. Technical Certificates should refer exclusively to the Training Provider. (Don't politicise) | For example Vocational and Technical Training in Carpentry, Tailoring, Auto Mechanics, Computers, IT etc..can issue authentic Certificates of qualification or attendance. | Technical & Vocational Training Institutions, Consultants. |
| 8. Transformation of weapons into tools has a positive psychological effect and economic viability | Surrendered weapons are better transformed into tools than mere destruction by burning or just stacked away with no accurate accountability. | UPDF, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Private Sector. |
| 9. Tool kits tied to training improves employability of ex-combatants. | Particularly in vocational skills such as Carpentry, Tailoring, Auto-Mechanic etc.. | AC, UVAB and implementing partners. |
| 10. Social Reintegration in best facilitated through local culture and traditional practices. | Cultural rituals or performances | AC, UVAB and Community traditional or clan heads, Religious Leaders. |
| 11. The need to improve the psycho-social support to ex-combatants | Counseling traumatic treatment follow up assessment of victims. | AC, UVAB, Line Ministries, NGOs. |
| <i>Program Design</i> | | |
| 1. There should be a clear and focused program design from day one. | -Socio-economic profiling of the ex-combatants. - Baseline review of the views, concerns and expectations of other stakeholders. | AC, UVAB, WB Consultants, Partners, Line Ministries, Community Leaders. |
| 2. Include all parties at all levels. | Through Consultations, Meetings, | AC, UVAB. |

| | Workshops | |
|---|--|---|
| 3. Communication in reintegration packages are important in program design. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Information on the packages, who gets it and where. - Choice of reintegration options, training, micro-enterprises etc. - Transparency & accountability | AC, UVAB, Partners |
| 4. Decentralisation of payment to ex-combatants to support the local economy. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cash payments through the banking facilities countrywide. - Rural Micro-enterprises. - Transparency & accountability | AC, UVAB, Banks |
| 5. Identification registration and verification of ex-combatants should be vigorous and robust. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Develop computerised list from UPDF and rebel groups - Issue ID cards with sealed photos. | AC, UVAB, UPDF, Rebel Groups. |
| 6. There is danger in linking disarmament to payments of cash (weapons for cash) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - This should be avoided because it is subject to abuse. - Transparency & accountability | UPDF, NGOs |
| 7. Reintegration is not mandatory | Ex-combatants voluntarily register for reintegration. | AC, UVAB. |
| 8. Key role played by competent communities at all levels. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Monitor the programme implementation at all levels. - Report shortcomings for ratification. - Ensure ownership. - Transparency & accountability | AC, UVAB, NGOs, Local Gov't Councils. |
| 9. The Private Sector should be invited to participate in program design. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Co-ordination through meetings, seminars/ workshops. - Sharing data. - Transparency & accountability | AC, UVAB, NGOs, Private Sector |
| 10. Integrated approach of reintegration of ex-combatants and members of the community. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Co-ordination through meetings, seminars, workshops. - Sharing data | AC, UVAB, NGOs, Local Gov't Councils. |
| 11. Social reintegration is key to economic reintegration | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Community sensitisation - Participatory discussions methods eg. Community theatre. | AC, UVAB, NGOs. |
| 12. Parallel efforts in support of IDPs and refugees | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Through emergency relief assistance. - Training of the youth. - Infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction | NGOs, Private Sector, Line Ministries. |
| 13. A clear security sector reform should run parallel with DDR | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Integrate personnel who qualify for national Army - Regulate recruitment into the Army - Professionalise the Army - De-politicise the Army personnel. | Government, The Executive, The Legislature, UPDF, UVAB |
| <i>Policy Information & Sensitisation</i> | | |
| 1. Importance of high level political involvement & commitment to DDR | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Supervision of implementation - Regulating issues for smooth implementation. | Government, The Executive, The Legislature, Politicians. |
| 2. Root causes of conflict should be dealt with to stop recurrences of conflicts. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Estimate mismanagement of natural resources - Stamp out corruption - Stop marginalisation - Ensure good governance. | Government, The Executive, The Legislature, Politicians, Line Ministries. |
| 3. Important to have a strategic | - Regional co-operation | AC, UVAB, Line |

| | | |
|--|---|---|
| regional or sub-regional approach to DDR | - Sharing information and experiences through regional conferences/meetings etc.. - Co-ordinate with international community. | Ministries, Politicians. |
| 4. Coherent partnership is necessary among all the stake holders under the co-ordination of the relevant Gov't agency. | - Ensure national ownership and continuity even after the DDR - Transparency & accountability | AC, UVAB, Line Ministries. |
| 5. Comprehensive sensitisation is critical at all stages of the DDP program | - Public rallies by civil society leaders, Gov't officials. - Sensitisation of the ex-combatants and immediate dependants - Radio/TV programs | AC, UVAB, Civil Society, the Media. |
| 6. The importance of establishing a strong network of partners involved in child protection. | - Harmonise the children statute to reflect the fate of child abductees - Register & harmonise partners involved in child protection activities. | AC, Line Ministries, the Uganda Children Rights Commission. |
| 7. Timely financing is essential for successful implementation of all aspects of the reintegration process. | - Establish a financial management system - Recruit efficient and competent financial managers - Too much bureaucracy be avoided. | Government, Donors. |

4. CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS

This is a summary of Salient Points recommended for consideration for a National DDTR Programme in Uganda

1. The institutional framework for implementing the DDR received a strong Government Support and Commitment. H.E the President of the Republic is the Chairman of the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR). The NCDDR Secretariat headed by an Executive Secretary (at ministerial level) implemented the program.

2. Reintegration was carried out by NCDDR through implementation partners who won contracts by competitive bidding. These included national and international NGOs, CBOs, UN Agencies (UNICEF, OCHA, UNAMSIL etc)

3. UNICEF and Child Protection Agencies played a commendable role from the emergency situation by establishing interim care centres, family tracing and reunification. Later their functions included follow-up in the homes, schools and skills training centres and provided psycho-social counseling. The programme promoted sensitisation on child right issues, provided advocacy and referrals in cases of child abuse and/or exploitation, mediation between child/family and community. Social Workers continued to provide regular monitoring and support to re-unified children, follow-up visits to schools where child soldiers or abducted children are admitted for formal primary school education. This continued until the child reached the age of 18 years.

4. Documentation/Identity of Beneficiaries NCDDR Established a robust identification and verification process of all ex-combatants. All beneficiaries were issued sealed identification certificates bearing a coloured photograph of the ex-combatant. The different stages of the DDR process were verifiable by means of punching a hole against A, B, C and which stood for disarmament, demobilisation, training and receipt of tool kit for example.

5. The National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA) was established with a mission to promote the efficient and effective implementation of activities that ensure post-conflict sustainable development, leading to the alleviation of poverty, reduction in the risk of renewed conflict and improvement in the well being of Sierra Leone citizens. Through its arm of the Community Driven Programme NaCSA offers Support to Resettlement and Reintegration Programme (SRRP) which takes off from where NCDDR stopped in the case of assistance to the ex-combatants. It offers therefore, a means of ensuring sustainability/continuity of the projects initiated under NCDDR for the reintegration of ex-combatants.